The reproduced print above “Escape from Cape Moem” by noted aviation artist Jack Fellows serves as the cover art of the paperback version of “Fire in the Sky”, a book I wrote about twelve years ago. It's a good print of its genre and I have one hanging over my modeling desk in California. The subject is dramatic enough – a top Japanese Army Air Force ace and group leader Shigeo Nango was shot down by Robert DeHaven the top ace of the 7th Squadron of the famous 49th Fighter Group over Wewak New Guinea in June 1944. The choice wasn't random because Robert DeHaven spent several hours of his time helping me reconstruct elements of the air war in the South and Southwest Pacific. He was extremely thoughtful, well spoken and very well informed having served as head of US Fighter Aces for several years in addition to his two years of Pacific War combat. It was a genuine pleasure to have known him.
Briefly put the kit was a fine example of the 90s vintage and I would recommend it without hesitation. I went to considerable effort to wash out the colors and scratch things up a bit: details are on a long build post in the Aircraft Section “1/48 AMT P-40N in New Guinea Garb Complete.”
Here let me say a little bit about 5th Air Force. Although the fighting around Guadalcanal got a lot of press, a much larger and much more important air campaign took place in 1943 – early 44 in the Solomons and New Guinea. Representing the allies in the Solomons were the excellent USMC and USN land based Corsair squadrons supported by the P-38s and bombers of 13th Air Force. Systematically they destroyed the Japanese Naval Air Force as they worked their way up toward the major Japanese base of Rabaul on New Britain. The job was done so completely that the IJNAF was not only crushed in the Solomons but also lost their carrier bound squadrons that were unwisely thrown into the battle, thus losing the last of their good pilots. The pitiful performance of the IJNAF in 1944 was a direct result.
New Guinea is not as well known, but to the Japanese it posed a desperate problem. After an abortive offensive toward Port Moresby failed in 1942 and the Japanese fortified zone near Buna was crushed in the same week as Guadalcanal was lost, the Australians and Americans – with Douglas MacArthur, for better or worse, in the saddle – quickly went on the counteroffensive. They could see that a move up the New Guinea Coast would allow the allies to cut Rabaul off and New Guinea also. That meant the loss of 300,000 IJA troops. It also left the door wide open into the Philippines and the “Southern Resource Zone” (oil, rubber etc) seized by the Japanese as the object of the Pacific War. Lose New Guinea and the PI was toast. If the US had air bases on Luzon, Southeast Asia was worthless and the war lost. In the event, the Japanese put nearly a million men into the effort to stop the Southwestern Pacific Offensive (which came together with King's Central Pacific drive on Leyte). If you've ever wondered why there weren't 250,000 IJA troops on Saipan or 50,000 on Iwo Jima, it was because the entire overseas reserve was thrown into first New Guinea and second the PI. Given a German defeat Japan was doomed regardless. However, it was only because the US (ably aided by Australia and New Zealand in the SOPAC and the Brits in India) was able to spread the Japanese Army out like a chicken on a spit in 1944 that Japan was forced into military ruin in 1945. Indeed, until MacArthur's forces bottled up the Rabaul zone by seizing the Admiralties in early 44, all US commanders assumed the Pacific War would last until 1946. The bomb, of course, was an unknown quantity at that time to everyone concerned.
The New Guinea campaign was one of the most brilliant fought in the 20th century. Whatever MacArthur's faults earlier or later, the dazzling march from Buna to Moratai and Biak was a textbook example of combined arms. MacArthur was not keen on attrition – he had seen that in World War I and saw it again on Bataan and Buna. Instead, once given the naval, land and air resources, MacArthur bypassed one major Japanese position after another and capped things off with the brilliant coup in the Admiralties. The 7th Fleet which operated the landings rarely had any carriers before Leyte so the whole campaign revolved around gaining a progressively larger zone of control in the air. For this MacArthur depended upon 5th Air Force. The organization was commanded by very bright and very driven General George Kenney. MacArthur was an unusual boss – he could be pompous, wary and duplicitous if there was any doubt about a subordinate's competence or loyalty. If MacArthur had confidence in a subordinate he gave them unwavering support and startling autonomy. He was a “for or against” type of leader. When the machine got running it revolved around the operations of the “KKK” (Krueger, Kincaid and Kenney) in whom MacArthur had confidence with the Australians more or less running their own war. Of the lot Kenney was closest to his boss in vision and temperament. MacArthur loved publicity for its own sake but also knew that “good press” would help the Southwest Pacific Theater to get very scarce resources. So Kenney, a formidable leader under any circumstances, was eager to highlight the exploits of his great aces and fostered the almost bizarre organizational “corporate culture” that had 5th Air Force engineers (sparked by an eccentric aviation engineering genius named “Pappy Gunn) creating “masthead” bombing attacks by B-17s at night and the home brew B-25 “strafers” which became an almost perfect weapon for the theater – so good that North American produced a proper version for wider distribution. I think it's worth noting that after the war Kenney wrote a biography of Gunn, and also one about Richard Bong: it's unusual for a general to write about lesser lights in his command. It's also unusual for a general to accept what amounted to a “sit down” strike because they were flying planes worn-out to the point of danger. In return Kenney's men flew a huge number of sorties considering the slender resources and always irregular (although good) maintenance system.
It's not easy to explain but the men of the 5th Air Force squadrons developed a kind of swagger. Perhaps it reflected success. Having never been stung by serious defeat, as USN pilots suffered in some of the carrier battles, 5th AF attacked aggressively and effectively. As victory piled upon victory (the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was a staggering blow to Japanese morale) and Japanese bases were chewed up by the fighters, strafers and B-24s there was a kind of assumption of victory. It was typical of Kenney (and his very fine subordinates like 5th AF Fighter Command leader General Wurtsmith) that they took great care in working “green” pilots carefully into the system. They also drilled into everyone alike the importance of discipline and teamwork at every juncture. Kenney claimed he never wanted a “fair fight” and he rarely offered one. By 1944 Kenney had authorized a kind of corporate memory of combat advice and doctrine written by his top pilots and squadron commanders specifically for those new in the theater. The message was a drumbeat – stay in you element – only fight when the advantage was already yours – guard your wing even if it meant an enemy might escape. The point, of course, was that if the advice was followed, the enemy often did not escape.
It helped a great deal that the USAAF had excellent aircraft for the theater and the IJAAF did not. Although the top 5th AF aces flew the P-38 (and had good success with the P-47 for a while) several squadrons kept P-40s well into 1944. DeHaven was a great fan of the plane. He found it more maneuverable than the P-38 and appreciated its extreme ruggedness. So as long as range allowed, the Japanese would get the “Wewak” treatment. (Wewak was the major IJAAF air base until demolished in mid-44. It was crushed so completely and so quickly that “Wewaked” became a verb in 5th AF.) In rapid successions the target was assaulted with B-24s, probably escorted by P-38s, with the strafers coming in low covered by P-40s. When the succession was right, there was almost no proper response. In New Guinea the Japanese warhorse was the Ki-41 “Oscar” - the most maneuverable combat aircraft of the war. (DeHaven claimed he saw one do a double Immelmann – the kind of maneuver usually seen in air shows.) It was also the slowest and carried two .50 caliber machine guns. As no 5th AF flight would dogfight with Oscars it was simply enough to keep up speed, make passes until American guns ignited the very flimsy Japanese fighter. As noted, if a Japanese fighter pilot looked up, he would very likely see a US fighter above him: down a bit, there were more. The Ki-61 Tony could do better but was always crippled by miserable operational reliability. Japanese bombers were second rate affairs and “easy meat” for any US (or Aussie) fighter. So even before the refined versions of the P-38 appeared in mid-1944 the early 38s and P-40s were wracking up startling kill ratios. It should be noted that this was all done on the attack. And during attack over the most inhospitable terrain on earth. (One 5th AF fighter pilot asked me the rhetorical questions: “what's the difference between ditching in the jungle or the ocean? Nothing.”) So it was no accident that 5th AF fielded America's two top aces – Bong and McGuire. There were also a sizable cast of supporting players like Gerald Johnson and tactical guru Charles MacDonald. Nine of DeHaven's 14 kills came in a P-40 which I think made him the US top P-40 pilot. (A couple of Aussies did better in Desert Air Force.)
All of this was done in beastly conditions. With everything in short supply, forward bases handled very complex maintenance on a regular basis. No American base had hangars – many lacked revetments – so aircraft were out in the tropical sun every day. With all fields made with Marsden matting, and heavy rain a daily occurrence, that meant that the plane took off or landed in either mud or dust on every outing. Judging by pictures of a 5th AF “flight line” these aircraft were regularly trampled on by ground crew so they would have been faded, dirty and nicely scratched.
Anyway, the results were impressive. At the start of 1943 5th AF was in the process of formation. By March they scored their spectacular victory in the Bismarck Sea. By the end of 1944 5th AF had done to the Japanese Army Air Force what the USN, Marines and 13th AF had done to the Japanese Navy Air Force – crippled it permanently and made it ripe for the crushing blows of 1944.
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Eric
