1/35 Tamiya M3 Stuart Tank (MkI “Honey”)
Paints: Vallejo Model Color
Weathering: Vallejo acrylic washes, Vallejo Model Color and Golden Fluid Acrylics, Iwata Com.Art paints, MIG & Sennelier Pigments with Liquitex matte and gloss varnish
Ok, here's my humble Stuart complete. The kit was old but a delight to build. I experimented with all acrylic weathering again. There is a build article in Armor if anyone is interested in the techniques employed under the heading “Old Tamiya Stuart Helps Aussies Take Buna.” Here I'd like to briefly explore why a handful of Australian light tanks had a huge impact on one of the largest, most important and certainly most sordid campaigns in the early Pacific War. You'll have to indulge me here because I wrote extensively about this subject and interviewed many of the participants – consider this an occupational hazard faced by military historians. And it's a lot faster and cheaper than going to Amazon and tracking down the original which thankfully is still in print. Those who agree with Henry Ford (I do myself sometimes) that “history is bunk” are invited to check the pics.
More than any WWII campaign I can think of, the road to Buna had the kind of insane inevitability one finds in a Greek tragedy. In early 1941 Japan decided to join the “New World Order” they believed would come after the nearly certain victory of Nazi Germany by conquering Southeast Asia, then controlled by European powers and the USA, to seize the oils and other resources needed to create a great industrial power. Barbarossa, which promised to remove the USSR, hastened things. Pearl Harbor was the result, followed by an amazing maritime blitzkrieg that swept up all of Southeast Asia in three months. Tokyo never intended to conquer the US. They hoped that a triumphant Germany would force Washington to focus its growing military power toward the Atlantic and create a situation where America would “see reason” and cut a deal to stop the Pacific War. In case the US proved stubborn, Japan also seized a string of islands across the Pacific that would serve as a kind of maritime Maginot Line that would protect the Home Islands and the SEA “resource zone.” Behind this line Combined Fleet would lay, ready for a Pacific Trafalgar against the US which Japan would win. In short, they hoped 1941 would be a repeat of 1905 on steroids.
Fierce arguments took place between the Japanese Army and Navy concerning the size of the island line and the number of troops available to man it. To save a nickle the Army made a staggering mistake by refusing to occupy southern New Guinea, an area that flanked a newly conquered defensive “crown jewel” in the Southwest Pacific, the marvelous harbor on New Britain at Rabaul. In early 1942, despite the Japanese blitz, the US showed no signs of searching for peace. (Ironically, the day before Nagumo's planes launched for Pearl Harbor, the Soviets launched their great counter-attack at Moscow thus putting a Nazi victory into jeopardy. It was an “oops” moment because a German defeat meant doom for Japan and every government knew it. Tokyo desperately hoped for a Nazi victory in the 1942 Stalingrad offensive.)
In January 1942 the Japanese could have grabbed all of New Guinea with two battalions. The only port and airfield, the ramshackle coconut transport point at Port Moresby, was almost undefended. But WWII moved fast. Pearl Harbor shocked Australia which feared a direct invasion. The Aussies had four splendidly trained and equipped divisions. As these units (called Imperial Divisions – or AIF) were volunteer only they were intended for deployment in Europe. At Pearl Harbor three were in North Africa. (A fourth was squandered at Singapore.) Canberra demanded an immediate return of all AIF units to defend the homeland. Desperate to keep at least one in the Mideast, Churchill convinced Roosevelt to send two US National Guard Divisions to Oz in April 42 – the first US units deployed abroad. Soon afterward, two of the AIF divisions returned and MacArthur was sent to Oz (at the request of Australian PM Curtin – not because of any desire of FDR) to plan a counter-blow.
The Japanese finally got the message and decided to rectify their error and seize Port Moresby with maritime forces. The result was the stunning Battle of the Coral Sea which led the IJN to abandon the invasion. Infuriated but another botch, the IJA decided to do the job themselves just as Combined Fleet sailed for Midway. With only a few transports available, the attack would be with elite infantry over the rugged Owen Stanley Mountains. At this time New Guinea was less known than the Amazon basin. There were no roads, towns, or anything that would pass for infrastructure. The IJA did know, however, that the Australians had charted a trail (or track – Aussies still argue about the term) across the Owen Stanleys from Port Moresby in the west about 100 miles to a coconut plantation at Kakoda in the east. Twenty miles farther was the little beach side settlement of Buna which had a population of about 200. Ironically MacArthur saw the same thing and in June 42 sent US engineers to Buna to see if it could be developed as a base for a offensive operations north. While there, the Americans found strategic gold. Under dense kunai grass was a plateau of relatively firm clay soil that could be used as an air base. Immediate plans were made to reinforce Buna with AIF units. But the Japanese got there first, landing over the beach at Gona (another hole in the wall ten miles north) and Buna on July 21 with eventually about 12,000 men. Knowing little about the debacle at Midway and even less about the terrain in New Guinea, the Japanese began marching southeast toward Moresby. The AIF rushed to Moresby and moved northwest. The result was the epic Kokoda campaign, the defining moment of the Pacific War for Australia. By November AIF pressure and serious supply difficulties forced a Japanese withdrawal to their original beach head at Buna-Gona.
Knowing little about Japanese dispositions, US intelligence told MacArthur that the Buna area was almost undefended. Hence the US 32d division was ordered to land on the eastern shore south of Buna , march north, and meet the Australians to annihilate the Japanese in a fortnight. Then work could begin on the airbase at Dobodura which indeed became the major hub for later operations. (The Japanese completely missed the location and thus greatly underestimated the peril posed by an allied presence at Buna.) To make matters interesting, the US Marines landed at Guadalcanal in August, causing the IJN to devote almost all resources to the Solmons and to neglect New Guinea. (A small expedition to Milne Bay near Moresby in September ended in humiliating withdrawal in face of AIF resistance. My father spent a year building the base and enjoying the 10” of rain per day, 95degree with 99% humidity temperatures and epic boredom.) Things looked good for the allies.
What followed was a vicious three month battle of attrition over a ten mile long strip of land that was mostly Mangrove swamp. Fearing uncharted reefs and possible the USN and RAN refused to risk warships or transports near Buna. All supplies had to be landed over the beach and hand carried to Buna. US C-47s were able to airdrop ammo and food but little else. Allied aircraft could bomb the fortified zone but had no visible targets. There were no roads, no trucks and no supply ships. Consequently, the allies fought their only WWII campaign completely lacking in artillery. Worse, some 3,000 Japanese combat engineers had landed with the original attack planning to make a proper road out of the Kokada track. When seeing the terrain, they knew it was a fool's errand. (Kokoda is still unpaved.) Thus the Japanese engineers spent three months fortifying the beachhead area. One commodity of which there was no shortage was tough coconut logs which were ideal for bunkers. Not as cautious as the allies, the Japanese did risk night time transport runs to bring reinforcements and stockpile supplies for a siege. The terrain was mostly swamp, interspersed with kunai grass over soft ground, the fringe of a tropical rain forest and all resting in the most malarial land on planet earth.
Expecting to walk into Buna, the 32d Division found itself mired into a Southwest Pacific Battle of the Somme with advances (when made) measured in yards. By December Dobodura was in operations but this could only help medical evacuation and light supplies. Badly trained in general and completely unready for the vicious terrain the 32d Division was tortured, although one company had taken part of Buna almost by accident. The elite AIF battalions did little better. Beyond the terrain itself, the worst problem facing the allies was a network of almost invisible bunkers and pillboxes. Artillery was non-existant and airpower blind. So it was that Australian engineers figured out how to put twelve Stuart tanks on barges at Milne Bay and float them to Buna. One barge with four tanks sunk. The other eight Stuarts arrived in December. They were welcome as the 32d Division was near collapse and the AIF literally stuck in the mud. AIF officers, many who had served in WWI during their youth, were openly talking about Gallipoli. Tank support, even in miniscule portions, was a huge boost to morale and, per machine, was probably never more effective.
The Japanese Army was not expecting tanks and had no anti-tank guns, although a few flak pieces posed a danger. Starting a series of attacks in late December, Australian tanks would crawl forward (the ground was so soft that was often maximum speed regardless) followed by infantry. As they closed on the Japanese, some of the bunkers visible and could be destroyed by the tanks themselves or following infantry. Usually the attacks gained little (two tanks were destroyed and breakdowns frequent) but sometimes they could break a portion of the Japanese line. The real enemy of the Japanese garrison was starvation, but there's no doubt that the tanks attacks saved much allied blood. In the final, and utterly wretched engagement between Gona and Buna (highlighted by a firefight inside a Japanese military hospital) the last tank attack in January 1943 helped trigger a break down of the Japanese resistance. A desperate Japanese plan for withdrawal came to nothing. A few days later several hundred remaining Japanese soldiers left their positions and stumbled around in a parody of a banzai charge with scores simply walking into the ocean and committing suicide with hand grenades. Only a handful of IJA troops survived. At the same time the Japanese were destroyed at Buna, the IJN withdrew from Guadalcanal and 6th Army surrendered at Stalingrad. The war was turning.
The allies lost 2,500 killed at Buna/Gona – double that of Guadalcanal. If you count diseases like malaria or worse as “casualties” the Aussies and Americans lost 80% of the men engaged. Yet despite the mistakes made the campaign was unavoidable if the allies wished to use New Guinea to outflank Japanese position in the Southwest Pacific. MacArthur swore “no more Bunas” and was good to his word. After a brilliant Aussie/US campaign in New Guinea during 1943 – which drew 200,000 Japanese reinforcements to the island – MacArthur pulled his greatest coup in early 1944 by occupying the Admiralty Islands. This cut-off both New Guinea and Rabaul transforming the Southwest Pacific into the world's biggest POW camp. Reeling the Japanese stripped Manchuria and China and sent 500,000 men to the Philippines where in turn they were later trapped. This was no small matter as places like Saipan, Iwo and Okinawa were under-manned because the IJA squandered a third of their army to thwart MacArthur's portion of the Pacific drive.
Eric
Pics of Beautiful Buna and the Aussie Stuart below (the last Buna photo is one of the Japanese bunkers that made life miserable for two allied divisions):
