That's it about the kit. It showed its considerable age and It wasn't my finest hour.
But it is an interesting subject. (Those interested in any of the following should refer to Michael Doubler's splendid "Closing with the Enemy" which explains the development of tactics via theory and practice in one of history's most demanding courses at the University of Mars - Western Europe in 1944-45.) I guess it makes sense that a humble weapon like the L-4 (ironically most famous for knocking out a couple of AFVs with wing-mounted bazookas in the Ardennes) would be forgotten. Soldiers on both sides would not have. The L-4 actually played a very important role in the arcane crafts of reconnaissance and target acquisition.
As Double points out the US Army learned a lot from Rommel and Kesselring in 1942-43, but still had some serious lose ends that needed to be met for Normandy. Nobody had to tell Ike that allied armies needed air recon, close air support and a heavy dose of artillery to grease the wheels. What wasn't clear was chemistry or balance between them particularly in the (surprisingly) unexpected terrain found in the bocage. (Allied forces were learning more in Italy by mid-44 but that theater had become something the Americans wanted to forget.)
Here was the problem. American doctrine had originally expected too much from direct artillery support when on the attack. They found (like WWI generals had) that displacing a well defended area unless you knew exactly where to put your shells was very hard. You could solve the problem briefly by throwing a few zillion rounds at a given zone, but despite some accounts US forces had limited resources in 1944 so “blowing a hole” was a rare delicacy and didn't reliably work then. (Defensive artillery was entirely different and the US mastery of “registered” indirect fire when under one of the many Germany counter attacks made attacking US forces a very dangerous proposition. The Ardennes illustrated this perfectly.) Therefore, US gunners when supporting an attack would try to isolate the immediate battlefield and try to prevent enemy reinforcement and resupply – any targets hit were a welcome plus. The converse meant that ground attacks were needed to find the bad guys – a process that required taking the first blow. (By the end of the bocage US infantry was beginning to see the huge advantage of using tanks for direct fire support – almost exactly the opposite of what the Army had originally believed armor should serve considering the “lessons” of May 1940.) So even though the US had excellent communications, line officers quickly learned (and the Germans never lost a chance to make he point) that mortars were invaluable because they could be used on a discovered target faster than anything other than direct fire. Aircraft were brutally efficient at some levels but were not considered weapons for close air support the way they became. They were supposed to sweep the LOCs and attack anything that could move. The Germans hated US “jabos” but it was not often hat a GI actually saw their impact. There was also highly justified fear of friendly fire from aircraft. So a great weapon, no doubt, but not the ideal thing to use on a machine gun nest discovered thirty seconds ago.
Hence the importance of the “grasshoppers” the generic name given to several civilian light planes used by ground forces. We had already learned in Italy that going “low and slow” could reveal targets for deadly naval artillery. (L-4s were used in this role at Normandy also, and there was no way to have a day ruined more quickly than a well aimed barrage of naval caliber artillery if you were in a German tank or foxhole.) They widened their value greatly in the bocage although it took a few weeks to figure things out. Grasshoppers were controlled by division HQ and could be delegated to regiment or even battalion commanders if an attack was important – perhaps not as important as P-38 or Spitfire recon bird in the grand scheme, but they were available within minutes. Soon artillery officers were flying as observers and, if lucky, would acquire a visual target and bring in howitzer fire. (It didn't take the Germans long to learn not to fire at L-4s even though they must have made tempting targets.) Soon enough USAAF officers were flying in the back seat, often in direct communication with a pair or flight of P-47s fully dressed for the dance. In either case this meant that artillery or air support could be brought into much closer contact with the vicious fire fights that characterized the last year of war in the ETO. And naturally this was very bad news for the Germans, particularly when allied armies were on the lose grinding up 30 miles a day.
The L-4 story hardly ended at V-E day. Grasshoppers stayed in service for several years. More to the point, billions of dollars have been spent to create “smart” L-4s. We know live in a world (I see problems frankly) where drone aircraft can kill instantly at long distance with no risk to life. I'm sure Patton would have wanted a Predator, but the L-4 played some of the role.
Pics below
Eric
