I found what appears to be the historical event that sent Sherman tanks of the 9th Armored Division to Bastogne from Neufchateau.
The following information is an excerpt from Blood for Time:
https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/blood-for-time-9th-armored-at-bastogne-and-the-battle-of-the-bulge/
The Retreat to Bastogne:
With its primary mission now canceled with the destruction of Task Force Harper, Team Booth weighed its options of either defending in place or heading for Bastogne. Lt. Col. Booth’s outposts had reported the presence of enemy armor on the Bourcy-Noville road and a platoon of the 52nd AIB discovered enemy units to the west, northwest, and south. Based upon all available information, Booth estimated that his team was up against at least one armored division. On the morning of December 19, Booth decided to move what was left of his team plus about 100 stragglers, even a few from the 106th Infantry Division, to Bastogne.
Lieutenant DeRoche, after turning five of his Shermans over to Lt. Col. Harper, led his small force toward St. Hubert where they found supplies of fuel and ammunition. After stocking up, the DeRoche force proceeded to Neufchateau where General Middleton had relocated his command post. Once in Neufchateau, DeRoche located Captain Walter M. Meier, who was busy gathering and regrouping retreating CCR men and armor. After acquiring DeRoche’s small force and a few others, Captain Meier called 9th Armored Division headquarters in Mersch and received permission to take his force into Bastogne.
Captain Meier’s force, like most of CCR, 9th Armored and 28th Infantry Division soldiers and tankers retreating from the roadblock battles, eventually made it to Bastogne. However, many other retreating soldiers never made it, having fallen to the gauntlet of sporadic enemy artillery fire, snipers, and engagements with concealed enemy infantry and tanks. Men and armor retreating into Bastogne from the battles that preceded the arrival of the 101st Airborne Division continued to stream in throughout the day with valuable information concerning German deployment and strengths.
These retreating soldiers and tankers were not, despite some postwar accounts, a bunch of dispirited, demoralized, and undisciplined panic mongers. The great majority of these men had given it their all. They came through the 101st defensive lines having had very little sleep or food for three days and in almost constant battle with an enemy that not only had the full advantage of surprise but was also far superior in numbers, the quantity and quality of its armor, and in its battle experience. The personnel of CCR, 9th Armored Division who managed to make it to Bastogne and regroup were able to assist the 101st Airborne Division by acting as either mobile emergency relief strike forces, armored support for the lightly armed paratroopers, or direct infantry augmentation to the defense line.
After the war, General Manteuffel wrote: “On the whole the delaying action of the withdrawing American Army was a success. It slowed down the German advance, though it could not prevent the pursuing German spearheads from coming within 4 km from the Meuse near Dinant without any major engagements. But the resistance by delaying actions gained the time needed to bring up their tactical reserves at the correct moment.”