I don't agree with that at all. And doing my due diligence, there don't seem to be too many that either share or can spread any light on that view.
The most common criticism seems to be that the book relied on Japanese war records and presents the "Japanese" point of view, namely that their operational stategies as described in the book don't match the truth.
I admit some ignorance in that, as I don't know that much about the details of Japanese Military doctrine.
But the book is harshly critical of the Japanese, on quite a few points.
- That even though they would not admit this, the loss of the war was a foregone conclusion by mid 1942. Rather the plan should have been to fall back on the Home Islands and defend them for as long as possible.
- That the overall goal of the plan made no sense, in that the objective was not particularly strategic, that it was untenable over time, and that the high risk in the use of totally irreplaceable resources was not worth it.
- That the battle plan was overly complicated and internally contradictory, relying on surprise and the blunt projection of great force in the same instance.
- That the coincidence of the Aleutian Campaign was a bad division of available forces, and that neither could be considered a feint for the other.
- That the underlying goal of a massive surface gun battle had already been rendered moot the year before.
And also critical in lots of other lesser but important details, such as that the AA artillery on board the ships shot down nothing (two attacking aircraft).
The writing style was loopy, but it helped get through the book, which is long.
I thought the summary, in which the outcome was neither good luck "Miracle at Midway" stuff, nor bad luck "3 minutes to Victory" stuff, fit the facts.
About the only overt sympathy towards the Japanese that I can remember was a fair amount for the human suffering and death of several thousand Japanese, who after all were doing their jobs without putting at risk a lot of collateral civilian damage. But not out of hand.