japanese carriers vs. u.s. carriers damage control

As I understand, the Japanese focus was more on single battle engangement then overall strategy, and singally for offensive, and not defensive action.

In addition to being poorly armed for antiaircraft defense, their armor was also less adequate then ours, as well as their designers running fuel and water lines for fire control next to each other, so a hit on a fuel line would render the fire control water valves inaccessable,or worse yet explode and kill any men seeking to man the fire control valves.

I would guess if there was a lesson they failed to pick up on, overall, unlike the Americans they refused to learn from their mistakes.

Specificaly:

• The Japanese had clearly failed in their approach to aerial scouting.
• Their ships were inadequately protected with antiaircraft weapons.
• Japanese aircraft carriers were poorly armored, and their designs made them vulnerable to hangar explosions and fires.
• Exacerbating these problems, damage-control technique was far behind that of the U.S. Navy.
• Furthermore, the Japanese still had not remedied their deficiencies in antisubmarine warfare, radar location, fighter direction, and damage control.

 In sum, the Japanese navy had been shown for what it was—a first-class force whose ships and tactics were skewed toward the offensive, and that had difficulty avoiding and recovering from battle damage.

At least that is how I understand it.

Tom T

Primarily it was cultural attitude. To the Japanese military mind of the time (and to a surprising extent, the the Japanese corporate mind of today) the individual is not important, but absolute discipline and obedience to superior authority was. Individual initiative was discouraged. This was so thoroughly inculcated into the individual, that even in a crisis, individuals often refused to take the initiative, especially in the enlisted ranks. When soldiers and sailors are so conditioned, they are often paralyzed without direction in a crisis. If, under those circumstances, the chain of command is broken, disaster results. Additionally, the ideal of dying for the Emperor and the Empire does not help the normal instinct for self preservation, which is a tremendous motivator when properly applied through training. Furthermore, the myth of Japanese racial superiority and invincibility has its roots hundreds of years in the past. This was why their aircraft had little or no armor protection for the crew—and the attitude affected everything they did, and the way they thought about it. Damage control would be unnecessary, or at least minimal, because they would rarely take much damage. Note that this is an attitude, largely unconscious but always present. If you could ask a Japanese naval officer of the time whether damage control was necessary, he would have responded with an incredulous, "Of course!" But deep down, he wouldn't quite believe it as thoroughly as someone from a different culture

By contrast, US forces personnel, both by training and social inclination, will willingly take matters into their own hands in a crisis, occasionally even to the point of a seaman who knows what needs to be done giving orders to  those who don't but outrank them (and are intelligent enough to realize they don't know.) Sadly, this is becoming less and less the case.

For insight into the Japanese psychology, particularly with regard to combat and war, I recommend:

Miyamoto, Musashi; The Book of Five Rings

Munenori, Yagyu; Life-Giving Sword

Wilson, William Scott; Lone Samurai, the Life of Miyamoto Musashi

Craig, Darrell; Iai, the Art of Drawing the Sword

Caiger, Mason J.; A History of Japan

Dunn, Charles J, and Broderick, Laurence; Everyday Life in Ancient Japan (I think this is the one. I found it in a Japanese bookstore, wrote down the information intending to find it on Amazon, and then lost it. Grumble.)

And that's just a start.

IJN Taiho was loss due to some stupidity of basic fire damage control action not applied...

The book Shattered Sword had a lot to say about the subject,it is a superior book on the battle of Midway which I would definitly recommend

we in the west have a hard time understanding the  kamikaze/suicide bomber   the individual gives himself completely to wipe out many enemy  1 death vs 10-20-30- or more  sad in our eyes but in theory very very efficent   but then   what is war it is a clash of cultural differences  more often then not

Banzai... Banzai... Banzai!!!  Most of them didn't expect to return home alive... strange enough the suicidal terrorists use the same concept blowing up as many as possible nowadays. 

I'll second the recommendation to read "Shattered Sword", it's an excellent book.  The authors include an examination of the IJN's damage control theory and practice at the time of the Battle of Midway, and how it weighed on the outcome.  If they had had similar damage control practices to ours at that time, they might not have lost all four of the First Mobile Striking Force's carriers.  I'm not saying that Nagumo's carriers would have returned to the fight in that battle, but they might have been salvaged, instead of burning out.

You can compare the Yorktown's experience in the first strike that hit her, to that of Nagumo's carriers.  The Yorktown took bomb hits that started fires and basically stopped her, but quick preventive measures and efficient, directed damage control prevented fires that would have consumed the ship, and had her back in action in a matter of hours.

We had also learned from the experience only a few weeks before with the Lexington at Coral Sea, and fire prevention methods had been adopted to prevent the kind of avgas fume leaks that sealed her fate.

In addition to what was already mentioned, you have to take into accout experience. The ships used in WW2 were designed with past naval experience in mind. The Japanese had minimal operations in the First World War, so most of their past experience comes from the Russo-Japanese War. The naval battles of 1904-05 were very lopsided in favor of the Japanese navy. Why bother with damage control if you've never experienced significant damage in combat and don't really expect to in the future?

DURR

we in the west have a hard time understanding the  kamikaze/suicide bomber   the individual gives himself completely to wipe out many enemy  1 death vs 10-20-30- or more  sad in our eyes but in theory very very efficent   but then   what is war it is a clash of cultural differences  more often then not

Agreed, but for a tactic to be efficient, it has to be successful. A cool head and steady aim almost always wins over dedication and passion. And of course, no operational plan survives contact—another axiom of battle that most Japanese commanders either seem to have failed to appreciate when planning, or underappreciated after battle was joined. That isn't to say that this hasn't happened to other commanders—I can't think of one, in all of history, who hasn't made the same mistakes. The difficulty is that in a rigidly controlled society, improvisation in the face of necessity is only rewarded if it results in overwhelming success. Anything less might get you cashiered at best, shot at worst. Soviet, German, and Japanese commanders were particularly vulnerable. Even on the allied side, commanders were not always allowed to learn from their mistakes.

The Americans also had a huge advantage before the battles even began. Oxygen is the most dangerous element because it is the "engine" of fire.

The Americans would flood the fuel systems with Carbon Dioxide before going into battle, thus creating an oxygen free environment  within the fuel storage and delivery apparatus and giving themselves a decisive edge against the initial outbreak of fire.

While not a "fire proofing", it would prove decisive in providing time and giving response teams a better chance to be most effective.

I also would agree with the difference in cultural attitudes coming into play, as well as the benefits of centuries of practical experience.

While the US damage control systems were good they weren't necessarily the best.  The Brits seemed to have learned the hard lessons of carrier warfare earlier than us and opted for a design favoring armored flight decks that were less susceptible to bomb damage in the first place.  This of course came at the expense of carrying fewer combat aircraft but the Brits experience against the Kamikazes had a better outcome than us.  I'd wager the men of the Franklin would have preferred an armored flight deck as opposed to more aircraft.

No question the British were carrier innovators. Shame they didn't do the same with naval aircraft.

Yeah, they sure did use a lot of our aircraft didn't they?  Maybe we should have used their ships and everything would have equalled out. 

PaintsWithBrush

The Americans also had a huge advantage before the battles even began. Oxygen is the most dangerous element because it is the "engine" of fire.

The Americans would flood the fuel systems with Carbon Dioxide before going into battle, thus creating an oxygen free environment  within the fuel storage and delivery apparatus and giving themselves a decisive edge against the initial outbreak of fire.

While not a "fire proofing", it would prove decisive in providing time and giving response teams a better chance to be most effective.

I also would agree with the difference in cultural attitudes coming into play, as well as the benefits of centuries of practical experience.

 

That's an excellent point, PWB, it's a good example of the USN applying lessons learned in action.  Flooding the tanks and lines with CO2 wasn't a standard practice, until after Coral Sea and Midway.  As a procedure, it had been developed and tested by various commands, but in the wake of the loss of the Lexington, and after its proven effectiveness aboard the Yorktown (whose crew applied the lessons they learned a few weeks before at Coral Sea), it was adopted as a standard practice.

That speaks to the point about the difference in damage control theory between the USN and the IJN.  It took the Japanese much longer to identify the problems and then try to apply solutions.

My two cents the U.S. carriers ammo storage areas could be flooded with foam which prevented fires from erupting in them ,that fire crews could be consentrated on other areass      Aceses5

In 1942 the navy began training all sailors in fire fighting and damage control, and equiping ships with the necessary equipment to accomplish it. It was started by two Lieutenants who were profi firefighters before the war. This training is still conducted today. Even reserve centers have damage controll lockers where this training is conducted. Cheers

well its a year later and im finally back I bought the book shattered sword for my dad.hes loves it. I read it when I go over there .exelent info on japanese damage control and carrier design I HIGHLY RECCOMENDit thanks redwing

deafpanzer

Banzai... Banzai... Banzai!!!  Most of them didn't expect to return home alive... strange enough the suicidal terrorists use the same concept blowing up as many as possible nowadays. 

Except those knuckleheads are doing it in the name of Allah, whereas the Japanese were doing it for their Emperor and country. Of course they considered Hirohito a living god, so your reference may be accurate.

The Shinano was lost due to a green crew and faulty construction among other things. She should have shaken off the torpedo hits due to her BB hull.

one thing the book mentions is that their carriers had enclosed hangers,which didnt allow explosions to diapate like an open hanger would. also enclosed hangers would not allow for dumping ordanace over the side

Actually Skokaku and Zuikaku had what was considered the best damage control personnel of all of the Japanese fleet carriers...they survived damage from many battles...in fact, that's why they were absent from Midway; they were being repaired from Coral Sea damage...

was it taiho or shinano that eventually sunk from one torpedo hit? one torpedo!!

redwing

was it taiho or shinano that eventually sunk from one torpedo hit? one torpedo!!

redwing is correct, it was Taiho that eventually sank from one torpedo hit of the six fired by USS Albacore.

Shinano was hit by four of the six-torpedo spread fired by the USS Archerfish.

The internet is your friend.

Manstein's revenge

Actually Skokaku and Zuikaku had what was considered the best damage control personnel of all of the Japanese fleet carriers...they survived damage from many battles...in fact, that's why they were absent from Midway; they were being repaired from Coral Sea damage...

Actually, they were kept out because they had lost too many aircraft and aircrews; it was felt that combining the surviving air groups would be ineffective and cause more headaches than there would be benefits from (see the first note 2 on Zuikaku's TROM).

A large reason the Japanese did not do so well with damage control is that they did not allow themselves to learn from mistakes; sailors who survived Midway were kept hidden away and no official reports were released, or widely disseminated. The US,  on the other hand, had ordered that each ship turn in a damage report if damaged even before the war started, and then created damage reports that were sent out fleet wide so that damage control officers, ship designers, and others could all learn from past actions. I've been working on posting the ones I've come across to my site and there's a long way left to go because of the sheer number of them:

http://www.researcheratlarge.com/Ships/

Tracy White

Manstein's revenge:

Actually Skokaku and Zuikaku had what was considered the best damage control personnel of all of the Japanese fleet carriers...they survived damage from many battles...in fact, that's why they were absent from Midway; they were being repaired from Coral Sea damage...

Actually, they were kept out because they had lost too many aircraft and aircrews; it was felt that combining the surviving air groups would be ineffective and cause more headaches than there would be benefits from (see the first note 2 on Zuikaku's TROM).

A large reason the Japanese did not do so well with damage control is that they did not allow themselves to learn from mistakes; sailors who survived Midway were kept hidden away and no official reports were released, or widely disseminated. The US,  on the other hand, had ordered that each ship turn in a damage report if damaged even before the war started, and then created damage reports that were sent out fleet wide so that damage control officers, ship designers, and others could all learn from past actions. I've been working on posting the ones I've come across to my site and there's a long way left to go because of the sheer number of them:

http://www.researcheratlarge.com/Ships/

From WIKEPEDIA:

The Fifth Carrier Division was then deployed to Truk to support Operation Mo (the planned capture of Port Moresby in New Guinea). During this operation, Shōkaku's aircraft helped sink the American aircraft carrier USS Lexington during the Battle of the Coral Sea but was herself severely damaged on 8 May 1942 by dive bombers from USS Yorktown and Lexington which scored three bomb hits: one on the carrier's port bow, one to starboard at the forward end of the flight deck and one just abaft the island. Fires broke out but were eventually contained and extinguished. The resulting damage required Shōkaku to return to Japan for major repairs.

On the journey back, the carrier shipped so much water through her damaged bow she nearly capsized in heavy seas, maintaining a high rate of speed in order to avoid a cordon of American submarines out hunting for her. She arrived at Kure on 17 May 1942 and entered drydock on 16 June 1942. Repairs were completed within ten days and, a little over two weeks later on 14 July, she was formally reassigned to Striking Force, 3rd Fleet, Carrier Division 1.^[8]

Also from Wikepedia:

In May 1942, she was assigned along with Shōkaku to support Operation Mo, the invasion of Port Moresby, New Guinea. Alerted by intercepted and decrypted Japanese naval messages, the Allies dispatched the carriers USS Yorktown and USS Lexington to interfere with this operation. On 8 May 1942, during the Battle of the Coral Sea, the main carrier forces located one another and launched maximum-effort raids, which passed each other in the air. Hidden by a rain squall, Zuikaku escaped detection, but Shōkaku was hit three times by bombs and was unable to launch or recover her aircraft. Aircraft from both ships helped sink the Lexington in return, with torpedoes from escorting destroyers. Zuikaku was undamaged in the battle, but sustained severe losses in aircraft and aircrew. This required her to return to Japan with her sister ship for resupply and aircrew training, and neither carrier was able to take part in the Battle of Midway in June 1942.

Sorry to Necro this thread but Shinano took 7 hours to sink after her torpedoing. The main reason she sunk was that the Shinano was not operational and was being towed to the fitting yard to get fitted out which meant he didn't have his full crew compliment and also didn't have all of his waterproof compartments due to the type of machinery that was to be installed. So if the Shinano was fully crewed and fully operational he would have shrugged off the torpedo damage.

[quote user="Manstein's revenge"]

it taiho or shinano that eventually sunk from one torpedo hit? one torpedo!!

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I am not sure I agree completely with the original premise of the question, just saying.

By the end of 1942, late October in fact, each navy had lost four fleet carriers.

Certainly the Japanese lost all four in one battle in pretty spectacular fashion.

Lexington Yorktown and hornet were lost in 42 but wasn't Saratoga lost in 43? you also forgot Wasp and Ranger. I could be wrong about Hornet being lost in 42 it could have been 1943. That left Enterprise as the sole remaining fleet carrier till Essex came to the front in 1943.

bondoman

I am not sure I agree completely with the original premise of the question, just saying.

By the end of 1942, late October in fact, each navy had lost four fleet carriers.

Certainly the Japanese lost all four in one battle in pretty spectacular fashion.

Saratoga survived the war in spite of multiple repeated torpedoings by Japanese submarines. She would be sunk as an Atomic Bomb target at Bikini post WWII. US carrier losses in 1942: Langley during the Java Campaign(although she was being used to ferry planes when sunk and classified as an Auxially vessel, she was still essentialy a carrier); Lexington at Coral Sea; Yorktown at Midway; Wasp off of Guadalcanal; and Hornet at Santa Cruz.