Although this was dated 1988, when I was at NTC from '91-'95 this was not uncommon.
The entry at 0503 happened frequently. So much so I think we really upset a lot of people. We were "admonished" many times for engaging their TOC. However, it was fun and well worth the trouble.
![Big Smile [:D]](/FSM/CS/emoticons/icon_smile_big.gif)
0503 hrs, TF TOC destroyed by OPFOR recon.
Subject I: Synopsis of Battle
http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/88-1/synop.htm
SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE
BLUFOR Mission: Defend a battle position.
Location: Central Corridor vic Nelson Impact Area, Hill 1109-Debnam complex. (NK 350170)
ENEMY FORCES: An OPFOR MRR attacking N-W from Hill 876 area (NK 400120) to their Objective-Hill 1011 (Airplane Hill) NK 250210.
0440 hrs, OPFOR enters TF sector marked by Barstow Road. TF Scouts render spot report. Two MRBs abreast, third MRB trails 6-7 km behind. TF goes to full combat posture.
0450 hrs, OPFOR cuts through screen line. As the TF Commander expected, the lead MRBs converge on the east flank of BLUFOR BP.
0500 hrs, OPFOR attempts to force the gap between Hills 1109 and 1141. Area defended by A and B teams. OPFOR taking heavy losses.
0503 hrs, TF TOC destroyed by OPFOR recon. C and D teams (vic BM 872 and BM 887) engaged only by two recon BMPs which are destroyed as it becomes light.
0506 hrs, H66 (TF CDR) is destroyed by direct fire in the gap.0515 hrs, A66 (A TM CDR) destroyed. OPFOR forces gap. B66 (B TM CDR) takes charge oflocal fight. C and D teams unaware of H66's demise.
0520-0600 hrs, Piece-meal counterattacks by remnants of A and B teams are crushed as trail MRB moves through gap.
0603 hrs, B66 destroyed, C and D teams still in original positions and bypassed.
OPFOR secures objective with MRB (+). What went wrong? The TF was well deployed on favorable terrain. There had been adequate preparation and the TF had adequate warning.
The MRR carried out a classic Soviet attack. Two up, one back. Massing against one point while demonstrating in front of another. In fact, the S2 called it almost perfectly in the IPB.
In this case, the unit failed to do two things:
First, they failed to protect their commander.
Second, they did not prepare for his "death."
As a result, command and initiative were lost with H66. The OPFOR was able to gain a local 6 to 1 advantage against the battalion and force their way through the position by sheer numbers.
Another Lesson Learned the hard way.