In the early 70's the USAF called for the development of a new generation of lightweight fighters. These were to be single seat jet aircraft with an emphasis on agility and air combat maneuvering. Among the requirements were a high thrust-to-weight ratio (above 1 to 1), and good acceleration. This led to the birth of what has come to be known as the "Lightweight Fighter Program", of which both the F-16 and, indirectly, the F/A-18 were borne.
In January 1972, several American manufacturers were engaged by the USAF to submit design specifications which would lead to the development of a true lightweight air superiority fighter. Both General Dynamics and Northrop were further engaged to build evaluation prototypes, but there was no promise made for a follow-on production contract. Hence, the F-16 and the YF-17 were initially concieved purely as speculative demonstrators of advanced technologies.
There were only a small number of specified performance goals and both contractors were free to build a prototype of their idea of what a lightweight air superiority fighter should be. Northrop's entry was the twin-engine YF-17 which incorporated breakthrough aerodynamic technologies. General Dynamics' entry, the YF-16, was a compact aircraft built around a single F100 engine. Aerodynamically an inherently unstable design, the YF-16 was equipped with an electronic flight control system which has come to be known as "fly by wire".
At some point during the development stage, the stakes changed; this was no longer a technology demonstration. It became a DoD competition to find a new fighter for the Air Force, the Navy and for allied nations as well. Based on the evaluation of the YF-16 and YF-17, the USAF initiated the Air Combat Fighter (ACF) Program. The Navy was also looking to develop a new multi-role strike fighter (VFAX) to replace both the F-4 and the A-7. (The VFAX was not intended to replace the A-6.)
Both the YF-16 and the YF-17 showed great promise at the end of the Lightweight Fighter competition in 1975. In fact, both were selected for military service. The USAF chose the F-16 which, initially, was to equip units within the Tactical Air Command. The Navy was directed by Congress to base the VFAX on either the YF-16 or YF-17 designs. Less than pleased with this outcome, the Navy proceeded independently with a derivative of the YF-17. In order to satisfy carrier suitability requirements, an extensive redesign was undertaken by McDonnell Douglas with Northrop as a junior partner and this resulted in the F/A-18 Hornet.
So, the F-16 was never envisioned as a purely air to ground platform. It was, after the conclusion of the ACF Program, intended as a purely air to air fighter. Later it found a place within the Air Force structure as a team player in air to air operations as part of a "high-low mix" that would use inexpensive F-16's at relatively low level in concert with more capable and high-flying F-15's.
Ultimately, however, the F-16
was touted as a multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) and used in a role for which it was, initially, not intended. The F-16 was, therefore, the replacement for the aging F-4 fleet. But, even with it's use as an MRCA the F-16 was not intended to replace the F-111. I believe that it's the F-15E that can claim to have done so.
The F/A-18 was first thought, by contemporary popular belief, to have been slated for production in two variants, the F-18 and the A-18. It was clear, however, that a single airframe configuration could easily allow the Hornet's employment in both the fighter and strike roles. Hence the designation, F/A-18. It was, indeed, intended to replace the F-4 and the A-7, but NOT the A-6.
The A-6, thus far, has not been replaced. The F/A-18E/F is considered by many to be a replacement for the A-6, but this is not the case. The "Super Hornet", in these days of fiscal woes, is simply a logical attempted advancement of an already capable MRCA design.
The main reason that the F-16 and F/A-18 are
perceived to have replaced seemingly more capable aircraft (in roles for which they were not intended) is because of cost-consciousness.
The older aircraft were more expensive to maintain. Also, there has been, for quite a long time now, a move towards commonality within each service and a strong desire for inter-service commonality not enjoyed since the heyday of the F-4.
The shorter the list of different types of aircraft in service means a shorter list of different types of spare parts needed to keep them flying AND, in some cases, a shorter list of associated support and maintenance equipment.
A shorter list of different types of spare parts and associated support and maintenance equipment means a shorter list of associated development costs for said parts and equipment AND a shorter list of training classes to teach folks how to use these parts and associated equipment to maintain the aircraft.
You can also apply a similar train of thought to aircrews and their training. All this goes on down the line to the realm of administrative activity, less paperwork and such. And there are other associated costs that could be factored in but, as usual, I've already written a novel here. In the end, this all means less money spent. As regards operational capability...
Capability is no longer judged by size of payload. Technology is responsible for this. With the advent and development of PGM's (Precision Guided Munitions) and their associated guidance equipment the latest variants of the present-day F-16 or F/A-18 employing such weapons can be considered more capable than an F-111 or A-6 of yesterday.
And contrary to the notion that F-16's and F/A-18's only drop "non guided dumb bombs", the vast majority of the munitions used nowadays are PGM's.
To a lesser degree, operational range is also less important. It is true that the A-6 and the F-111 have a greater range than an F/A-18 or F-16. But both of the former were employed in the deep-strike role, the intention of which is to attack targets deep within enemy territory.
The need for such a deep-strike capability remains, but the tools of the trade have changed somewhat. Such far-reaching striking power is now provided by cruise missles and the B-2.
F-16's and F/A-18's are not truly able or even fully expected to perform such tasks.
And I can hear some screaming out there: "Whaddya mean range is less important?" I can answer that question with two words. Aerial refueling. The range of a combat aircraft is usually utilized in as logical and efficient a manner as possible, but aerial refueling will alway be necessary, even if USAF F-111's and F-4's were still flying.
It was implied above that air refueling a modern aircraft twice is not cost-effective. In order to validate such a statement, one would have to compare fuel capacities and rate of fuel consumption for the aircraft in question.
I don't have the necessary information to do so, so I shall not make a judgement as to which is more cost effective; a gas guzzling F-111 or F-4, or a comparatively fuel efficient F-16 or F/A-18. Regardless, I don't think that there's much more explanation needed on this subject. But...
In the face of cruise missles and high-flying stealth bombers some argue that there is no substitution for the presence of a pair of eyes connected to a thinking brain in the immediate target area. And I myself agree with this. But I beg that you don't forget the F-15E! (Nor the F/A-18E/F which is also to be employed in a similar role.)
Survivability is also an issue as has been pointed out already. A strike package is all well and good, but there will always be instances where the strike aircraft will have to get out of a tight spot.
Such an occurrence was there in the Gulf War (Gulf 1 or the First Gulf War as some call it) when an F/A-18C shot down a MiG-21 on it's way to a target. The CAP won't always be able to get there in time to help. Sadly, the air war over Vietnam illustrated this all too well.
Speaking of strike packages, the presence of escort, recce, refueling and battlefield management assets, as well as those for the suppression of enemy air defenses, would be necessary regardless of the type of aircraft in the striking force. So the matter of cost effectiveness of the strike package is irrelevant. Unless, of course, the strike aircraft can defend themselves well enough to avoid, say, extra fuel consumption by escorting fighters screaming in to the rescue at full burner.
It was stated that the only time a strike package would have to fight it's way out of the target area is if an enemy fighter managed to get through the CAP. In that case, if I were one of the strike pilots, I'd rather be flying an F-16 or F/A-18 than an A-6 or F-111. Or an F-4 for that matter.
So, it's not exactly fair to say that the F-16 and F/A-18 don't measure up to some of their predecessors.
Fade to Black...