Stik hits upon an important issue here.
USMC organizations were (and still are) significantly different from similar Army operations.
One significant difference being that MC artillery was not a Branch, but integrated into the combat formations of infantry units. So, a given Regimental Combat Team might have three, even four platoons of arty Transport for the RLT would be pulled from various Transportation companies in a similar way. Those transport companies were based on the International Harvester M-5-6, a 6x6 2.5 yon truck similar to the CCKW in the way a Hawker Hurricane is similar to a Spitfire. So, even with the same manual, the same equipment was not necessarily available.
Then, there is the 'method' of making a landing. MC doctrine, going back to the first (circa mid 30s) Landing Part Manuals was to bring arty in in Wave 2 or no later than Wave 3. The AK's would be combat loaded to achieve just that, too. So, the guns would come out of the holds ready for off loading onto Mike boats. This would allow bringing gun crew and some ready service ammo as well.
Mike boat is no speedster, but, it's faster than a DUKW (and in more sea states), loading arty on DUKW would mean starting them before Wave 1 in hopes that they'd catch up to Wave 2. Once ashore, they'd need some sort of gin pole derrick--each--to offload a gun. Which would then have no ready service ammo, commo, or crew, all while on a contested beach needing fires about 5 minutes ago
At least of PTO, which was a Navy (as in DepNav) run sort of theater. Over in SWPTO which was very much a War Dept. operation, where MC units were used to flesh out Army divisions & regiments, they likely wound up paired to Army QMC transportation units. Those units would have followed the Army manual, naturally.