Yamato VS. Missouri Mano A Mano-Who Wins

Gents,

As this thread is clearly a source of antipathy amongst users it is hereby locked. We encourage intelligent and spirited discourse, BUT discourage the kind of venom and personal attacks seen here.

Regards,

 

As you have not produced any passages from any sources to support your arguments, limited as they are, it seems to me that YOU need to go to the library and check out a few of mine (they are the standard texts on the subject, and I am surprised that someone purporting to know something about Yamato, or any other battleship doesn't have at least ONE of them in your library).  I suggest you read them in all detail.  And when I say you have never seen the effects of a 16" shell, I also include the effects of an 18" shell, by which I mean you were not anywhere in the vicinity or time when that shell impacted and exploded, whereas, I HAVE been, nor have you ever been in the vicinity of one of these big guns when fired either.  I suggest you learn something about concussive damage caused by both impact AND explosion, as well as concussive blast effects caused by main gun firing.  Finally, you haven't addressed any of my comments regarding fire and its impacts on the combat effectiveness of the ship.  If the main armor deck is two decks down, that means a shell is going to penetrate those two decks, and then explode.  And if the armored deck is so impervious, that means the blast effects are going to go sideways and up, which kills every one on that deck, and a high possiblity of fire.  And as fire goes up, and is fed by air, that fine wooden deck of Yamato is going to ignite and burn like a forest.  And since no crewmen can be anywhere on deck when the main guns are firing, that means there is no way to put the fire out, and if that fire is on the foredeck, the heat and smoke is going to obscure ALL of the firing directors, and the bridge as well, leaving Yamato blind and burning, and her citadel will simply act like a Dutch oven for its inhabitants, and the engine room crew choked to death by smoke and fumes sucked down the ventilators.......

As you apparently have not been able to open any of these photographs (and they are large scale, for detail), then I fail to see how you are able to comment on any of them, least of all the Kongo diagram.  So until you CAN open them (and they are simple jpgs), really you have nothing to discuss here (no doubt your terminal ennui has prevented you from bothering to try).  And again, you fail to explain how your 'sources' have any idea of what hit where, and did what damage on Yamato, as the ship sank with most of her crew (and as far as I know, though I might be wrong, the ship has not been dived on to confirm or deny anything).  However, if you ever bother to open the photos I have provided, you will see with your own eyes what what I am talking about, which is why I provided them in the first place...... Trollin' trollin' trollin'.........

searat12 wrote:

though why I bother to go through this nonsense, is beyond me!

 

There is no need to be coy.  You love to spew nonsense:

"I am making an effort to be inflammatory here! "- searat12

searat12 wrote:

First off, consult with the references 'British Battleships of World War Two,' by Alan Raven and John Roberts, for information regarding the blast effects of HMS Rodney.  You might also peruse 'Janes Battleships of the 20th Century,' for more on the same.

 No one is arguing Rodney's susceptibilitty to the blast effects of 16" gun.   Your point is?  

 

searat12 wrote:

References for the blast effects of Yamato, please check 'Japanese High Seas Fleet' by Richard Humble, especially the effects of firing 'San-Shiki' 18" AA shells.  For the problems associated with having too many fire control and gun assets packed too closely together on Yamato, please check 'The Imperial Japanese Navy' by A.J Watts and B.G. Gordon.

 Care to quote the relevent passages so we might dissect it for its source, instead of throwing names?  I don't happen to have these on hand.

 

searat12 wrote:

It is obvious you have never seen the blast effects of a 16" shell,

 You would be wrong.   I've in fact seen the blast effect if an 18" shell, albeit a British one fired out of a monitor in WWI.

 

searat12 wrote:

First, below is a photo of Yamato, having had her 'B' main gun turret plainly destroyed by a bomb (so much for 'armor invulnerable to bombs'), with the guns blown out,

 

As seen in the case above, something might appear obvious to you, yet is not so in reality.  There is not a single reference that says Yamato had her "B" main turret destroyed, much less guns blown out.   

BTW your pictures do no display on my monitor.  If your photo is the famous one showing Yamato under the air attack of April 7 1945 from James Fahay collection, then the center gun on the B turret is not blown out, but elevated where the two other barrels were at their loading angle of 12 degrees.  The roof of the B turret is intact, the two blurry objects seen on either side of B turret roof are 25mm triple AA mounts in their gun tubs.  

 

searat12 wrote:

and if you look closely, you will see the 6" turret out of action as well.

Again assuming this is the April 7 1945 photo I am familiar with, then the aft 6" turret was destroyed by abomb hit on its roof, which led to a large fire in the 6" turret.

You said in an earlier post the mount was dislodged, where is the source? 

searat12 wrote:

Next, although the 'Armored deck' may have been 'designed' to resist bombs, at the end of the day it was only 9" thick, and not sufficient to do so,

 

It was never penetrated.  Is that not sufficient?

 

searat12 wrote:

as is evidenced from the next photo, with a bomb hit forward of 'A' turret

Evidenced by what?  The 200 mm armored deck is 2 decks below the upper deck, and its state is invisible to the outside on any battleship.     The most you can see from the outside of the ship is the upper or weather deck, which is only 35mm thick on the Yamato.   The only way to know if the armored deck is penetrated is by survivor testamony, or a catastrphic detonation of magazine immediately after a bomb hit near the magazine.   In both Yamato and Musashi, the surviors testified to the integrity of the citadel and their non-penetration from above, and neither ship suffered magazine explosions that can be linked to bomb hits.   Ballistic evidence shows 500 or 1000 lb bombs actually used had far too little penetrative power to pierce 200 mm homogenous armor used in Yamato's armored deck.   The only bombs actually used against ships in WWII that would have penetrated Yamato's armored deck would be the British super bomb used against the Tirpitz, and possibly the German rocket assisted glide bomb that was used against the Roma.

Furthermore, the armored deck covers only the main citadel, which terminates just ahead of the A turret.   If the photo is the one I think it is, ie the one taken in the lead up to Leyte gulf, then the bomb hit forward of A turret shows three things:

1.  It missed the citadel and landed too far forward to effect critical ship components

2.  The 35mm upper deck did its job and detonated the bomb on the weather deck and prevented it from penetrating into the hull

3.  Has it penetrated into the hull it would have missed the citadel all together and therefore missed the armored deck

 

 

searat12 wrote:

(also carefully note the large amount of smoke from a previous hit aft on the superstructure, which is likely to make the aft main firing director ineffective, as well as the aft turret and the 6" forward turret is plainly out of action as well.).

 

Again your picture does not display.   But if you refer to the rather famous photo of Yamao on her last sortie, let me explain to you what is happening.   The aft 18" turret is plainly or non-plainly not out of action.   The aft 6" is destroyed by a bomb that penetrated the turret roof but is not blown off of its mount.   There is an uncontrolled ammunition fire in the aft 6" turret which leaves a prominent flame and smoke trial covering the quarter deck.   The smoke from superstructure could either be from some fire further forward, or more likely from the AA gins firing.     During the entire action no indication of 18" turret being knocked out is found in any reference, although they did not fire after a few initial rounds to give clearance to the unshielded light AA guns on deck to fire.    All three turret were out of action near the very end, but that's because the ship's list prior to sinking had become too severe for the powered ammunition train to operate.    A comprehensive list of damages each ship received and an engineering analysis of the ship's losses is available in Garzke and Dublin, Axis and Neutral Battleships in WWII, Naval Institute, 1985, ISBN 0-87021-101-3, pages 58 - 74.    A naval architect's description of where the ship's protection is likely to have succeeded  and where they have failed can be found on pages 94 - 104.

searat12 wrote:

And finally, a diagram from Japanese source demonstrating the levels and angles of blast effect associated with the Kongo class, and it is well known in the literature that these were increased by a factor of four for the 18.1" guns of Yamato.

 

We are not talking about Kongo, which did not have the blast effect mitigation measures worked into the Yamato.

 

searat12 wrote:

Just how 'armored' are your 'armored' communication tubes?  Armored enough to resist the blast or impact of a 16" shell?

You really need to learn to read other people's posts more carefully before going off on a tangent.

 

searat12 wrote:

As far as your 'reputable sources' about what did, or did not penetrate Yamato or Mushashi, it is important to remember that these ships are on the bottom of the sea, along with most of their crews, so just which 'sources' do you use?

 

That did not seem to impede you in making your claims......

 

searat12 wrote:

In other words, spare me your ennui, and either contribute something concrete, or let it pass.......

I am making an effort to be inflammatory here! "- searat12    

Can't deal with what you started?  

 

Well here's some good ones (though why I bother to go through this nonsense, is beyond me!).  First off, consult with the references 'British Battleships of World War Two,' by Alan Raven and John Roberts, for information regarding the blast effects of HMS Rodney.  You might also peruse 'Janes Battleships of the 20th Century,' for more on the same.  References for the blast effects of Yamato, please check 'Japanese High Seas Fleet' by Richard Humble, especially the effects of firing 'San-Shiki' 18" AA shells.  For the problems associated with having too many fire control and gun assets packed too closely together on Yamato, please check 'The Imperial Japanese Navy' by A.J Watts and B.G. Gordon.  It is obvious you have never seen the blast effects of a 16" shell, but I have.  In the Gulf War, they left craters approximately 100' wide, by 15-25' deep, and while an AP shell's blast is a bit smaller, it is also delivered much deeper into the vulnerable interior of the target.  You have a touching faith in the power of armor to resist shell, but my point all along has been that many of the systems of a battleship, even Yamato are quite vulnerable to even common HE shell (perhaps more so).   Please find below, a few photos for you to examine.  First, below is a photo of Yamato, having had her 'B' main gun turret plainly destroyed by a bomb (so much for 'armor invulnerable to bombs'), with the guns blown out, and if you look closely, you will see the 6" turret out of action as well.  Next, although the 'Armored deck' may have been 'designed' to resist bombs, at the end of the day it was only 9" thick, and not sufficient to do so, as is evidenced from the next photo, with a bomb hit forward of 'A' turret (also carefully note the large amount of smoke from a previous hit aft on the superstructure, which is likely to make the aft main firing director ineffective, as well as the aft turret and the 6" forward turret is plainly out of action as well.).  And finally, a diagram from Japanese source demonstrating the levels and angles of blast effect associated with the Kongo class, and it is well known in the literature that these were increased by a factor of four for the 18.1" guns of Yamato.  You obviously have never stuck your head inside an operational military aircaft hangar of any kind, or you would know what I say about them is true.  And certainly boats and their accoutrements are also highly flammable, and fire has a way of spreading quite quickly if not contained.  Just how 'armored' are your 'armored' communication tubes?  Armored enough to resist the blast or impact of a 16" shell?  Hardly likely! And they all have a source, and junctions and termini, and many of these are necessarily outside the citadel (and US battleship designers practically invented the citadel concept decades previously).  Smoke, and fire, are increased by windspeed, and wherever the fire is located, the forward motion of the vessel will rapidly increase the intensity of the flames and smoke, driving it upward at a slant into the bridge, and/or aerodynamically sweeping it down aft, into the ventilation systems and choking to death everyone in the engine rooms (see photo below).   As far as your 'reputable sources' about what did, or did not penetrate Yamato or Mushashi, it is important to remember that these ships are on the bottom of the sea, along with most of their crews, so just which 'sources' do you use?  In other words, spare me your ennui, and either contribute something concrete, or let it pass.......

 

Those are not the good ones.   You have to come up with better researched and supported arguments than those to interest me in continuing this discussion.   

1.  No bombs ever actually penetrated Yamato or Musashi's armored decks.  That fact is well atested to and agreed upon by all reputable references.    The armor deck is capable of resisting a 2000 lbs armor piercing bomb dropped from 10,000 feet, which means the deck far exceeds the penetrative power of any bomb ever actually used on the these ships.   The closest any ever did was by the one that struck Musashi on the porforated armor plate where the funnel uptake goes through the armored deck.  It did not penetrate the porforated plate, but did sent a shrapnel through a 8" smoke hole into a boiler room where it severed a steam pipe, forcing the temporay evacuation of that boiler room.

2.  No hit dismounted the 6" turret.   The 6" turret stayed in its place according to all evidence, although its roof was penetrated, and a ammunition fire developed inside the turret.

3.  Impact concussion is not an effect often associated with APC shell hits on unarmored superstructures.   Non-penetrating AP shell hits on heavy armor can generate modest local impact concussion effect.    But takes a mine or torpedo hit and the augumenting and transmitting effect of water to produce widespread concussion effect in the ship

4. In fact there is very little direct factual record of the actual concussive effect upon ship structure of Yamato firing her guns.   But given that Yamato's design went to far greater length to minimize blast effect on the superstructure than any other battleship - All boats removed to below decks,   all exposed superstructure projections aerodynamically faired in,    all exposed manned positions protected by blast proof covers with apertures protected by garage door type roller blinds,  all optics and equipment placed on shock mounts, all vents directed away from the main turrets, decks around the main turrets underlain by 35mm steel to avoid dishing in, one would expect that she would do rather better than average in the muzzle blast department.   Rodney, on the other hand, does seem to suffer rather more from blast than is common even amongst 16" armed battleship.

5. In most if not all battleships, the power lines, data cables, and hydraulic lines for the main turrets would be completely enclosed in citadel armor, and those leading up to fire control positions outside the citadel would be protected by armored communication tubes.   No random hit outside the citadel is going to severe these, unless it so happen to cut the communication tube, or cause fire so large as to burn through cables protected inside armored steel tubes.  But this vulberability is common to both Iowa and Yamato

6.  Smoke don't go straight up if the ship is moving.

7. Any generalities like "any time you have a hangar and airplanes, there will be fuel lying around" is generally without merit, and like boats is outside of the citadel, and well segregated from any critical armament, fire control, and other points of vulnerability.

 

 

 

 

Well, first off, there are 'splinters' and then there are 'splinters!'  By 'splinterproof' we are really talking about falling shell fragments from AA, stray bits of shrapnel metal flying around, and machine gun bullets.  Looking at the main turrets of say, 'Atago,' there is only 1" armor for the turrets!  That won't stop a 20mm round, let alone a chunk of steel several inches thick and weighing 50 Lbs or more from an exploding 16" shell, or even a chunk of the ships own armor flying into it either.  And a Japanese 6" turret will have no more armor than that. 

You mention that the fire control center is below the armored deck, yet 500 Lbs and 1000 Lbs dropped on Yamato (just dropped, not a ballistic shell plunging in with enormous velocity) went right through the armored decks and trashed the ship from stem to stern, one of which, landing between a forward 18" turret and a 6" turret exploded with enough force to completely dismount the 6" turret, even though it was not a 'direct hit.'  Concussion alone is enough to shatter the optics of a fire director, even if it is not hit directly.  In fact, Yamato, and a few other battleships like HMS Rodney had a lot of problems with the concussive effects of their own main guns firing, so bad that the bridge and other structures could be severely damaged if the guns were aimed much further aft than directly broadside, and tear up the foredeck if aimed too far forward as well.  Yamato in particular was very bad that way, and no-one could be on deck if the main guns were firing, regardless of direction.  That means, if there is a fire someplace, the fire control people are not going to be able to get at it from the deck, if the guns are still firing.  I have not heard of any such problems with the Iowas, though thier blast is pretty prodigious as well. 

On another point, all of these directors, and the gun turrets as well, depend on electric, or hydraulic power to operate, and electrics for communication.  If a 16" shell penetrates the superstructure and explodes inside, it is going to cut power lines, live steam pipes, hydraulic lines, and start fires (even the paint will burn merrily in such circumstances), and these things will have a cumulative and cascading effect that is geometric, not arithmetic, and I don't care how well 'armored' the conduit pipes are, they WILL get cut or burnt, and in such situations, it is surprising how often such damage either cannot be bypassed, or got at for quick repairs.  Fire, as you may recall, burns upward for the most part, so a nasty fire below the bridge, for instance, can produce enough smoke to obscure observation for the whole tower, or even make the bridge, or anywhere on the tower be completely untenable in very short order from the heat of the flames.  This used to be quite a problem with a number of ships in WW1, whose masts and bridge structures could be severely affected just from the smoke of their own boiler furnaces, let alone fires caused by battle damage.  As well, not all fire-directors are equal, with the most accurate being those with the widest binocular 'field.'  Thus a fire director whose optics are 40' apart, will be far more accurate at long range than another director whose width might only be 12'.  Hit the big one at the top of the tower bridge, or make it inoperative, and the other big one aft, and long-range accuracy will drop accordingly.

Finally, while you seem to think that shells hitting a ship are 'random' in their location, in point of fact, it is amazing how many times ships have had their bridges/battlebridge/conning towers hit directly, and how often hits are made on superstructures and turrets, as against say, the ensign staff or the anchor locker.  This is not coincidence.  The gunners will do their very best to aim for the center of mass, and a good one will hit just about anything he aims at.  Radar-directed firing is particularly suited for this 'center of mass' kind of targeting, and that's where the rounds hit.  And that's not just Americans firing, but Japanese, Germans, and Brits too.  'Hiei' was hit dozens of times, by relatively small-calibre shells, and while none of her armor was effectively compromised, or even penetrated, was set on fire, all communications severed, fire direction for main and secondary guns put out of action, and the ship in a sinking condition because electric power failed to run either the fire hoses, or the bilge pumps.  Much the same thing happened to Kirishima, and to Bismarck, and the same thing happened to any number of ships, which ended up unable to fight, or run.  And if you don't believe me, just ask Admiral Makaroff, Admiral Rodhjestvensky, Admiral Graf Von Spee, Admiral Callaghan, or Admiral Scott..... Oh wait, you can't, because they were all blown away, along with their bridge personnel from direct hits on the bridges of their ships (maybe they should have conned their ships from the anchor locker!)!

As for avgas, any time you have a hangar and airplanes, there will be fuel lying around, along with oil, greasy rags, and all the other impedimentia of airplanes and their mechanics, not to mention all the launches, and other ships boats (made of wood) and their fuels.  Yes, the main fuel tank may be down in the bilges somewhere, but there is a pressurized hose to deliver it to the hangar, and a shell hitting the hangar is going to bust up just about everything in there, and set fire to the rest, including any fuel delivery systems.  Like I said with the superstructure in general, there is so much packed into a relatively small space, that a hit anywhere on the superstructure is going to hit something significant directly, and will likely affect other systems in the surrounding area as well.

 The point of all this is the age-old adage from the Civil War, to win a battle, you have to 'get there fustest, with the mostest,'  and most indications are that radar-directed long range plunging fire from an Iowa will hit Yamato before Yamato can hit the Iowa.  And if the Yamato gets hit first, chances are, it won't get a chance to hit back effectively, and its chances of doing so go down dramatically with every 16" shell hit she absorbs, even if the armor isn't compromised, even if the ammunition doesn't explode.   And since Yamato can't run away because she is too slow, it is the Iowa that has the initiative, and can press the battle, or withdraw at any time (it's like having the weather gauge in a battle of sailing ships)

Is this a question that allows for no supporting forces? In other words is it ship to ship or task force against task force? Air power is the obvious deal breaker for the IJN in 1945. And it is not clear to me that BB63 was set up as commissioned to sink other battleships, I'd say in her 1944 configuration it was more for shelling the shore, providing defence from air attack and tearing up smaller surface vessels attacking carrier groups. If I had to go one-on-one with the Yamato, I'd take an Essex class carrier.

searat12 wrote:

Well, if you look at Yamato, you will notive that her superstructure (where all the fire-directors are located) is extremely compact, with everything packed and stacked closely together.  A hit anywhere on the superstructure is going to hit something, or perhaps several vital somethings.  If the hit is below a fire-director, the fire director will lose power.  If the hit is to one side, it will get clobbered with splinters, and the gun, or the next fire director will be hit.  If the hit is above the director, it will hit the bridge, the funnel, or perhaps another gun or director, and if a shell lands between, it may take out two or more directors and/or guns with one hit!

The director stations themselves are spliter proof, little short of direct hit will take them out.   Fire control directors are connected to the fire control computer and fire control transmitting stations below armor deck through armored communication tubes that carry the power supply, voice tubes, telephone cables, and data transmission cables.   Unless the hit below the director actually sever the armor communication tube, it will not disable the director.

At normal battle range one is lucky to hit the ship, and has no realistic chance of specifically targeting the superstructure.    Within the context of shells falling inside the danger zone, where they fall exactly is for all practical purposes random, and the danger of direct hit each piece of equipment is subjected to is determined mainly by its own target area, and the target area of the directors doesn't change whether the superstructure is large or small.   

So whether they are on a compact superstructure or an expansive one does't matter so long as they are spaced far enough apart to make it difficult for a single shell to directly hit more than 1 directors.   The 3 directors on Yamato's tower bridge is separated by 5 deck levels.   No one hit is going to take out all three.   Only an extremely lucky hit will take out 2.    The 3 directors on the aft fire control tower is separated laterally and by 2 deck levels, again no one hit is likely to take out all 3.   Compare the director layout on the Yamato with those on the Bismarck.  Both are provisioned with many more redundant directors thanUS battleships.  But despite the much more compact superstructure of the Yamato, Yamato's 6 directors are much more widely separate, both within each group, and between the 2 groups, then those on Bismarck's expansive superstructure, where 3 directors in each group are on the same level and occupy the same relatively small armored structure.    It is theoretically possible to take out all main armament directors on any other WWII battleship with 2 precise hits from any angle.   On the Yamato one needs 4 precise hits to do the same, and then only if one is firing from exactly abeam.

 

 

searat12 wrote:

Farther aft, and a penetration may hit the gasoline for the multiple airplanes carried, and farther forward is another 18" gun turret......

It is extremely unlikely that a battleship would go into action with fueled aircraft in the hanger.   It is also extremely unlikely for a battleship to go into action with fuelled aircraft on deck as the blast of the main guns would topple them and through them overboard.   The fuel stow on the Yamato is in the ship's bottom, so it would take a lucky hit indeed, or a torpedo, to effect those.   18" gun turret on the Yamato is the single most well protected position of any type ever put to sea, and it impenetrable by US 16"/50 firing 2700 APC shell at any range, much less by anything less.

searat12 wrote:

Forget about the 6" guns providing any sort of offensive or defensive power in this scenario, as the 6" japanese turrets (and the 8" turrets on the heavy cruisers as well) have almost no armor at all, and will be heavily damaged by splinters, and certainly cannot outrange a 16" gun.

The 6" guns are splinter protected, and it would in fact be unlikely for them to be disabled by mere splinters.  They are penetrable by 16" shells, and possibly also by 5" shells.   But their target profile is quite small, and so is the chance of any individual one of them being disabled by a single shell hit at normal combat range.    They are also widely separated, so it is also extremely unlike for more than 1 to be knocked out by a single hit.    It would be quite likely that 2 or 3 of them will survive 16" shell fire until 20,000-25,000 yards, when they are still well outside the range of of Iowa's 5"/37, but can effectively play on Iowa's softer spots.   

 

searat12 wrote:

As well, there really aren't a lot of 'redundant' fire-directors, as each set of directors is designed to work with a particular type of gun battery (primary, secondary, tertiary and/or AA batteries).........

Well, there are.    By WWII, the main surface fire computations are done by centralized fire control computers below armored deck, the directors and range finders merely serve to supply data.  Anything director throughout the ship, except those dedicated to machine cannons have the ability to provide the necessary data, although of course the ones designed for the main armament provides the best data for surface fire control.  

Yamato has 6 main armament directors on the superstructure, and 3 more in the main turrets.   There are also 4 secondary surface fire directors in the 6" turrets.      The main armament directors on the Yamato is designed to work with both 18" and 6" guns, and were intended to form the main control for both 18" and 6" guns.   The secondary surface fire directors in the turrets are equivalent to main directors on the Nagato and are thus also quite capable of directing 18" guns as a backup.   That makes a total 13 dedicated surface fire directors capable of supporting both 18" and 6" surface fire, 6 in elevated position suitable for long range fire.      There are also 2 heavy dual purpose directors for the 5" guns (later increased to 4).  These have provision to direct 6" and 18" surface fire in an emergency.    The only directors incapable of supportting surface fire are the 4 light AA directors for the machine guns.  So a total of 15 directors are availble to the Yamato for surface fire direction

On the Iowa there are 2 main armament directors on the superstructure, and 3 more in the main turrets.    However, like the Japanese dual purpose, the US Mk37 directors can also direct heavy surface fire from 16" guns.  Thus the US battleship has 2 directors suitable for long range surface fire direction, and a total of 9 directors capable of surface fire direction.

 

searat12 wrote:

as you are making some very good points.....!

 

I know.

 

searat12 wrote:

But don't give up yet,

 Then interest me with better arguments. 

Just kidding.

There are important ones in your favor you have not touched upon.

 

Well, if you look at Yamato, you will notive that her superstructure (where all the fire-directors are located) is extremely compact, with everything packed and stacked closely together.  A hit anywhere on the superstructure is going to hit something, or perhaps several vital somethings.  If the hit is below a fire-director, the fire director will lose power.  If the hit is to one side, it will get clobbered with splinters, and the gun, or the next fire director will be hit.  If the hit is above the director, it will hit the bridge, the funnel, or perhaps another gun or director, and if a shell lands between, it may take out two or more directors and/or guns with one hit!  If the hit is to the left or right of the superstructure, it will hit either a 6" gun turret, or an 18" gun turret.  Farther aft, and a penetration may hit the gasoline for the multiple airplanes carried, and farther forward is another 18" gun turret......  Forget about the 6" guns providing any sort of offensive or defensive power in this scenario, as the 6" japanese turrets (and the 8" turrets on the heavy cruisers as well) have almost no armor at all, and will be heavily damaged by splinters, and certainly cannot outrange a 16" gun.  The 5" guns on Iowa would only come into play after the Yamato was a burning wreck, and the Iowa would feel confident enough to move in close.... I think your odds about percentages of damage from a 16" hit are a bit low.... If I grant you your '5%' chance of hitting a fire-director, then it must have hit something else (and that something is not happy, I assure you!).  You don't really need to hit a director directly to take it out, just cut its power and/or communications and it is useless.  As well, there really aren't a lot of 'redundant' fire-directors, as each set of directors is designed to work with a particular type of gun battery (primary, secondary, tertiary and/or AA batteries).........

Reference Warspite in WW1, her fire control compared to WW2 was exceedingly primitive, required ranging shots, and hardly hit anything as a result.  You could make the same claims for the German battlecruisers, who faced the combined fire of the entire British gunline at Jutland, not once, but twice, yet got away.  Jutland and the situation we are talking about here are like apples and oranges (i.e. two fleets facing each other, vs two ships facing each other)....

But don't give up yet, as you are making some very good points.....!

Given that the Warspite was not seriously damaged, and retained close to 100% effectivenss after 13 heavy caliber hits in Jutland,  I would say there is a good chance that a ship like Yamato would retain close to 100% combat power after 10-20 16" hits.   The fire control position were not protected against direct hits by major caliber shells, but the odds of a major caliber hit on a fire control position is small.     The fire control positions do have splinter plating, which means anything but a very near miss is unlikely to effect them.   Compare the size of the ship to the size of the area in which a 16" shell must land to take out a director or its communication tube to the fire control center below armored deck, and you will see on average how many hits one must make before taking out a director.    I would say a hit on a battleship has no more than 5% chance of taking out a director.    So the average number required to take out all of the redundant fire control positions must be very large.      

US ships have few redundant director aloft (2), so they would likely lose all their directors first, especially if the Yamato let her 6" guns, which has twice the effective range of 5"/38,  join in.   Yamato has 3 times more directors, so the odds of her lossing effective director control first in a shootout with Iowa is not that good.     Radars are just as soft and vulnerable as directors, so they too can be taken out by non-penetrating hits.  What is more is the fire control radars on US battleships are mounted directly on the directors.   So we can assume once the directors on US battleships are knocked out, the US battleships would also lose radar fire control. 

I have to say in clear weather, with a long approach, and determination on the part of both side to fight to the finish, the chances of Iowa coming out ahead is not all that good.   Although if she meneuvers vigorously, she could probably avoid getting hit too often, and can probably come out not too seriously damaged.

 

I think it depends on what you call combat power..... If your fire directors are all smashed, the bridge in flames, the funnel with multiple perforations so the smoke gets sucked down the ventilators into the engine room and chokes all the engine room crew, and the only guns you have left are some manual deck AA guns, which won't help you to reply to more 16" shell coming in from 20,000 yards..... This is essentially what happened to Bismarck.  She was effectively nothing more than a target long before she actually sank, and with one or two 105 mm guns still firing wildly (and hitting nothing) until the end, I suppose you could say she retained a measure of combat power, but certainly not enough to save her, nor could she escape....... Same could be said about Kirishima, on fire, smothered in her own smoke, and staggering off back up 'The Slot'.....

searat12 wrote:

(and it should be noted that even though she had been hit directly by at least nine 16" AP shells, in fact she was able to limp away from the battle area and was in fact scuttled by her own crew, not sunk by gunfire......

 

Water has to come in to make a ship sink.   Shells are just not very good at making the water come in.  Bismarck, Blucher, Kirishima, Scharnhorst, etc, etc, all shows that unless one gets lucky and send a shell straight into the magazine,  guns are just a softening up weapon.   The little armored cruiser Blucher took 40 hits from 12" and 13.5" guns during Dogger Bank before sinking.   One can expect Kirishima, 3 times as large, to take a few more and still stay afloat.    Look at how many heavy caliber hits HMS Warspite withstood in Jutland without serious damage.    The estimates used in Pre-WWII naval war college wargames about how many hits a capital ship can take before being destroyed or rendered incapable all grossly underestimate the staying power of modern capital ships, I think.     Ships like the Yamato can probably take 40-50 16" hits at medium range and still retain some combat power.

 

Yeah, I am very fond of the Japanese ships myself (particularly their heavy cruisers!), but it's hard to overcome the facts when dealing with the Yamato/Iowa controversy.  Yes, USS South Dakota was hit (a lot!) by the Japanese that night, but that's because it WAS at night, and the ranges were ridiculously close (14000 yards?  Almost point blank for a battleship!).  But we are talking about a clear-day engagement, starting at maximum range for both ships.  Yes, Atlanta was hit several times by USS SanFrancisco, but that was because the Sanfran was using her Radar for fire direction, and you can't really tell nationality by a blip on the screen..... (and she hit too, didn't she?).  I don't really give much credence to the 'newer/older' issue, as armor is pretty much armor, and certainly there were plenty of old ships with updated systems that could be just as tough a nut to crack as anything just down the ways..... In the case of Kirishima, her big problem was that she was a battlecruiser (with 8" armor) dealing with two battleships, but even bigger was the fact that she was hammered so badly at quite close range (even the 5" guns were hitting) that her fire control, most of her guns, her bridge, and her steering gear were smashed in a matter of just a few minutes, and so could no longer respond (and it should be noted that even though she had been hit directly by at least nine 16" AP shells, in fact she was able to limp away from the battle area and was in fact scuttled by her own crew, not sunk by gunfire......Finally, the maximum effective range for a 14" shell isn't significantly different than the maximum effective range for a 16" shell, or even an 18" shell, and of course fire-direction units have very little armor, and a lot of delicate optics hat can be easily smashed.......

Hieronymus wrote:

I still don't buy it, mostly because I miss some objectivitiy. OK we know that US warships enjoyed a better fire control, radar, something the Japanese never really achieved during WWII at least not at the same standard as the US radar. But was their fire control really that bad? As I recall the South Dakota was hit during the battle for Guadacanal, at the 14.-15. Nov. 1942 within 4 minutes by no less than 27 hits, during the night!

Actually, the was at point blank range.   Japanese performance was in fact poor on that occassion, which many ships being slow to react and clearly lacking situational awareness, which is why South Dakota only received 27 hits despite numerous Japanese ships being at virtually point blank range.    The battleship Kirishima only manage to score 2 hits on the South Dakota.

Hieronymus wrote:

On the other side, the USS Atlanta was hit several times by the USS San Francisco, how can that be declared with better fire control?

 The Japanese on more than one occassion manage to hit their own ships as well.

Hieronymus wrote:

Somewhat later it was mentioned that the Kirishima was sunk by superior fire control of the US Navy battlehips. I would this not call objectivity, cause the Kirishima was 27 year old at her sinking, while her opponent the USS Washington was in fact brand new and could easily be called "state of the art"

Kirishima was sunk by the fact that she didn't have radar and didn't know the Washington was sneaking up on her.   Washington's shooting is in fact not that great considering the range was only 9000 yards.   But when the otherside didn't know you were coming, you can get in enough shots to do fatal damage to a WWI era battlecruiser.   It should be noted that poor as Japanese radar might be, it would be impossible to sneak up on Japanese like this after 1943, when the Japanese would have been able to detect Washington from 20,000 yards away.

 

Hieronymus wrote:

The US did know a few things about the Yamato but they did not know anything about her armour, gun calibre and their overall displacement. Even in late war and right to the end of the war you can read in some publications that the US Navy suspected the Japanese having two "40.000 tonners" armed with 16" guns. Whatever they really suspected , they clearly had no informations at all about the real capabilities of the Yamatos.

Actually, by late 1943 the USNI has already accurately estimated Yamato's dimension, tonnage, and gun power using highlevel aerial reconn photos taken over Kure.    Some people in the USN persist in thinking the USNI was being alarmist and Japanese couldn't build ships that large, hence the confusion.   But people in the know knew in 1944 Yamato wasn't your average run of the mill 46000  tonner.

 

Hieronymus wrote:

Another argument which I read here was that an Iowa would use its greater volume of fire, by trying to get close enough to bring its own battery of 5"  guns into the game as well. This could lead to a very nasty suprise, cause the Yamato had not only 6pcs. 6" guns but additional a few more 5" guns too, to be exactly 12 per side, so the idea to simply "shoot it out" with the Yamato would be pure suicide, cause in this field she was clearly superior to the Iowas!

In her original configuration the Yamato would have been able to bring 9 6"/60 cal guns to bear on any surface target in addition to 18" guns.  Japanese 6"/60 guns were the best 6" gun of WWII, had superb ballistics, and would have vastly outranged, and be more accurate and damaging against surface targets than Iowa's 5"/38.   On top of that Yamato also carried 6 5"/40 AA guns per side that were closely comparable to US 5"/38 in rate of fire, shell weight and range.   In ship to ship battle Yamato would win the volume of fire, shell weight, and shell ballistic contests hands down.

I still don't buy it, mostly because I miss some objectivitiy.

OK we know that US warships enjoyed a better fire control, radar, something the Japanese never really achieved during WWII at least not at the same standard as the US radar. But was their fire control really that bad? As I recall the South Dakota was hit during the battle for Guadacanal, at the 14.-15. Nov. 1942 within 4 minutes by no less than 27 hits, during the night!

That is not what I would call a bad fire control!

On the other side, the USS Atlanta was hit several times by the USS San Francisco, how can that be declared with better fire control?

Someone mentioned the Iowa was much more modern than the Yamato because it was build 1-2 years later, and because of that would be superior to the Japanese design. which was "older"

Somewhat later it was mentioned that the Kirishima was sunk by superior fire control of the US Navy battlehips. I would this not call objectivity, cause the Kirishima was 27 year old at her sinking, while her opponent the USS Washington was in fact brand new and could easily be called "state of the art"

The US did know a few things about the Yamato but they did not know anything about her armour, gun calibre and their overall displacement. Even in late war and right to the end of the war you can read in some publications that the US Navy suspected the Japanese having two "40.000 tonners" armed with 16" guns. Whatever they really suspected , they clearly had no informations at all about the real capabilities of the Yamatos.

Sure fire control is very important but if we have an open mind, we must accept the fact, that the Japanese Navy was a real master at fighting at night, So even if the Iowa would have a better radar and becasue of that would be able to start an attack at longer distancewe always have to keep in mind that any skipper of an Iowa would suspect the Japanese battleship of having 16" guns and perhaps the same quality and quantity of armour (if at all, cause at that time the Iowa's were believed to be the tip of the iceberg) Thus he would try to attck his opponent just tzhe way he would do with any other battleship of a "normal size and capabilities" and if he would not have all the luck or the real superior fire control he was indeed in great danger of finding out the hard way what the Yamato could do!Sure he still enjoed a much greeater speed which I personally think would be a real advantage but he had ALWAYS to keep in mind that  perhaps 1 single hit of these 18" shells would be enough not only to cripple his ship but to ruin his whole day, even BEFORE he would be able to bring his "superior" fire control into the game.(and how should he able to do this because he did not know anything at all about those guns)

Another argument which I read here was that an Iowa would use its greater volume of fire, by trying to get close enough to bring its own battery of 5"  guns into the game as well. This could lead to a very nasty suprise, cause the Yamato had not only 6pcs. 6" guns but additional a few more 5" guns too, to be exactly 12 per side, so the idea to simply "shoot it out" with the Yamato would be pure suicide, cause in this field she was clearly superior to the Iowas! 

And finally if we say that an Iowa can hit the Yamato first with it's gun we always have to keep in mind that due to her bigger armour she could withstand  much more damage and still fight back. Even if here radar would be damaged or even knocked out with one of those first hits, we just recently said that the japanese did not use their radar for proper fire control because it was not good enough, so if she looses it due to a hit.......Keep in mind that the Bismarck did not use radar controled fire to sink the Hood with one of her first salvoes either. So why do we argue that Yamato should do this?

High technology is something really good and can be VERY useful in combat situations and if were argue that a ship like the Sheffield was actually sunk by a single (and pretty small) Exocet missile (which did NOT even explode on impact if I'm right) try to imagine what would have happened if this missile would have hit a ship with an armour like a battleship......Gentleman man your brooms! some superficial damage and THATS IT only because of some old fashioned armour! 

Keep on modeling

René

www.usns.biz 

searat12 wrote:

Yada yada yada.  I'm here to tell you that any American Naval commander of an Iowa-class battleship coming across a Yamato-class battleship would engage, and to full effect.  As seen above, the Japanese had NO effective Radar-directed fire control, and as such, an Iowa would knock out, or make ineffective the fire control of a Yamato in fairly short order (i.e. with the first two or three salvoes), at which point, the Yamato would be a heavily armored target to be sunk.  Too slow, too unmaneuverable, with crappy damage control, the Yamato would be an excellent fire-support ship for amphibious landings, but in a face-to-face with American battleships, I can't help but think that she would be blanketed in a hurry (though I admit, I am making an effort to be inflammatory here!), and in actuality, it might even happen faster with one of the older 14" armed battleships (but with updated Radar and fire-control, say USS New Mexico), as they have more guns, and faster rate of fire (and the ranges are not much different in reality)...............

Yada yada yada.  I'm here to tell you that any American Naval commander of an Iowa-class battleship coming across a Yamato-class battleship would engage, and to full effect.  As seen above, the Japanese had NO effective Radar-directed fire control, and as such, an Iowa would knock out, or make ineffective the fire control of a Yamato in fairly short order (i.e. with the first two or three salvoes), at which point, the Yamato would be a heavily armored target to be sunk.  Too slow, too unmaneuverable, with crappy damage control, the Yamato would be an excellent fire-support ship for amphibious landings, but in a face-to-face with American battleships, I can't help but think that she would be blanketed in a hurry (though I admit, I am making an effort to be inflammatory here!), and in actuality, it might even happen faster with one of the older 14" armed battleships (but with updated Radar and fire-control, say USS New Mexico), as they have more guns, and faster rate of fire (and the ranges are not much different in reality)...............

 I'm not saying the Americans didn't know the Yamato was a beast. Just the intelligence they had was not complete. Much was based on educated guessing from the technology of the times. They were wrong about the optimal range and the battle plan they concieved would have put them into the optimal range when they thought it wasn't.  I'm also not saying that this was a deciding factor in any hypothetical engagement.  I'm still of the mind it woulda come down to who hit who where and a lotta luck. Kinda a mute point. The real point and facination in this discussion is that it never happened. The sinking of the Yamato was the end game. The loss was no surprise to either side. Battleships were no longer king. The Yamato was just a formal funeral to that doctrine.

Chuck Fan wrote:

The Americans actually had no direct intelligence on the Yamato until about 1943.   It was firmly believed that Japan was building new battleships, but no one knew how many, or how large.  For much of the early war US preceeded on the false assumption that it was impractical for Japan to build battleships larger than about 46,000 tons, so the new Japanese battleships were pegged at 46,000 tons.    46,000 tons puts upper limit on how much armor the battleship can carry.   So US developed tactics based on defeating a ship carrying armor appropriate to 46,000 tons.   However, by late 1943, the US had enough intelligence to at least suspect, if not confirm, that the Yamatos were much larger than 46,000 tons, and carried 18" guns.   So it is not correct to say, as has often been claimed, that US didn't know Yamato's true power until after the war.   If a battle were to have occurred between the Yamato and a US battleship in 1944 or 1945, then it would be reasonable to assume the US skipper would be briefed and would at least have in the back of his mind the possibility that Yamato carried 18" guns and had armor commensurate with 65,000 tons.    I have no idea what a US captain would do if someone tells him that, on the one hand, if the enemy is 46,000 tons, he should do this.   On the other hand, if he did do this and the enemy turned out to be 65,000 tons, he'd be slaughtered.

Realistically? He'd call for the carriers, use his superior speed and beat feet.

The Americans actually had no direct intelligence on the Yamato until about 1943.   It was firmly believed that Japan was building new battleships, but no one knew how many, or how large.  For much of the early war US preceeded on the false assumption that it was impractical for Japan to build battleships larger than about 46,000 tons, so the new Japanese battleships were pegged at 46,000 tons.    46,000 tons puts upper limit on how much armor the battleship can carry.   So US developed tactics based on defeating a ship carrying armor appropriate to 46,000 tons.  

However, by late 1943, the US had enough intelligence to at least suspect, if not confirm, that the Yamatos were much larger than 46,000 tons, and carried 18" guns.   So it is not correct to say, as has often been claimed, that US didn't know Yamato's true power until after the war.   If a battle were to have occurred between the Yamato and a US battleship in 1944 or 1945, then it would be reasonable to assume the US skipper would be briefed and would at least have in the back of his mind the possibility that Yamato carried 18" guns and had armor commensurate with 65,000 tons.    I have no idea what a US captain would do if someone tells him that, on the one hand, if the enemy is 46,000 tons, he should do this.   On the other hand, if he did do this and the enemy turned out to be 65,000 tons, he'd be slaughtered.

 

 

 

 There are absolutely dozens of web pages on this subject. One of the one's I like best is this one as it has lots of info on many ships and many factors.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

The error I was talking about is one of intelligence on the American side. In battle drills that were based on this intell. The Americans trained to engage the Yamato at an optimal range and direction which they believed would give them the most advantage.

Based on information they had at the time they developed tatics and drills to this effect but were wrong. Only after the war did a lot of details about the Yamato class emerge and because of the destruction of records right before the surrender some secrets of this ship sank with her forever. The details on the ballistics and range of the Yamato's 18 inch guns were mis guessed and the tatics the Americans developed actually put them into the Yamato's optimum engagement zone.

 Would this have made a difference? I dunno like I said luck has much to do with battling behemoths but it seems to me that it would at least lowered the Fire control advantage enjoyed by the Americans.

sfcmac wrote:

When I read up on this subject the what if. The American Fire control systems were given a lot of credit. There was however a major blunder on the American side with intelligence on the Yamato class. Several training scenarios were run where the Americans were trained to use supier speed and maneuvering to place them in what they believed was the best position for them and the worst for the Yamato. In fact these errors would have placed them into the Yamato's sweet zone negating any fire control advantage they had.

What were these errors that you allude to?

No, I don't know during which specifically actions the Japanese actually used radar for fire control.    On the flip side, given type 22's relatively limited detection range (~20000 yards for a battleship target), I am also not sure during which actual actions radar fire control could have made a big difference for the Japanese.    But that type 22 can be used for fire control was confirmed in the descriptions of the resolution of the set.   US postwar naval technical commission also made specific mention of how Japanese radar directed fire was very inefficient because radar data can not be automatically entered into the fire control computer.   Postwar writings of war time IJN naval officers (a captain of a Agano class CL whose name escapes me for the moment) also attested to practicing with radar fire control with both type 21 and type 22.

 

Well, I still say a lot depends on how sharp the Japanese gunners and fire control people would be (and they could be very good, particularly at night, and they could also be very bad, as was seen in some of the Java Sea actions).  However, the US Radar-directed fire had numerous examples of being particularly good at first salvo hits.  I have not heard of any specific examples of the Japanese making use of their Radars to direct fire, only for air surveillance and general navigation, while for the Americans, it was used for fire control quite consistently almost from the beginning (though I must admit, it took them awhile to figure out how to use it effectively!).  Have you heard of any specific examples of Japanese use of Radar-directed fire control in action?

searat12 wrote:

Correct.  While gun turrets generally receive the thickest armor, gun directors generally receive little, if any.  This is because a gun director is essentially a giant set of adjustable binoculars inside a sort of revolving tuurt.  The optics are extremely vulnerable to blast effects, and in fact, don't even need to be directly hit to be knocked out.  On a battleship, there is generally an aft fire control station, and a forward control station.  These stations coordinate the information received from the gun directors, and communicate the information to all gun positions so that all the guns are pointing at the appropriate target with the right range and speed info for the gunners.  While these fire control stations are ordinarily armored, it is generally fairly light, and certainly not up to either 16" or 18" shell resistance.  In other words, if the fire control position gets hit, all coordinated communication between gun directors and guns is cut.  If a gun director is hit or otherwise taken out, the battery of guns that director controls is now entirely on its own, or simply silenced.  If enough redundant systems are in place, or good damage control, one of the other gun directors might be able to take over for that battery, and/or the alternate fire control station can step in too (aft or forward).  Of course, smoke can interfere with gun directors, as can flames, and/or electrical failures, so really, it only takes a few good hits to render even the most powerful ship combat ineffective.  Same is true of the conning tower, or 'combat bridge.'  This ordinarily has some of the thickest armor on the whole ship, yet it is surprising how often the vision slit and/or portholes can suffer direct hits, which fill the entirelty of the bridge with shrapnell, killing all personnel.  This happened to the Russians, not just once, but twice at the Battle of the Yellow Sea (where Admiral Makharoff and his staff was killed by a single 12" hit to the bridge of the battleship 'Tsesarevitch,' which caused the ship to reel out of line, breaking up the Russian formation, and costing them the battle.  Same thing happened at Tsushima, where Admiral Rodhzenvensky was severely wounded and most of his staff killed by a hit to the armored conning tower vision slit.  The rest of the ship was fine at the time, but the loss of the admiral, and the loss of steering control not only resulted in the ship destroyed, but the whole battle lost as well..... Finally, it should be understood that before the use of Radar-fire direction, the standard method of gunnery was to fire a pair of shells at an estimated range to the target, watch the splashes, and adjust the angle of the guns and fire again, watch the splashes, make final corrections and open up with all guns (splash under, splash over, straddle).  This wastes a lot of valuable time, and of course, the enemy ship is going to maneuver to dodge your next set of shots ('chasing splashes') to screw up your calculations.  With Radar-directed firing, no 'ranging fire' is required, as all the relevant information is obtained from the Radar, which means the first full salvo is likely to hit, as is the next, and maneuvering to dodge has much less chance of success........

 

Yamato has 9 redundant main armament directors (3 protected inside the main turrets, 3 on the tower bridge, 3 on the aft fire control station),  Iowa only 5 (3 protected inside the main turrets, 1 on tower bridge, 1 on aft fire control station).   The directors inside the main turrets are too low to support long range engagements.  So 6 of Yamato's main armament directors are suitable for supporting long range engagement, only 2 of Iowas is located high enough up to direct long range fire.  So Yamato can take a few more hits than the Iowa before experiencing a complete loss of all her soft but vital fire control equipments.  

Also, with WWII optical range finders and fire control computers, it is not really necessary to use ranging fire to find the range to a target following a steady course so long as visibility is good.   The optical range finders from WWII era is accurate enough to enable the first salvo to straddle in good visibility.   This was demonstrated several times in both Pacific and Atlantic.   Against menuevering targets radar directed guns fire would also need to fire ranging shots.

The main thing favoring the Iowas is definitely blind shot capability in bad weather or at night.  There is also another, more subtle factor favoring Iowa in bad weather besides the inferior quality of Japanese radar.    Japanese and American fire control systems were both stabilized.   But Japanese uses optical stabilization that relies on being able to clearly see and track the horizon.   Americans use gyro stabilization that does not.   If the weather is bad and the horizon is not visible, then Japanese fire control losses stabilization.    American fire control would not.   As a result, Japanese guns might not track the target properly through the ship's normal roll, and Japanese fire control computers might not properly calculate the  compensation for trunnion tilt.   The same would not afflict American system.

 

 

 

I have a question, have any of you been researching the Missouri, or just the Iowa class in general? What I mean is, how was the Missouri's combat record? How good was her crew at the time? These are all questions I am looking for answers to.

Other than that, this is a great thread! I love all the different opinions flying back and forth.

 

Thanks!

jason

One more thing I forgot.   Although Yamato had almost the same main armament ammunition load out as Iowa (100 rounds per gun), Only half of Yamato's 18" ammunition are stowed under the turret turn table and immediately accessible by its power driven shell transfer mechanism.   The other half is stowed outside the turret in the magazine and has to be manually transfered into the turret rotating structure before they can be access by the ammunition train and used.    If Yamato and Iowa were to vigorously menuever while fighting each other, Yamato would have to find a way to break off action after firing 50% of her shells so she could transfer the remainder of her ammunition loadout into the turrets.   I don't know if the Iowa would suffer a similar handicap. 

 

.   

All very good points!  One thing I might note regarding automated, vs manual loading.... In tanks, it is a proven fact  that the M1 Abrams with manual loading fires almost twice as rapidly than a T-72 with fully automatic loading.  The simple reason for this is adrenalin!  If as a loader you are getting shot at, or are encouraged to believe that if you don't get in the first shots the enemy will blow you to bits, you will automatically move far faster than you have ever done before!  Granted, this edge will eventually fall off due to exhaustion, but by that time, 'the deed is done,' and the enemy in flames..... I wonder how much that same effect would impact the manual retrieval of shells in the Iowa's?

 

One other point to remember, the ship that is maneuvering is going slower than the ship that is not, which allows the relatively 'non-maneuvering' ship to rapidly close the range.  While I will grant the Yamato a measure of fire control, I'm not sure sure it was much good in compensating for the ship's own maneuvering (and I recall the Yamato as having to do a LOT of maneuvering at Leyte while dodging torpedoes!), and of course, if your own ship is not maneuvering, your firing accuracy while also rise, even if you might make yourself a bit more vulnerable to your opponent (i.e., go straight for 5 minutes to unleash a couple broadsides, then start dodging again).

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Several points:

1.  It is untrue that the Japanese "never" had radar firecontrol.   The Japanese type 22 radar (The one with 2 little trumpet shaped antenna) can be used for fire control, and by the end of the war almost every Japanese surface ship had it.    However, Japanese surface radar fire control would not be very good because type 22 radar had limited detection range, and rather poor range resolution.   Furthermore Japanese fire control computing equipment do not offer any way for data supplied by radar to be automatically entered into the fire control calculation.  Manual transfer of data was required.   This made it much more difficult for the Japanese use radar to shoot while maneuvering, or shoot at a target that is maneuvering.   The Japanese also practiced using type 21 radar (big mattress shaped antenna) for surface and AA fire control.   The results with type 21 radar are unknown.

2. Regarding Yamato's performance against jeep carriers, one has to keep in mind that Yamato was shooting at targets that where determined to avoid getting hit rather than standing up to shoot back.   Any WWII era ship would have done poorly in such an engagement.    All WWII era computerized fire control systems can compensate for own ship's maneuvers,   but none can produce a good solution against a target that is maneuvering vigorously.   US fire control system exhibited comparable inability to individually engage vigorously maneuvering targets.   The only way to deal with such targets would be for several ships to coordinate their fire to saturate the area around the wiggling target.    In the action against jeep carriers each heavy Japanese ship was pretty much acting on its own.    So it should not be surprising that Japanese battleship fire would be relatively ineffective against targets that are more interested in wiggling around and surviving than in shooting back.    So that battle does not highlight the effectiveness of Yamato's fire control system in relation to other battleship fire control systems of the era, only the general inability of synthetic fire control computer of the era to deal with maneuvering targets.    The first computerized fire control system to attempt to even address the problem of hitting a maneuvering surface target didn't materialize until 1946.   HMS Vanguard and USS Des Moines were the first ships in the world with even a nominal capability to effectively engage a maneuvering target.

3. As a result of the fact that WWII computerized fire control allows a ship to shoot while maneuvering without loss of accuracy,  but does not allow a ship to shoot at a maneuvering target without loss of accuracy, there must be very strong temptation for captains engaged in a one on one fight to maneuver his ship vigorously.     If engagement takes place in clear visibility so both Yamato and Iowa clearly sees each other, and if both Yamato and Iowa continuously maneuvers vigorously while shooting at each other, then I suspect the engagement would last hours and neither ship will hit each other very often and would expend their entire ammunition supplies without decisive results.     

 4. If one ship maneuvers while the other holds a steady course, the one that holds a steady course will loose.  

 5. If both ships hold steady courses I don’t know who would win.    The nominal capabilities of the fire control computers of US and IJN were judged to be very similar by postwar US technical commission.    However, because US fire control system is more automated and less dependent on a very sharp crew, while Japanese fire control is the reverse, I suspect Japanese performance would be more dependent on the degree of rustiness than US performance.   US ships would shoot well even if the crew is rusty or tired.  The Japanese ship would shoot well only if the crew is fresh and well trained.   So the US might enjoy a slight edge overall in actual performance.

6. If there is bad weather or low visibility, and Iowa’s skipper is aware of the strength of Yamato, then the Iowa will shoot first, hit first, and dominate the battle.   Since Yamato can not effectively hit back, the best Yamato can hope for is to vigorously maneuver to run the Iowa out of ammunition and then escape.

7. The cyclic rate of fire of Yamato's 18" guns is for all practical purposes the same as those of Iowa.   Both guns load at fixed angle and has to move from and to the firing elevation with each shot.   So the further the firing elevation is from the loading elevation, the slower the guns would shoot.   For some reason popular naval history likes to quote Yamato's slowest firing rate at 45 degree elevation while Iowa's at fastest firing rate at 12 degrees elevation, thus making it appears as if Yamato can only fire 1.5 rounds per minute while Iowa can fire at over 2 rounds a minute.   In fact at the same elevation as Iowa's firing rate is quoted at, Yamato's 18" gun also had a firing cycle of less than 30 seconds and can also fire at just over 2 rounds a minute per gun.     Yamato also enjoy a fully mechanized ammunition train to move the shells from the turret storage to their hoists.   Iowa requires the crew to use parbuckling to move the shells from storage to hoist.  So I suspect Yamato's firing rate would drop off less with crew fatigue than Iowa's.   Also I suspect Yamato's firing rate would be less effected by roll and list than Iowa's.