Tunnel Vision?

Manstein's revenge,
The sad thing is that each successive empire thinks it will be the one to succeed where all the previous had failed. I sometimes wonder why we bother to record historical events if none are willing to learn.
Perhaps it is arrogance that leads current empires to believe they can accomplish what the others could not.
Regards, PWB.

PaintsWithBrush wrote:

bbrowniii, Looks like America may be moving away from air strategy quicker than we would have thought. The man in charge of "turning things around in Afghanistan", Gen. Stanley McChrystal has called for an increase in troop levels. His advisors are recommending: 300,000-600,000 total (US, NATO, Afgan). I imagine somewhere in Moscow, Putin is smiling and across Russia, tens of thousands of veterans are shaking their heads in disbelief at America's "TUNNEL VISION". Interesting that America achieved it's Imperial height quicker than any other in history, and it's reign will also set the record for shortest duration. Oh well, we are an "instant result" bunch. Regards, PWB.

Afgahnistan has been the bane for many empires, including Great Britain and the USSR...it seems to be a region immune to conventional thinking...

bbrowniii,
Looks like America may be moving away from air strategy quicker than we would have thought. The man in charge of "turning things around in Afghanistan", Gen. Stanley McChrystal has called for an increase in troop levels. His advisors are recommending: 300,000-600,000 total (US, NATO, Afgan).
I imagine somewhere in Moscow, Putin is smiling and across Russia, tens of thousands of veterans are shaking their heads in disbelief at America's "TUNNEL VISION".
Interesting that America achieved it's Imperial height quicker than any other in history, and it's reign will also set the record for shortest duration.
Oh well, we are an "instant result" bunch.
Regards, PWB.

Mansteins revenge wrote:

ddp59 wrote: after the 2 gulf wars, you'll still have conventional warfare in the present & future. IMO, neither of the two were conventional. Airpower alone pretty much defeated the Iraqi forces during Desert Storm.  I believe the air campaign lasted 28 days and the ground war less than 3--maybe the first one more than the second...In the 2003 Liberation, no conventional Iraqi units of any size were encountered...

Good point, although I think ddp59 may have been referring to the lack of a nuclear exchange.  Still, your point is right on that the wars we are currently involved in are asymetric...  However, perhaps as a result of that very asymetry, we find ourselves relying quite heavily on armored vehicles (as well as ground pounders).  Even, or maybe especially, in Afghanistan, in recent months we have seen a movement away from airpower due to the tendency of airstrikes to result in civilian casualties.

At least those who plan for war at sea rarely have to take those considerations into account...

ddp59 wrote:

after the 2 gulf wars, you'll still have conventional warfare in the present & future.

IMO, neither of the two were conventional. Airpower alone pretty much defeated the Iraqi forces during Desert Storm.  I believe the air campaign lasted 28 days and the ground war less than 3--maybe the first one more than the second...In the 2003 Liberation, no conventional Iraqi units of any size were encountered...

after the 2 gulf wars, you'll still have conventional warfare in the present & future.

PaintsWithBrush wrote:

For this reason, unconventional is the way to go. Oil rich nations would be well advised to train their militaries in insurgent warfare and to simply purchase existing nuclear weapons from Russia or China and place them amongst the oil fields, thus assuring that any attempt to steal the resource by force would be met by denying safe access to the oil for several thousand years. The "Doomsday Device" idea put forth in 'Dr. Strangelove', as it were.

PWB,

You have an interesting hypothesis here, but I think it oversimplifies the usefullness of nukes.  Even in the scenario you present above, there really would be no contamination of the oil - it is hundreds of feet underground.  It may make extraction of that oil more complicated, but the oil companies could be counted on to invest in all the decontamination gear they needed to get it done - they're not going to stand around and let their record setting profits dry up.

In addition, many (most) of the countries that have treasured resources today also do NOT have nuclear weapons.  Consider mineral rich countries of Africa.  Heck, consider that most nations simply don't have them (yet).  The idea that Russia or China would simply sell intact weapons is unlikely - it is not in their best interest and both are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Still, the 'face' of warfare is obviously changing (as has been true since the first two guys went at each other with rocks and sticks...) and it is useful to consider if there are any lessons from history currently being ignored...

Very good points regarding the inevitable demise of the both the equipment currently used (MBT) and the notions of traditional maneuver warfare. Both the vehicles and the tactics are extremely expensive in terms of men, material, fuel (food for men, gas for vehicles), not to mention rallying the will of a nation to fight for anything less than it's very survival.
I also agree with 'Manstein's Revenge' regarding nuclear options. The "wars" that are coming our way now are for control of and/or access to resources and no nation is going to contaminate the regions thus denying themselves access to whatever the "goodie" may be.
If there were a release of nuclear weapons, I foresee it as a sabotage maneuver, done to deny the aggressor their prize. Let's face the truth, American forces are not needed to hold any large swath of land in the Arab or Persian countries, only the oil fields, production facilities, and the ports to load the outgoing tankers.
The countries that are blessed with desirable resources know "Western" countries will be friendly only as long as those resources are cheap, plentiful, and easily accessible. The day any one of those criteria are threatened, the term "regime change" becomes topic #1.
For this reason, unconventional is the way to go. Oil rich nations would be well advised to train their militaries in insurgent warfare and to simply purchase existing nuclear weapons from Russia or China and place them amongst the oil fields, thus assuring that any attempt to steal the resource by force would be met by denying safe access to the oil for several thousand years. The "Doomsday Device" idea put forth in 'Dr. Strangelove', as it were.
'Manstein's Revenge', on the subject you brought up about the B-25 being named for Billy Mitchell, to your knowledge, was this the first time the Americans actually "named" an aircraft? Weren't aircraft simply referred to by their type/model, (PBY, P-51, etc.) while the British actually named them (Catalynia, Mustang, etc.)?
Regards, PWB.

Off topic to this section of the forum but not to this thread; keep in mind that the Stryker used by the Army was an attempt to meet future threats. There was a lot of division within the Army over it, although a lot of that was due to scope creap, design problems, etc..

There is an  excellent book on an Air Force officer named John Boyd (retired as a Colonel) by Robert Corum that covers a man dedicated to doing the right thing and not fighting the last war to the detriment of his career. Highly recommended.

bbrowniii wrote:

Mansteins revenge wrote:  PaintsWithBrush wrote:  Tracy White wrote: Use it as a base or at least deny us our use of it. There is still tunnel vision in place today... most militaries will "fight the last war" in their planning. Admirals and Generals are always more in tune with the idea of "This is how we've done it in the past, and it worked out well". The surest way for a ranking military person to find themselves "on the outs" is to propose a change to sacred doctrine. How many careers were cut short trying to break the cycle of "tunnel vision"? Yeah, Billy Mitchell's career and reputation was wrecked for being a proponent of air power defeating sea power.  When he was proved right they named the Mitchell bomber after him... Some hold that the Battle of Khafji, during Desert Storm, demonstrated the same superiority of airpower only over armored units rather than naval ones.  Do you think some day in the 'near' future, we'll be pondering the same obsolesence of the MBT relative to airpower and that those who still advocate for the production and deployments of armored units will be seen as having that same type of tunnel vision?

We might very well be...

In fact, the great armored battle to end all armor battles never occured that was predicted in Europe during the Cold War...Both sidess built their armies around the theory that the Soviets would conduct a Blitzkrieg across Western Europe with huge numbers of armored vehicles, as the Germans did in WW2 (some of that same kind of tunnel vision?)...it never happened...it could be argued that conventional types of ground units are a thing of the past: the divisional system...in fact, you can hear it discussed fairly regularly by military analysts...

Many believe that all future wars will be unconventional, like what happened as far back as Vietnam, and is currently occuring in Irag and Afghanistan...most countries with conventional armies also have nuclear weapons, and that pretty much ensures most countries are not stupid enough to start open warfare with a "nuclear player"...Korea may well be the last example of the classic war of manuever, with regimental and divisional units fighting against each other...

For a good example of air power overkill read about the Battle of the Bismarck Sea:  http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-the-bismarck-sea.htm

Allies losses: 2 bombers, 3 fighters

Japanese: 8 transport ships, 4 destroyers, 20 fighters, 3000-5000 troops.

No allied ships were even involved in the battle!

Well, I guess it would depend on who establishes air supeiority over the battle field first and how effective the anti-aircraft defenses are.

Mansteins revenge wrote:

PaintsWithBrush wrote:  Tracy White wrote: Use it as a base or at least deny us our use of it. There is still tunnel vision in place today... most militaries will "fight the last war" in their planning. Admirals and Generals are always more in tune with the idea of "This is how we've done it in the past, and it worked out well". The surest way for a ranking military person to find themselves "on the outs" is to propose a change to sacred doctrine. How many careers were cut short trying to break the cycle of "tunnel vision"? Yeah, Billy Mitchell's career and reputation was wrecked for being a proponent of air power defeating sea power.  When he was proved right they named the Mitchell bomber after him...

Some hold that the Battle of Khafji, during Desert Storm, demonstrated the same superiority of airpower only over armored units rather than naval ones.  Do you think some day in the 'near' future, we'll be pondering the same obsolesence of the MBT relative to airpower and that those who still advocate for the production and deployments of armored units will be seen as having that same type of tunnel vision?

 

PaintsWithBrush wrote:

Tracy White wrote: Use it as a base or at least deny us our use of it. There is still tunnel vision in place today... most militaries will "fight the last war" in their planning. Admirals and Generals are always more in tune with the idea of "This is how we've done it in the past, and it worked out well". The surest way for a ranking military person to find themselves "on the outs" is to propose a change to sacred doctrine. How many careers were cut short trying to break the cycle of "tunnel vision"?

Yeah, Billy Mitchell's career and reputation was wrecked for being a proponent of air power defeating sea power.  When he was proved right they named the Mitchell bomber after him...

Tracy White wrote:

Use it as a base or at least deny us our use of it. There is still tunnel vision in place today... most militaries will "fight the last war" in their planning.

Midway was (is) too small to support a large air contingent, it was too close to Hawaii to avoid being bombed regularly, it was too far from Japan to be readily supplied, etc., etc. ... It would have been nearly indefensible for Japan.

Tracy White wrote:

Use it as a base or at least deny us our use of it. There is still tunnel vision in place today... most militaries will "fight the last war" in their planning.

Admirals and Generals are always more in tune with the idea of "This is how we've done it in the past, and it worked out well". The surest way for a ranking military person to find themselves "on the outs" is to propose a change to sacred doctrine.
How many careers were cut short trying to break the cycle of "tunnel vision"?

Use it as a base or at least deny us our use of it.

There is still tunnel vision in place today... most militaries will "fight the last war" in their planning.

Seeing that the Japanese did not have a long naval tradition to call from, they seemed to be trying to force the circumstances that had worked for them in their short naval past. This wrung true at Midway where their whole plan was to engage the US  Navy in a climactic battle. What were they really going to do with that tiny atoll anyway?

Manny; brilliant foray. Source please, for me, as I don't recognize the quote.

Bondo posit #1: The idea of Fleet engagements was largely diminished by the results of Jutland, perhaps. Tsushima was a very glorious engagement involving staggering logistics over the course of a great deal of time, and ended of course very badly for the Russians, but I suggest was more a foregone conclusion than a tactical vistory, as Togo made a very dangerous maneuver and had superior units that had been much shorter at sea, to say the least. And he was a British proxy, after all which gave him all kinds of pre-combat intelligence.

I concur as you know on the later importance of airpower, but it wasn't a consideration in 1905. So to follow your logic, it's a broader ignorance of the effect of future technology as yet not understood. That was pretty hard for Victorians, until 1925 when the issue was settled IMHO.

Bondo Posit #2:  It's hard for me to reconcile that quote when a great fleet won while another great fleet lost, but again in that era much import was put on valor rather than technology, or more precise, IMHO, the economy that produces same.

I recently picked up the Hasegawa Mikasa plus all it's PE at a sale for about $ 100, and the Borodino/ Suverov by Zvezda, both in 1/350, for $30 from a collector. A little ways out, after the T2 Mission Carmel and the USS San Francisco. But I appreciate any information.

 

 

Great post and an interesting view, which I'm sure is correct. A clear case of the strategy lagging behind the technology, usually requiring much unnecessary death and destruction before the old ideology is scrapped in the face of cold, hard reality. The old naval boys were still dreaming of crossing the T when they should've been looking skyward. Much like the cavalry charge into machine gun fire they were looking for the glory of their generation.