RoG Bismarck, Pray for me!

Yeah, I like the 'eye candy' argument best myself! ;o)

That said, there is a lot about battleships and battlecruisers that have not really been appreciated, not even now.  The standard argument is that the aircraft carrier 'swept the field' of battleships, making them all obsolete in a stroke, and that they were so costly, that nations were afraid to commit them to battles where they might be lost, etc. 

It is important to understand that the battleship really was one of the first real 'weapons of mass destruction' created, and huge resources were put into their construction, so much so, that by the end of WW1, the former 'great powers' (in particular, Great Britain) realized that if they were to continue to try to keep pace with new powers arising (in particular, Japan and the US), they would be completely bankrupted (sounds kind of like what the US did to the USSR in the Cold War!).  Therefore, before this could occur, and while the Brits still had the most powerful 'fleet in being,' they made enormous diplomatic efforts to rein in battleship production by other nations, voluntarily 'giving up' a large number of their own battleships in the process, while retaining a relatively powerful position in comparison with the other powers of the day.  What this effectively meant was largely scrapping their fleet, and under treaty terms, scrapping large numbers of battleships belonging to other nations at the same time.  Of course, this does not, in any way demonstrate that battleships were in any way 'obsolete' or undesirable, just unaffordable by the UK!  Certainly, if push came to shove, many of these ships that the Brits scrapped could have been modernised and significantly upgraded, as were most of the Italian battleships, and the Japanese battleships and battlecruisers as well.

Germany, under the terms of the Versailles Treaty, lost 25 dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers, a fleet which took some 15 years to build with 'an open checkbook' (let alone all the submarines, cruisers, etc, which were also eliminated).  Britain lost 24 (which does not count war losses), the US lost 8, and scrapped a  number of additional ships that were in construction, and Japan scrapped a number of ships and planned ships as well (and two were converted into aircraft carriers).

In other words, more than 60 dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers were scrapped during the 1920's and '30's, not because they were in any particular way ineffective or useless, but to suit political and economic issues, and mostly that of Britain!  The result of this 'vacuum of power' caused two important developments, the first being the rapid development of the aircraft carrier, and less well appreciated, the development of the heavy cruiser, which largely supplanted the battleship in a surface fleet role, simply because there were no longer enough battleships in existence to form the kind of squadrons necessary to perform proper battleship combat functions.  All through the '20's and '30's, the remaining fleets with numbers of battleships (primarily, the US and UK) still did their exercises and evolutions as squadrons, the idea being to perform much the way they always had.  This changed dramatically in WW2, with the loss of a significant portion of the US battlefleet at Pearl Harbor, plus the sheer number of different tasks and operational areas that now required some measure of battleship support, and not because the battleship squadron was in any way outdated. 

Britain simultaneously had to commit capital ships in the Med (to counter the Italians), the Pacific (to counter the Japanese), the North Atlantic (to deal with German battleships and battlecruisers breaking out), and the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans (to deal with powerful commerce raiders like Graf Spee).  Quite simply, there were not enough battleships available to deal with all of these in squadrons as before, and given the nature of many of these operations (chasing after single ships somewhere in the middle of the ocean, not confronting other squadrons, and not worrying too much about enemy air attacks), it was both sensible and operationally necessary to deploy these battleship assets in twos and threes, so the job for which these battleships were designed (working in squadrons) was just not possible. France only had TWO operational capital ships at the start of the war (Dunkerque and Strassbourg), with a few very old dreadnoughts that had been converted into training ships.  Italy had a good squadron of capital ships, but because of a lack of experience, plus a healthy fear of British battleships, and of course, the ugly experience of Taranto, rarely did much of any use, being largely pinned down by the RAF (or more truthfully, the FEAR of being pinned down!).

Looking at the US experience in comparison with that of the Brits, much the same was true, with battleship commitments necessary in the Atlantic, North Africa, the Med and all over the Pacific as well, and with much of the US battlefleet sunk at Pearl, the few remaining battleships available could only be dispersed among the carrier task forces to act as AA platforms (and they did a tremendous job in that role!) and shore bombardment.  At the same time, since the Japanese fleet only had a few battleships that were actually fit to 'stand in the line,' such as the Yamatos and Nagatos (four ships in total, as the 'Kongos' were still battlecruisers, and the Fuso's and Hyuga's were too slow to keep up), the idea of a squadron of these operating in concert was only used as a desperate last measure at Leyte (which of course meant the US did not NEED to form up in battle squadrons of their own).  And an interesting note here, is that despite confronting a force of 18 escort carriers (Taffy 1, 2 & 3, the equivalent of six 'Essex' class fleet carriers, plus hundreds of land-based planes, and suffering innumerable airstrikes and submarine attacks on their way to the battle area off Samar with no aircover of their own, the Japanese battle squadron of Kurita in fact arrived, having only lost Musashi and two heavy cruisers, and might well have proceeded to cause some real damage, if Kurita had not decided to play it safe and go home... This does not indicate, at least not to me, that a battleship squadron with a measure of air support, was in any way either 'obsolete,' 'ineffective,' or doomed to defeat at the hands of aircraft, or aircraft carriers (and what might have happened if Kurita's force had been directed at Surigao, instead of Samar, is a question for the ages!).

Germany, in full recognition of its complete inferiority in terms of squadron operations, had really no choice BUT to conduct largely single ship operations against merchant ships, as anything else would have only resulted in the immediate and comprehensive  destruction of the German ships involved.  It is also important to realise that in the Bismarck 'incident,' the only reason Bismarck did not escape safely to Brest was the result of one extremely lucky and otherwise badly aimed torpedo hit in the one place that could (and did!) cause real problems, the rudder!  If that torpedo hat hit just about anywhere else, Bismarck would have shrugged it off and continued at speed!  That is not to say that the situation for the German Navy would have changed dramatically as a result (as Bismarck failed to sink any merchant ships, and still could have been bombed in Brest as was Gneisenau), as there still would not have been enough capital ships available to form an effective battle squadron.

As for Bill's comments about the model manufacturers spending too much energy on Bismarck, as against other capital ships, I cannot but agree!

searat12 wrote:

Yeah, I like the 'eye candy' argument best myself! ;o) That said, there is a lot about battleships and battlecruisers that have not really been appreciated, not even now.  The standard argument is that the aircraft carrier 'swept the field' of battleships, making them all obsolete in a stroke, and that they were so costly, that nations were afraid to commit them to battles where they might be lost, etc.  It is important to understand that the battleship really was one of the first real 'weapons of mass destruction' created, and huge resources were put into their construction, so much so, that by the end of WW1, the former 'great powers' (in particular, Great Britain) realized that if they were to continue to try to keep pace with new powers arising (in particular, Japan and the US), they would be completely bankrupted (sounds kind of like what the US did to the USSR in the Cold War!).  Therefore, before this could occur, and while the Brits still had the most powerful 'fleet in being,' they made enormous diplomatic efforts to rein in battleship production by other nations, voluntarily 'giving up' a large number of their own battleships in the process, while retaining a relatively powerful position in comparison with the other powers of the day.  What this effectively meant was largely scrapping their fleet, and under treaty terms, scrapping large numbers of battleships belonging to other nations at the same time.  Of course, this does not, in any way demonstrate that battleships were in any way 'obsolete' or undesirable, just unaffordable by the UK!  Certainly, if push came to shove, many of these ships that the Brits scrapped could have been modernised and significantly upgraded, as were most of the Italian battleships, and the Japanese battleships and battlecruisers as well. Germany, under the terms of the Versailles Treaty, lost 25 dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers, a fleet which took some 15 years to build with 'an open checkbook' (let alone all the submarines, cruisers, etc, which were also eliminated).  Britain lost 24 (which does not count war losses), the US lost 8, and scrapped a  number of additional ships that were in construction, and Japan scrapped a number of ships and planned ships as well (and two were converted into aircraft carriers). In other words, more than 60 dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers were scrapped during the 1920's and '30's, not because they were in any particular way ineffective or useless, but to suit political and economic issues, and mostly that of Britain!  The result of this 'vacuum of power' caused two important developments, the first being the rapid development of the aircraft carrier, and less well appreciated, the development of the heavy cruiser, which largely supplanted the battleship in a surface fleet role, simply because there were no longer enough battleships in existence to form the kind of squadrons necessary to perform proper battleship combat functions.  All through the '20's and '30's, the remaining fleets with numbers of battleships (primarily, the US and UK) still did their exercises and evolutions as squadrons, the idea being to perform much the way they always had.  This changed dramatically in WW2, with the loss of a significant portion of the US battlefleet at Pearl Harbor, plus the sheer number of different tasks and operational areas that now required some measure of battleship support, and not because the battleship squadron was in any way outdated.  Britain simultaneously had to commit capital ships in the Med (to counter the Italians), the Pacific (to counter the Japanese), the North Atlantic (to deal with German battleships and battlecruisers breaking out), and the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans (to deal with powerful commerce raiders like Graf Spee).  Quite simply, there were not enough battleships available to deal with all of these in squadrons as before, and given the nature of many of these operations (chasing after single ships somewhere in the middle of the ocean, not confronting other squadrons, and not worrying too much about enemy air attacks), it was both sensible and operationally necessary to deploy these battleship assets in twos and threes, so the job for which these battleships were designed (working in squadrons) was just not possible. France only had TWO operational capital ships at the start of the war (Dunkerque and Strassbourg), with a few very old dreadnoughts that had been converted into training ships.  Italy had a good squadron of capital ships, but because of a lack of experience, plus a healthy fear of British battleships, and of course, the ugly experience of Taranto, rarely did much of any use, being largely pinned down by the RAF (or more truthfully, the FEAR of being pinned down!). Looking at the US experience in comparison with that of the Brits, much the same was true, with battleship commitments necessary in the Atlantic, North Africa, the Med and all over the Pacific as well, and with much of the US battlefleet sunk at Pearl, the few remaining battleships available could only be dispersed among the carrier task forces to act as AA platforms (and they did a tremendous job in that role!) and shore bombardment.  At the same time, since the Japanese fleet only had a few battleships that were actually fit to 'stand in the line,' such as the Yamatos and Nagatos (four ships in total, as the 'Kongos' were still battlecruisers, and the Fuso's and Hyuga's were too slow to keep up), the idea of a squadron of these operating in concert was only used as a desperate last measure at Leyte (which of course meant the US did not NEED to form up in battle squadrons of their own).  And an interesting note here, is that despite confronting a force of 18 escort carriers (Taffy 1, 2 & 3, the equivalent of six 'Essex' class fleet carriers, plus hundreds of land-based planes, and suffering innumerable airstrikes and submarine attacks on their way to the battle area off Samar with no aircover of their own, the Japanese battle squadron of Kurita in fact arrived, having only lost Musashi and two heavy cruisers, and might well have proceeded to cause some real damage, if Kurita had not decided to play it safe and go home... This does not indicate, at least not to me, that a battleship squadron with a measure of air support, was in any way either 'obsolete,' 'ineffective,' or doomed to defeat at the hands of aircraft, or aircraft carriers (and what might have happened if Kurita's force had been directed at Surigao, instead of Samar, is a question for the ages!). Germany, in full recognition of its complete inferiority in terms of squadron operations, had really no choice BUT to conduct largely single ship operations against merchant ships, as anything else would have only resulted in the immediate and comprehensive  destruction of the German ships involved.  It is also important to realise that in the Bismarck 'incident,' the only reason Bismarck did not escape safely to Brest was the result of one extremely lucky and otherwise badly aimed torpedo hit in the one place that could (and did!) cause real problems, the rudder!  If that torpedo hat hit just about anywhere else, Bismarck would have shrugged it off and continued at speed!  That is not to say that the situation for the German Navy would have changed dramatically as a result (as Bismarck failed to sink any merchant ships, and still could have been bombed in Brest as was Gneisenau), as there still would not have been enough capital ships available to form an effective battle squadron. As for Bill's comments about the model manufacturers spending too much energy on Bismarck, as against other capital ships, I cannot but agree!

Manny,

Perhaps if you defined your meaning of "husbaned" it would clarify things for me.  To me, the term means that battleships were kept in port in relative safety as in WWI after Jutland.  Again, during WWII, battleships were heavily engaged by most navies that had them.  I have shown how the Americans and the British used them extensively; the Germans used them until December 1943, while the French fought theirs when absolutely necessary.  Even the Italians sortied theirs regularly, only to turn away when faced by british capital ships. Only the Japanese kept theirs in home waters or away from the fighting.

Bill Morrison

Manny,

Thanks for your quick response! I will just leave it that I respectfully and sincerely disagree with that assessment. I agree that they were husbaned in WWI but not in WWII for the reasons that I've already stated.

Bill Morrison

warshipguy wrote:

Manny, Thanks for your quick response! I will just leave it that I respectfully and sincerely disagree with that assessment. I agree that they were husbaned in WWI but not in WWII for the reasons that I've already stated. Bill Morrison

As far as BB's being used extensively in other roles during WWII, I agree with you, they were: shore bombardment, escorting carrier groups, etc...but rarely did BB's tangle w/ each other...

Manny,

I count at least eight instances when capital ships fought each other in WWII.  That doesn't include those instances when they were at sea hunting for each other. Even towards the end of the war, when Yamato was on her suicide charge, the U.S. battleships under Admiral Lee were sailing an intercept course to engage Yamato.

To me, this fact means that these ships weren't husbanded. To you, it means that they were. I guess that it is in the eyes of the beholder. History is based on interpretation.

Bill Morrison

warshipguy wrote:

Manny, I count at least eight instances when capital ships fought each other in WWII.  That doesn't include those instances when they were at sea hunting for each other. Even towards the end of the war, when Yamato was on her suicide charge, the U.S. battleships under Admiral Lee were sailing an intercept course to engage Yamato. To me, this fact means that these ships weren't husbanded. To you, it means that they were. I guess that it is in the eyes of the beholder. History is based on interpretation. Bill Morrison

Manny,

I have already said that I agree to disagree.

Bill Morrison

Manny,

I have already said that I agree to disagree.  Please read my previous posts . . . they outline the capital ship engagements very well.

And, it doesn't matter whether or not the Germans sought out engagements between capital ships; they used their ships aggressively against British commerce until Bismarck's loss in May 1941. They planned for a "guerre d' course" not a war against opposing navies. The Panzerschiffe and the Scharnhorsts were designed for such a war.  The Germans did not "husband" them. Following the loss of Bismarck, their theater of operations changed to the far north where they used them when they could. In other words, they "forward deployed" to Norway in order to interdict Allied shipping. In itself, that was an aggressive move and not one of "husbanding."  Remember, the British were also very aggressive in constantly trying to damage German capital ships, keeping them from going to sea.

Our discussion does not center on German ships. British capital ships were constantly at sea, seeking out German ships.  Every convoy had at least one "R" class battleship as protection against German commerce raiders,whatever their type. The British clearly did not "husband" their capital ships.

Nor did the Americans. Rather than "husband" them, American battleships were constantly at sea with carrier groups, bombardment groups, or fighting ship-to-ship engagements. They did not stay in port as a reserve, the meaning of "husbanding".

The French were only in the war for six weeks. They never had a chance to actually fight against the Germans, but Dunkerque still participated in the hunt for Graf Spee with Hood.

Only the Italians and the Japanese sought to "husband" their ships. The Italians did deploy their ships but retreated when faced with the British. The Japanese sent only the Kongo class out; the others were husbaned.  My comment about Yamato in my last entry did not mean that the Japanese used her aggressively, rather, that the American sought to engage her by using their battleships.

Anyway, again, let's agree to disagree. Historical interpretation can be tricky, depending much on an individual's point of view.

Bill Morrison

Also, I thought I had made the point that battleships did not fight each other in fleets in WW2, because there simply weren't enough battleships around to do so!  A fighting battleship squadron really needs at least four battleships, and a few cruisers and destroyers for a screen, and just about the only time in WW2 where there were actually enough battleships available in any one place for such formations was at Leyte, and of course, this is also when the last battleship vs battleship battle was fought (though there was certainly other opportunities in the Med, but the Italians backed down).  In other words, if your enemy isn't cruising around with squadrons of battleships, there is no need for you to do so, and so largely, they didn't!  This is not quite the same as being 'husbanded,' at least by my interpretation.  Instead, appropriate ship grouplings were assembled to deal with equivalent groupings of opposing ships.  Guadalcanal is a good example of this.  As long as the Japanese were sending cruiser groups into battle, the Americans responded with cruiser groups of their own.  But once the Japanese 'upped the ante' by sending in a couple of battlecruisers, the Americans upped their stake as well with a couple of battleships of their own in response, with predictable results..... 

In any case, I would very much like to see any progress made on one of these Revell Bismarcks, as I plan to get one myself as soon as my Trumpeter Prinz Eugen arrives....

searat12 wrote:

Also, I thought I had made the point that battleships did not fight each other in fleets in WW2, because there simply weren't enough battleships around to do so!

If navies were so loathe to use battleships, why did they fight in virtually every major naval battle or campaign of WWII? That is an undeniable fact.  The fact and the statement do not match; if navies were in fact loathe to use them, why did they use them? But, use them they did. Please explain . . .

Bill Morrison

ps1scw wrote:

Was her true value that she tied up much needed resources, while at port, that the British could have used elsewhere?

After WW2, the only nations that had any number of battleships were the US and the UK, and the UK could no longer afford to operate even ONE battleship, let alone a fleet of them (the cost of TWO world wars finally bankrupted the empire, which collapsed shortly after), and so the Brits scrapped them all.  This left the US as the ONLY nation with any number of battleships (the French still had two, and committed them at Suez in the '50's, you may recall), but as there were NO adversaries left in the world with any real pretensions to seapower, the battleship was retired by the US (though repeatedly reactivated as need required).  Again, this was NOT because of 'nuclear warfare threats' (the Bikini Atoll atomic tests showed that battleships were in fact the ONLY ships likely to survive a direct nuclear strike!), or the aircraft carrier either, as naval warfare had evolved to feature balanced task forces with carriers AND battleships for mutual defense.  However, as the US was ALSO just about the only nation with any appreciable number of aircraft carriers either, it was easier and cheaper to mothball the battleships, rather than the carriers.  Even today, there is a role for the battleship which has YET to be equalled by any other ship-type (shore bombardment), but as long as no other nation decides to BUILD battleships (and in fact the technology and industry to do so has been lost for at least 50 years!), then there is no reason for the US to reactivate the Missouri's again, or design any new ones either.  In other words, that particular hatchet HAS been buried, but not because it wasn't sharp!

searat12 wrote:

Manny, I still don't think you have quite understood what I have been saying, but I will try one more time...The record shows exactly the opposite of 'battleships being husbanded,' with battleships repeatedly committed in every theater of the war, and in every kind of operation, from convoy escort, to carrier support, to shore bombardment, to search and destroy missions against other heavy warships, etc, etc.....  I STILL don't know why people keep saying battleships were 'obsolete' at any time in WW2, or even well after (Heck!  Even today!).  As I have said repeatedly, battleships kicked butt in every operation they were involved in during WW2, but because there were so few of them available in WW2 (and NOT because they were in any way 'obsolete,' but because of the treaties of the '20's and '30's), they did not operate as they were intended, in squadrons, and against squadrons. After WW2, the only nations that had any number of battleships were the US and the UK, and the UK could no longer afford to operate even ONE battleship, let alone a fleet of them (the cost of TWO world wars finally bankrupted the empire, which collapsed shortly after), and so the Brits scrapped them all.  This left the US as the ONLY nation with any number of battleships (the French still had two, and committed them at Suez in the '50's, you may recall), but as there were NO adversaries left in the world with any real pretensions to seapower, the battleship was retired by the US (though repeatedly reactivated as need required).  Again, this was NOT because of 'nuclear warfare threats' (the Bikini Atoll atomic tests showed that battleships were in fact the ONLY ships likely to survive a direct nuclear strike!), or the aircraft carrier either, as naval warfare had evolved to feature balanced task forces with carriers AND battleships for mutual defense.  However, as the US was ALSO just about the only nation with any appreciable number of aircraft carriers either, it was easier and cheaper to mothball the battleships, rather than the carriers.  Even today, there is a role for the battleship which has YET to be equalled by any other ship-type (shore bombardment), but as long as no other nation decides to BUILD battleships (and in fact the technology and industry to do so has been lost for at least 50 years!), then there is no reason for the US to reactivate the Missouri's again, or design any new ones either.  In other words, that particular hatchet HAS been buried, but not because it wasn't sharp!

"...luckily, the two US carriers were not in port during the Japanese raid on Pearl; otherwise, the US could not have rebounded so quickly and strike the devastating blow to the Japanese fleet at Midway..."

...Midway...that about sums it up...

Whereas I agree that aircraft carriers changed the role of the battleship I disagree with the common assessment that they rendered the battleship obsolete.  Carriers became the primary strike weapon of the fleet, but there were many examples of carrier airpower being unable to deal with shore bombardment problems.  Carriers also depended heavily on antiaircraft firepower of battleships; many more would have been lost had it not been for their battleship escorts!There are indeed roles for them to play in today's concern over the littoral environment. The limiting factor is cost not effectiveness. Otherwise the Soviets/Russians would not continue to operate the Kirov class.

Besides the U.S. Navy, no other navy operates carriers in any number. Only a few exist elsewhere, and the U.S. Navy only has 12. The limiting factor, again, is cost not effectiveness. Most navies are operating missile oriented surface ships. The Falklands conflict saw what missiles can do to unprotected warships.

Searat12 is right when he said that the Bikini nuclear tests demonstrated that the only ships capable of surviving a nuclear attack are battleships.

Bill Morrison

warshipguy wrote:

Searat12 is right when he said that the Bikini nuclear tests demonstrated that the only ships capable of surviving a nuclear attack are battleships. Bill Morrison

I really doubt anyone believes that ANY ship, after suffering from a nuclear blast would still be in any capacity to conduct offensive operations...Had there been real people on those ships at Bikini, most probably all would have been killed outright, severly injured and/or had radiation exposure that would have killed them within days or weeks...the "surviving" ships themselves were so radioactive that they could never be used again for their original purpose, so I'm not sure what your point is about them "surviving".

I'm not interested in joining this debate, as it's way beyond my knowledge, just a listener.

Here's a point I thought of a few pages back. BB's were a big political statement, an expression of national pride and empire, and to lose one, let alone five, would be a national tragedy on the greatest scale. For the British and the Germans, the Italians and the French to a lesser extent, that must have figured into their war plans.

If I was forced to be at Bikini, I'd pick a submarine.

warshipguy wrote:

Whereas I agree that aircraft carriers changed the role of the battleship I disagree with the common assessment that they rendered the battleship obsolete.  Carriers became the primary strike weapon of the fleet, but there were many examples of carrier airpower being unable to deal with shore bombardment problems.  Carriers also depended heavily on antiaircraft firepower of battleships; many more would have been lost had it not been for their battleship escorts!There are indeed roles for them to play in today's concern over the littoral environment. The limiting factor is cost not effectiveness. Otherwise the Soviets/Russians would not continue to operate the Kirov class. Besides the U.S. Navy, no other navy operates carriers in any number. Only a few exist elsewhere, and the U.S. Navy only has 12. The limiting factor, again, is cost not effectiveness. Most navies are operating missile oriented surface ships. The Falklands conflict saw what missiles can do to unprotected warships.   Bill Morrison

true the missile that destroyed sheffield didnt even go off!! fire an excoset at a bb and it would barely even dent it

subfixer wrote:

Actually, the USS Dentuda, a Balao class sub, was moored submerged just outside of the 1,000 yard perimeter of the Baker blast. As she was submerged, she avoided the highly radioactive base surge and hull damage that the surface ships (including surfaced subs) did. She was decontaminated rather easily, underwent minor repairs, and was briely returned to active service. None of the surface ships (at least none of the surface ships in the immediate area of the blast) could make that claim. Although the Saratoga and Prinz Eugen were still afloat, they were so highly radioactively contaminated that crew survival would have been unlikely. I think I would have preferred to take my chances in a submerged submarine.

Manny's point about radiation exposure could be true if subsequent ship design did not take this into consideration. Modern ships are designed with NBC warfare protection in mind.  First, the men inside the ship would have had a large degree of protection depending largely on where they were. Radiation decontamination is practised quite regularly on warships with any sort of nuclear capabilities. Second, shipboard washdown capabilities can reduce or eliminate surface contamination. Third, topside damage did heavily damage the battleships' offensive capabilities. But, my comment was that those ships could survive. I said nothing about their ability to fight an immediate battle after undergoing such an explosion. Admiral Tirpitz said it best when he said that a surviving ship, no matter how heavily damaged, could be repaired at a fraction of the cost at a fraction of the time of building a new ship.

As for Manny's additional comment that it is incorrect that battleships were the only ships to survive at Bikini, at no time did I say that they were.  Battleships are more likely to survive than other surface ships, but there are many factors to consider.  What was the type of explosion, its yield, the location of the ship in relation to the explosion, etc.  These factors being equal, the better protected ship would have a better chance of survival.  The Exocet missile that hit HMS Sheffield and sank her would have been shrugged off by a better protected ship. And, don't forget that USS Saratoga, the carrier that survived, was designed as a battlecruiser with a very stout hull. 

Bill Morrison