| Yeah, I like the 'eye candy' argument best myself! ;o) That said, there is a lot about battleships and battlecruisers that have not really been appreciated, not even now. The standard argument is that the aircraft carrier 'swept the field' of battleships, making them all obsolete in a stroke, and that they were so costly, that nations were afraid to commit them to battles where they might be lost, etc. It is important to understand that the battleship really was one of the first real 'weapons of mass destruction' created, and huge resources were put into their construction, so much so, that by the end of WW1, the former 'great powers' (in particular, Great Britain) realized that if they were to continue to try to keep pace with new powers arising (in particular, Japan and the US), they would be completely bankrupted (sounds kind of like what the US did to the USSR in the Cold War!). Therefore, before this could occur, and while the Brits still had the most powerful 'fleet in being,' they made enormous diplomatic efforts to rein in battleship production by other nations, voluntarily 'giving up' a large number of their own battleships in the process, while retaining a relatively powerful position in comparison with the other powers of the day. What this effectively meant was largely scrapping their fleet, and under treaty terms, scrapping large numbers of battleships belonging to other nations at the same time. Of course, this does not, in any way demonstrate that battleships were in any way 'obsolete' or undesirable, just unaffordable by the UK! Certainly, if push came to shove, many of these ships that the Brits scrapped could have been modernised and significantly upgraded, as were most of the Italian battleships, and the Japanese battleships and battlecruisers as well. Germany, under the terms of the Versailles Treaty, lost 25 dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers, a fleet which took some 15 years to build with 'an open checkbook' (let alone all the submarines, cruisers, etc, which were also eliminated). Britain lost 24 (which does not count war losses), the US lost 8, and scrapped a number of additional ships that were in construction, and Japan scrapped a number of ships and planned ships as well (and two were converted into aircraft carriers). In other words, more than 60 dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers were scrapped during the 1920's and '30's, not because they were in any particular way ineffective or useless, but to suit political and economic issues, and mostly that of Britain! The result of this 'vacuum of power' caused two important developments, the first being the rapid development of the aircraft carrier, and less well appreciated, the development of the heavy cruiser, which largely supplanted the battleship in a surface fleet role, simply because there were no longer enough battleships in existence to form the kind of squadrons necessary to perform proper battleship combat functions. All through the '20's and '30's, the remaining fleets with numbers of battleships (primarily, the US and UK) still did their exercises and evolutions as squadrons, the idea being to perform much the way they always had. This changed dramatically in WW2, with the loss of a significant portion of the US battlefleet at Pearl Harbor, plus the sheer number of different tasks and operational areas that now required some measure of battleship support, and not because the battleship squadron was in any way outdated. Britain simultaneously had to commit capital ships in the Med (to counter the Italians), the Pacific (to counter the Japanese), the North Atlantic (to deal with German battleships and battlecruisers breaking out), and the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans (to deal with powerful commerce raiders like Graf Spee). Quite simply, there were not enough battleships available to deal with all of these in squadrons as before, and given the nature of many of these operations (chasing after single ships somewhere in the middle of the ocean, not confronting other squadrons, and not worrying too much about enemy air attacks), it was both sensible and operationally necessary to deploy these battleship assets in twos and threes, so the job for which these battleships were designed (working in squadrons) was just not possible. France only had TWO operational capital ships at the start of the war (Dunkerque and Strassbourg), with a few very old dreadnoughts that had been converted into training ships. Italy had a good squadron of capital ships, but because of a lack of experience, plus a healthy fear of British battleships, and of course, the ugly experience of Taranto, rarely did much of any use, being largely pinned down by the RAF (or more truthfully, the FEAR of being pinned down!). Looking at the US experience in comparison with that of the Brits, much the same was true, with battleship commitments necessary in the Atlantic, North Africa, the Med and all over the Pacific as well, and with much of the US battlefleet sunk at Pearl, the few remaining battleships available could only be dispersed among the carrier task forces to act as AA platforms (and they did a tremendous job in that role!) and shore bombardment. At the same time, since the Japanese fleet only had a few battleships that were actually fit to 'stand in the line,' such as the Yamatos and Nagatos (four ships in total, as the 'Kongos' were still battlecruisers, and the Fuso's and Hyuga's were too slow to keep up), the idea of a squadron of these operating in concert was only used as a desperate last measure at Leyte (which of course meant the US did not NEED to form up in battle squadrons of their own). And an interesting note here, is that despite confronting a force of 18 escort carriers (Taffy 1, 2 & 3, the equivalent of six 'Essex' class fleet carriers, plus hundreds of land-based planes, and suffering innumerable airstrikes and submarine attacks on their way to the battle area off Samar with no aircover of their own, the Japanese battle squadron of Kurita in fact arrived, having only lost Musashi and two heavy cruisers, and might well have proceeded to cause some real damage, if Kurita had not decided to play it safe and go home... This does not indicate, at least not to me, that a battleship squadron with a measure of air support, was in any way either 'obsolete,' 'ineffective,' or doomed to defeat at the hands of aircraft, or aircraft carriers (and what might have happened if Kurita's force had been directed at Surigao, instead of Samar, is a question for the ages!). Germany, in full recognition of its complete inferiority in terms of squadron operations, had really no choice BUT to conduct largely single ship operations against merchant ships, as anything else would have only resulted in the immediate and comprehensive destruction of the German ships involved. It is also important to realise that in the Bismarck 'incident,' the only reason Bismarck did not escape safely to Brest was the result of one extremely lucky and otherwise badly aimed torpedo hit in the one place that could (and did!) cause real problems, the rudder! If that torpedo hat hit just about anywhere else, Bismarck would have shrugged it off and continued at speed! That is not to say that the situation for the German Navy would have changed dramatically as a result (as Bismarck failed to sink any merchant ships, and still could have been bombed in Brest as was Gneisenau), as there still would not have been enough capital ships available to form an effective battle squadron. As for Bill's comments about the model manufacturers spending too much energy on Bismarck, as against other capital ships, I cannot but agree! |