Carrier warfare in the Pacific...

subfixer

Manstein's revenge:

subfixer:

Manstein's revenge:

 

 

Actually, Santa Cruz cost the Japanese more in aircrew losses than any other carrier battle...

 

With, of course, the exception of the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Granted, those pilots weren't the cream of the Japanese air forces.

 

I was speaking of aircrew operating solely from carriers...many lost during the "Turkey Shoot" were land based...

 

I think that the Japanese lost around 150, more or less, aircrew at Santa Cruz while at the Philippine Sea they lost a little more than 420 ship based aircraft and crew and around 200 land based aircraft and crew. But you could say that the loss of 150 crack pilots far outweighed the 600+ rookies.

I read an interesting article on Coral Sea last night that suggested that it was both a tactical and strategic victory for the Americans, and marked the end of Japanese expansion---wheras most folks cite Midway for this...All three Japanese carriers comitted were either sunk (Shoho) or damaged (Shokaku and Zuikaku)...this was the first time the Japanese split their large fleet carrier force (Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku) up and it cost them...it also knocked the two best carriers out of the upcoming fight for Midway (Shokaku and Zuikaku)...

Another interesting tidbit I learned is that aircrew were permanently assigned to a carrier--they never rotated air-wings off like the Americans did.  If you were a Japanese Navy pilot you had a really great chance of NEVER serving or even landing on a carrier...if I recall, none of Japan's leading Navy aces ever served on carriers, or at least for no length of time... 

Manstein's revenge

subfixer:

Manstein's revenge:

 

 

Actually, Santa Cruz cost the Japanese more in aircrew losses than any other carrier battle...

 

With, of course, the exception of the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Granted, those pilots weren't the cream of the Japanese air forces.

 

I was speaking of aircrew operating solely from carriers...many lost during the "Turkey Shoot" were land based...

I think that the Japanese lost around 150, more or less, aircrew at Santa Cruz while at the Philippine Sea they lost a little more than 420 ship based aircraft and crew and around 200 land based aircraft and crew. But you could say that the loss of 150 crack pilots far outweighed the 600+ rookies.

There was a fundamental difference between the two navies; they tended to keep their crews at sea until they were used up whereas we'd bring pilots home after a bit to serve as instructors and build up new squadrons so that the combat experience helped make better new pilots.

We also acknowledged ship losses and learned from them, such as the damage reports I post on my site that were spread across the entire Navy as opposed to entire crews being sequestered and hidden.

subfixer

 

Manstein's revenge:

 

 

 

 

Actually, Santa Cruz cost the Japanese more in aircrew losses than any other carrier battle...

 

 

 

With, of course, the exception of the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Granted, those pilots weren't the cream of the Japanese air forces.

No they weren't. The Battle of the Coral Sea may well have crippled the Japanese air arm from eveything I've read. Had they survived, they might have affected the Battle of Midway. Gotta love history.

True. The Solomons campaign ate up whatever experienced air groups the IJNAF had. They were  decimated by the summer of 1943, with no real prospect of ever regaining their former experience level that was standard at the outbreak of war 18 months earlier.

Japanese did not lose that many pilots even during the major carrier battles. However as a carrier force the concentration never reached pearl level and their training of new ones lagged significantly behind US. The disparity comes from a number of factors:

Japanese naval aircraft also had zero survivability and are superseded by anything beyond F4F

Sheer number, and marginally more effective AA armament

Squadron tactics developed to take advantage of US aircraft's ruggedness, nullify Japanese aircraft manuvurability and exploit lack of survivability

Radar provided early warning, which the Japanese lacked and always on the defensive

Even during Coral/Midway arguably at good strength, Japanese strike forces suffered heavy losses - some up to 60% per sortie, whereas AA vs US attacks were largely ineffectual and relied ton CAP fighters. As Japanese carriers got depleted, experienced pilots were sent to land bases and suffered additional attrition vs US land based airgroups.

subfixer

Manstein's revenge:

 

 

Actually, Santa Cruz cost the Japanese more in aircrew losses than any other carrier battle...

 

With, of course, the exception of the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Granted, those pilots weren't the cream of the Japanese air forces.

Manstein's revenge

 

 

Actually, Santa Cruz cost the Japanese more in aircrew losses than any other carrier battle...

With, of course, the exception of the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Granted, those pilots weren't the cream of the Japanese air forces.

telsono

Going back to the Japanese supply of experienced carrier pilots. It is stated that after the Guadalcanal campaign there was an extreme dearth of veteran carrier pilots left. Midway, Coral Sea, etc. just drained the supply down, and the training allowed for only a trickle of replacements.

Going back to the Japanese supply of experienced carrier pilots. It is stated that after the Guadalcanal campaign there was an extreme dearth of veteran carrier pilots left. Midway, Coral Sea, etc. just drained the supply down, and the training allowed for only a trickle of replacements.

Subaro Sakai in his memoir stated how tough the regime was to become a naval airman in the IJN. The Japanese had to change from an overly strict program down to a shortened basic program of less than 6 months of flight training. They couldn't keep up with their losses. We on the other hand extended our training time to nearly 2 years with plenty of trained pilots in the pipeline. Experienced US naval airmen were rotated back as instructors, where the Japanes fought without rest.

The IJN came to have carriers with only very small cadres of veterans, inadequate to maintain an audacious offensive program. Actually, after Guadalcanal, japan was on a startegic defensive position. the momentum had shifted. As Yamamoto had predicted they had awoken a sleeping giant with terrible consequences.

Mike T.

Very true, but the manner in which the Royal Navy used their carriers was very much in line with USN pre- war war games. It was rare for the carriers to be grouped together as more than a pair in a task force or operate completely independent of the battle line. In the Med the threat was land based air power, the Italian Navy, and some U-Boats. In the Atlantic, only rarely did the Royal Navy encounter a German surface warship. And then usually their carriers supported and augmented their surface fleet. The USN operated in a similar manner in the Atlantic in 1942. During Operation Torch the few US carriers present operated very much to support to amphibious assault.

stikpusher

I suspect that had the battle line not been taken out of the equation at Pearl Harbor, the admirals in charge may have been tempted to operate in a manner similar to the Royal Navy with carriers for the most part supplementing and supporting the surface task forces.

I suspect that had the battle line not been taken out of the equation at Pearl Harbor, the admirals in charge may have been tempted to operate in a manner similar to the Royal Navy with carriers for the most part supplementing and supporting the surface task forces.

stikpusher

IRC, War Plan Orange, which was essetially the blueprint for the drive across the Pacific towards Japan dated from the 1920s.

Would you believe 1906? Perhaps 1911 if wanting to be a bit more precise, I guess.

Also, the notion that the attack on Pearl Harbor forced the switch to carriers is overblown, I think.  If you look at the Fleet Problems the Navy ran before the war a lot of the shift to carrier-centric task forces happened there. When Halsey was offered battleships for his mission to Wake just before the attack he declined them, preferring to keep just carriers, cruisers, and destroyers.

Yes, there were a lot of battleship admirals out there, but that was because we still had a lot of battleships; the programs to ramp up production hadn't had a chance to produce anything before the war happened.

Yes indeed. But the basic pattern for the battles to follow was solidified. Scouting to locate the enemy, strikes lauched as quickly as possible once the enemy was located, and defensive measures taken. The USN seemed to have learn better on the damage control side as a result as well.

And interestingly, during the "learning" battle, the USN flew probably their best and most successful example of a co ordinated dive bomber and torpedo strike on an enemy carrier until Leyte Gulf.

Yes and no....Coral Sea was the "learning" carrier battle...mistakes were identified by both sides and they tried to avoid them agaon, although not always successfully....

Manstein's revenge

...the other thing to remember is that war itself with the Japanese was not really a surprise...many/most in govt and military thought it was just a matter of time...it was the manner in which it started that was the surprise...So, I'm sure every day from around '38 to '41 someone was saying, "Something's up with the Japanese..."

Probably longer than that. IIRC, War Plan Orange, which was essetially the blueprint for the drive across the Pacific towards Japan dated from the 1920s. It was modified in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, but still essentially followed by Nimitz's forces across the Central Pacific. The major change to the plan was the replacement of the Battleship line by the Fast Carriers as the primary offensive weapon.

As for myself, I am particularly fascinated by (aside from Midway) the Coral Sea battle. The first carrier clash. Blue Skies and Blood, by Edwin Hoyt tells the story in great detail. That battle essentaily set the way that things were going to happen in the rest of the carrier fights in 1942 and beyond.

Yep...

subfixer

 The one carrier battle that hasn't gotten any mention yet is the Battle of the Philippine Sea.  I realize that the IJN was low on experienced pilots and were outnumbered (well, they picked this fight) but the losses it took in that battle were beyond catastrophic. It was the virtual end of its naval air arm. Between 550-650 Japanese planes were destroyed, three fleet carriers (two of these by submarines) and two oilers sunk and six other ships damaged against one damaged battleship and 65 aircraft lost on the US side. And, most of the US flightcrews were rescued after having to ditch after the long missions they flew. The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot's 67th aniversary is this coming Sunday, June 19. 

True. It has kind of gotten lost in history. The Japanese had close to 500 carrier aircraft If I'm correct, we nearly double. But by this time, the tide had turned and it was one steady push to Japan. The japanese as said had mainly novice pilots and it showed. I think their over confidence came with all of the land-based aircraft they had. By 1944, our navy was huge with so many carriers and support craft. We also had the big advantage of radar on all our ships. Our fighters totally out-calssed anything they had. It really was a "turkey shoot". It's interesting that 2 of the 3 carriers lost were from submarines, not naval gunfire or airplanes. The Musashi was sunk by aircraft though.

...the other thing to remember is that war itself with the Japanese was not really a surprise...many/most in govt and military thought it was just a matter of time...it was the manner in which it started that was the surprise...So, I'm sure every day from around '38 to '41 someone was saying, "Something's up with the Japanese..."

His story doesn't jibe with history. Lerxington was moving USMC aircraft to Midway when the attack happened and was ordered to search for the Japanese fleet immediately afterwards, prior to delivering the aircraft.

That's one of those fun situations where one just listens politely and enjoys the other things they bring to the table.

Just met a veteran that served in the navy from 39-45.  Was on the Lexington during the attack on Pearl Harbor and when it was sunk.  Said that the Lexington was sent to Midway "for support" because they heard "something was up with the japs".  And then ordered to stay there (midway) until after the attack ended.  He said he didn't like the navy much and enlisted in the army in '46 and served something like 15 years.

 The one carrier battle that hasn't gotten any mention yet is the Battle of the Philippine Sea.  I realize that the IJN was low on experienced pilots and were outnumbered (well, they picked this fight) but the losses it took in that battle were beyond catastrophic. It was the virtual end of its naval air arm. Between 550-650 Japanese planes were destroyed, three fleet carriers (two of these by submarines) and two oilers sunk and six other ships damaged against one damaged battleship and 65 aircraft lost on the US side. And, most of the US flightcrews were rescued after having to ditch after the long missions they flew. The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot's 67th aniversary is this coming Sunday, June 19. 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=2QvNQS7HLYE

I think the chart's just the fleet, but land based aircraft woudl've easily doubled the aircraft numbers. Japan is trying to launch an offensive on the established US bases in the area.

Japan also has this tendency to divide their fleet into various groups in an overly complex operation - partly they want to engage in gunnery duel so a two proned attack is preferred in order to inflict maximum damage. However it also divided up the screening force, eg battleships deserve their own escorts, so carriers has to contend with the left overs - rather than battleships being escorts of carriers.

It's sad that Japan decided to build strike aircraft at the expense of ruggedness and armour which took its toll once they no longer had the numerical superiority - unlike europe where a downed air crew walks 10 km to the nearest friendly air base, in naval battle a downed aircraft most likely means dead crew.

The other day I watched the animation Manstein posted on the Santa Cruz battle, rather interesting.  I wikipedia'd it....did not really seem fair to me.    It looked as USA was outnumbered as wiki has a chart showing loses and numbers.  I will admit I dont know enough about the war other than what I saw on the video and wiki.  Maybe I missed something.    I found the chart:USA(left) Japan (right) 

It’s a poor day you don’t learn something.

Cogito ergo sum. Sum certus ergo sum falsus.
“I think, therefore I am. I am certain, therefore I am wrong.”

Manstein's revenge

Carrier Strike by Hammel is a great account about the battle of Santa Cruz...I, too, have read Shattered Sword and would recommend it as well, although like I mentioned, to me, Santa Cruz is much more fascinating as the two sides traded body blows until one "left the ring"...

Midway may have been when the Japanese were stopped in their expansion and a certain degree of parity was achieved, but the Japanese could have very well sank the last operational carrier the Americans had in the Pacific at Santa Cruz had a few minor things gone the other way... 

Aircrew losses for the Japanese were highest at Santa Cruz than in any other carrier battle...it was also the last time they were able to mount the classic "anvil and hammer" attack...

Some food for thought. You are correct in that Midway stopped the expansion. Had the Japanese sunk 2-3 of our carriers at Midway and kept theirs intact, the Pacific campaign would have taken a much different turn. We would have had to fall back to Pearl and possibly to the West Coast. The war would have been most definitely prolonged and might also have affected our contributions to Europe and Italy.

That being said, the Guadalcanal naval campaign doesn't get enough press. It's always Leyte, Iwo and Okinawa. However the greatest naval battles between opposing navies happened in the Guadalcanal campaign. It wasn't until Leyte that there were any further ship-to-ship battles.

Carrier Strike by Hammel is a great account about the battle of Santa Cruz...I, too, have read Shattered Sword and would recommend it as well, although like I mentioned, to me, Santa Cruz is much more fascinating as the two sides traded body blows until one "left the ring"...

Midway may have been when the Japanese were stopped in their expansion and a certain degree of parity was achieved, but the Japanese could have very well sank the last operational carrier the Americans had in the Pacific at Santa Cruz had a few minor things gone the other way... 

Aircrew losses for the Japanese were highest at Santa Cruz than in any other carrier battle...it was also the last time they were able to mount the classic "anvil and hammer" attack...

Just finished Shattered Sword last month, and it is fantastic--much information from the Japanese side.

Another excellent book (and probably you know about it already--I'm new to the Pacific naval side of things) is The First Team, about the carrier air groups from Pearl Harbor through Midway.  Very detailed but highly readable and keeps your interest.