Most historically significant naval battles???

All very good points, Schoonerbumm!

I will make just a couple last points about Midway, and then leave it alone (everybody gets to have their own opinion in a 'what if' contest!).

It is important to remember that most, if not all the references that have been quoted by various members were written by Americans after the war, not Japanese, and not by actual participants.  Therefore, most of this stuff is heavily laced with a lot of self-righteous propaganda that conveniently ignores an awful lot of facts.  As what I have proposed appears to be controversial (at least!), it might worth remembering that this proposition was developed using Japanese sources, as well as American sources, and by participants, not after-the-fact academics.  As you might imagine, the picture is very different!  Two excellent sources are 'The Reluctant Admiral' by Hiroki Agawa (a Japanese Intelligence officer in WW2), and 'Japanese Destroyer Captain,' by Tameichi Hara (a destroyer Captain throughout the Pacific war with a lot of good points to make about how operations were conducted).

These two books, along with a number of others, illustrate most of the points I have been trying to make;  Yamamoto knew Japan could not fight a long war with the US, and argued very strongly against any such undertaking.  But once he had been over-ruled by the Army, he came up with the best plan he could.  And it was quite a good plan!  But for some reason (and I have speculated that espionage and sabotage had a large part in this), he did not follow his own plans, which ensured they would fail.

Both Pearl Harbor and Midway are classic examples of this failure, intended or not.  It is important when looking at Midway not to look at this battle in isolation.  Yes, the loss of three US carriers and a few thousand men by itself would not have 'knocked the US out of the war.'  But that position ignores all that had led up to that point, with the fall of Singapore, the fall of the Phillipines, and the huge losses that entailed.  The loss of Java, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, etc, etc, the destruction of the ABDA naval forces, and on and on, and all within just a few months meant cumulative losses to the US and the allies of tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen, dozens of ships (including a number of carriers and battleships), hundreds and hundreds of aircraft, and at the same time, the Germans were rampaging all over Europe, North Africa and the Med.  While the Coral Sea action gave a bit of encouragement, it was purchased at terrible cost, and one more big loss might well have been catastrophic for allied morale in the Pacific.

Yes, the US was cranking out carriers and other ships as fast as possible, but to divert all of these, or even the major portion to an apparently losing campaign in the Pacific, when the Atlantic convoys were critical for the survival of not just the UK, but the Soviet Union as well, begs the question of what might have resulted in Europe if this did in fact happen.  The loss of the US carriers at Midway could have led to Hawaii becoming rapidly untenable for US logistics, as once such things as docks, machine shops, cranes, etc are destroyed, it is pretty easy to prevent them from being rebuilt.  And without Hawaii, and without the Panama canal, the logistics behind putting an American fleet in combat operations in the Pacific becomes tenuous in the extreme, if not impossible.  In fact, there is a very good argument that without the facilities at Pearl Harbor, most of the US ships that were damaged in the various battles would never have returned to fight another day.

All this points to a very grim conclusion, and that is the political pressures to sign up to at least a temporary peace with Japan would have been enormous if Midway had been lost (and that pressure would have been applied not just by elements within the US government, but by our allies as well).  At the end of the day, the rationalisation goes something like this;  None of the territories lost in the Pacific could be truly considered 'US soil,' so just what have we actually 'lost' here?  Politicians are generally pragmatic, and (as you should understand by now!) can rationalize and spin just about anything to make it look favorable, and usually do (and the same goes for many academics, I might add!).  Roosevelt and Churchill gave away Eastern Europe to the Soviets, when it was convenient and necessary to do so, and under the right circumstances, a temporary peace or ceasefire with the Japanese was well within possibility, given another huge loss..... Here endeth the lesson.......

my two cents...

After thirty years of historical reading, war gaming and working as a chief engineer on a real weapon system used by the US Navy, I offer my sage wisdom, and free advice (remember, you get what you pay for and everyone is entitled to my opinions).

My view of significance in history is based on... what if the outcome of the battle had been different? Would anything have ultimately changed? 

From that persepective, I believe that only two BATTLES really matter in American history: the battle of Salamis and the Battle of the Virginia Capes. Other than these two actions, Naval BATTLES have had limited inluence on historical outcomes.  

Without Themosticles's victory at Salamis, we'd all be making our morning prayers facing Mecca. The seed of western culture, the European tradition and the concept of democracy would have been crushed.

By medieval times, the European, and middle eastern economies were as dependent on German silver and the Hanseatic ports as control of the Med. Control of the Med was about profitability, not survival.

The Spanish Armada had already failed in its mission with its inability to offload troops from the Netherlands. Our protestant English heritage would remain protestant.

If Trafalgar had been a draw or a French victory, England would still never have been invaded, and Napolean would still have met his demise in a land campaign, in Russia.

The American super frigates created a great naval tradition and had great psychological impact, but ultimately were effectively neutralized and militarily insignificant in the outcome of the War of 1812.

If the Monitor and Virginia hadn't have slugged it out, some other ironclads would have. Regardless, no major strategic or political issue was or would have been resolved. Both sides had ironclads.

Tsushima was a symbolic victory, but ultimately did not change the political map. Forty years later, the Russians still had a significant hand in the western Pacific.

If the Japanese had been victorious at Midway or Leyte Gulf, the Americans would still have triumphed in the late 1940's after Hitler had been crushed (remember, the Battle of the Bulge had more American causualties than the entire Pacific theater). The atomic bomb was the ultimate discriminator against the kamikaze, not naval power.

The victory off Yorktown was a bruising POLITICAL defeat to the British ruling class, helping the cause of American Independence. But even its true significance, like Salamis, was deciding the ultimate outcome of a land campaign.

Now, Naval CAMPAIGNS are a different story. The cummulative effect of privateers in the War of 1812, the Union blockade of the Confederacy, U-boat wars in the Atlantic and the Pacific carrier campaign are examples that had incredible significance in that they not only affected political outcomes, but influenced naval doctrine for decades. That is a different discussion...

bondoman wrote:

Thats a good point, even though it was a one sided affair. Do you have a connection with the Lusitania?

the only problem with that is the ship was not an altogether commercial vessel as it was also carrying arms to Britian

gary

Mansteins revenge wrote:

squeakie wrote:  JMart wrote: I would have to agree with Prof Tilley's assessment - basically, a battle must have profound and long-lasting strategic effects in order to be "significant". Of course, several mentioned in here fullfill that criteria to some extent: - Spanish Armada inasmuch as the 'expedition" basically bankrupted Felipe II (Phillip) court and marked the start of England as a world power. - Ironclads - made wooded ships obsolete in one day. - Jutland - actually showed the foolishness of massive capital ship navies, both tactically and economic. - Battle of the Atlantic; all four years - The only realistic way the Axis could have made GB bow out of the war. - Malta convoys - yes, malta convoys in WW2. Why? If Malta had not been re-supplied, GB/allies would not have been able to stop Rommel from reaching the oil fields of the Middle East. Read the great book "At all Costs" by Moses (the author, not the prophet). - The strategic submarine - not a "battle", but basically assured MADD (pun intended), keeping the cold war, well, cold. The Age of Sail? Trafalgar/Nelson? Great stories, gorgeous ships.... and (at most) a major nuisance to Napoleon's land campaign. Battles for colonies? more significant... just look at latin american countries, who speaks portuguese, who speaks spanish? Many times depended on which country (Portugal/Spain) won some obscure battle somewhere... Take Puerto Rico...Spanish colony, then took over my Sir Francis Drake (almost) and the Dutch (till dysentery and malaria killed them all).,,,then passes to the US in 1898. All because some (relatively) minor skirmishes and naval actions. Argentina could have been portuguese, Brazil could have been spaniard..... what if?? As for Midway...sorry, a great battle, but would not have changed the outcome of the war (my definition of "significant" battle). Face it, Japan "lost" the war the momment the first bomb fell on PH. Even if IJN would have made it to Hawaii, no historian has ever suggested that the US would not have done anything and everything possible to get it back. Losing "our" flattops in Midway would have delayed the inevitable by several months, max. Just look at the massive sea fleets the US had on the Pacific in late 44... dozens of flattops, hundreds of planes (of much higher quality than the IJN/IJA), etc etc. The "What If" series (if you dont have it yet), has been re-packaged in one volume, Robert Cowley is the editor. Very VERY highly reccomended! your comments on the Malta convoys rings a bell. There is a strong military theory that if the Germans had have taken Malta at whatever cost they would have controlled the entire Mediterranean. With controll of the Mediterranean they would have been able to take all of North Africa, and thus create an air umbrella that would have reached far into the Atlantic Ocean. This with the Palistenians on there side anyway would have gave them an endless supply of oil that would have been almost completely out of reach from our four engined bombers.     Airpower was what won the Battle Of The Atlantic. Add this with launching a Liberty Ship every three days spelled doom for the Nazis. The Germans couldn't put a submarine out to sea as fast as we were building ships.     Tying in with the previous paragraph, one needs to look at what was going on in the ship building yards on the mainland. We laid down 21 Essex Class carriers alone! And then add a large quantity of smaller escort carriers to this number. We were building them faster than the Japanese and Germans could even begin to deal with them. You knock out a carrier, and it was replaced with two! Just like the Russians building T 34 tanks!     I put myself on your side of the street sir, and confer with everything in your post gary Gary, I been fighting the "good" fight about Midway this entire thread---throw a little of your support this way as well, my friend...I built the street!!! LOL

the stratigic location of Midway is something that has to be taken into thought here. But not in Japan's favor. The problem Japan and Germany both had when they entered WWII was that neither of the two possed a true long range bomber that could also carry a heavy load out. But the U.S. and Great Britian did. The Japanese probably didn't have anything that was good for much more than 700 miles of radius (strait line and then back). So I'm doubting they could have done much good even if they were to have held the island for any length of time (I'll come back on this range thing in another post as the data is downstairs).

    What might have worked well for the Japanese with Midway in their hands was a good forward operating base for their submarines (remember the Japanese did have very good ones) even they they often were looked down upon by the Japanese hiarchy. To take Midway and hold it they would have had to have three carriers in the area all the time. What did they have? Seven maybe? But in taking Midway it would have tied up a large U.S. fleet to that area. Still it was a loose loose deal. And then Midway was under the U.S. B17 umbrella with the "F" model on the way let alone B-24's.

    It would have served Japan's best interest to secure Samoa and Fiji; thus cutting off the vital trade routs to Australia. That ment everything would have to come in from the east making Guadalcanal an even more important strong point.

    As great a battle as Midway was, it would have gone on and on for the Japanese. And I once again say I doubt they could have held it for any length of time. It was just too far out, and really not in their best interests (even though they still wanted to take it. If they'd have moved on it in January 1942 they might have got the job done, but could they hold onto it? I'd say no. What was most important in the Battle of Midway was they loss of carriers and even more importantly the loss of seasoned pilots. We could have lived with the loss of all the carriers we had there when one looks at what was going on in the shipyards.

    What the Japanese really needed at the time was a bomber on the four engined scale that had a range of about 2,000 miles carrying a 5,000lb. loadout (samething for Hitler too). They never used their submarines to their best potential, and that alone was problematic. Never tried to lay down more carriers till it was too late. Yet the Japanese were kinda hung up on the use of big capital ships (they did build pretty good ones).

   Was the Battle of Midway a total success for the Allies? Yes! They almost couldn't loose. We were in the process of building the single largest carrier force ever seen by man. Look at the loss of the carriers at Midway and the Coral Sea alone (both sides). Now project those losses ahead nine months. Japan was like a guy drowning and gasping for air after that.

    What the Japanese really failed at was in their Indo-China Campaign (now you must remember those four troop transports that were sunk in the Java Sea Battle), and New Guinea. They just never really secured Burma and made that all important move into Pakistan. By doing so China would have been theirs for the taking (add that needed four engine heavy bomber to the mix as well). I credit "Vinegar Joe Stillwell" with as much todo with the Pacific victory as any one other campaign just with the way he tied the Japanese up.

    But as much as we all have posted about the Midway campaign, Iwo Jima was by far the most important. After we took Iwo the Japanese heartland was totally doomed, and the hop to Osaka was just an easy jaunt (not all that easy but now they had a P-51 escort)

just some random thoughts on the subject, but may be of some importance.

    Here's another thought to ponder on this naval warfare subject:

     I'm gonna move us to the otherside of the planet a bit, so bare with me. In WWII the most advanced submarine design was the Type XXI Uboat by a wide margine. It was not without many problems and of course there was a well known quality issue. What if the Germans had have gotten it right, and in mass production in early 1944? Would the anti-submarine warfare as we knew it have gone south? This boat was much quieter, faster, and far more capable than the Type VII or IX. This and the Essex class carrier were probably the most signifiant ships produced in WWII.

gary

Mansteins revenge wrote:

squeakie wrote:  Mansteins revenge wrote:  searat12 wrote: But of course, the flip side of this is also true, in that if Yamamoto had conducted his operations (1941-1943) with an idea of actually winning, there really was no technical reason he could not have done so (i.e, inflict significant enough damage to achieve control of the Pacific long enough to fortify and secure the Japanese gains). It's nice to think that the US, or other countries when attacked are willing to 'fight to the death,' but in fact the opposite is usually true.  How many nations in the 20th century have 'fought to the death' when they have had really significant defeats?  I can only think of the Soviet Union under attack by Germany, and that was a very close-run thing!  WW1? Ended by armistice despite millions of deaths.  Korea?  Ceasefire  Vietnam?  Ceasefire.  First Gulf War?  Ceasefire.  Even the terrible struggles between the Israelis and Arabs all ended in negotiated ceasefires.  Given this historical fact, why would you think the US would be any different? Because the loss of three carriers and a few thousand dead isn't "fighting to the death"... to avoid a trip to the woodshed for not being nice, I'm going to let this one rest gary From "Midway, 1942" by Mark Healy and David Chandler (start at the 3rd para down: "What if..."):

Manny, pretty interesting stuff... might have to revise my original thesis after I read this whole thing.... , but first I gotta read the whole thing to see what he bases his opinions on, because you know what they say about opinions...

By the way (and completely off topic) there is an interesting corollary there between how the attack on Pearl politically unified the US in a way no event had before and how the Sept 11 attacks did the same thing... at least for awhile...

squeakie wrote:

Mansteins revenge wrote:  searat12 wrote: But of course, the flip side of this is also true, in that if Yamamoto had conducted his operations (1941-1943) with an idea of actually winning, there really was no technical reason he could not have done so (i.e, inflict significant enough damage to achieve control of the Pacific long enough to fortify and secure the Japanese gains). It's nice to think that the US, or other countries when attacked are willing to 'fight to the death,' but in fact the opposite is usually true.  How many nations in the 20th century have 'fought to the death' when they have had really significant defeats?  I can only think of the Soviet Union under attack by Germany, and that was a very close-run thing!  WW1? Ended by armistice despite millions of deaths.  Korea?  Ceasefire  Vietnam?  Ceasefire.  First Gulf War?  Ceasefire.  Even the terrible struggles between the Israelis and Arabs all ended in negotiated ceasefires.  Given this historical fact, why would you think the US would be any different? Because the loss of three carriers and a few thousand dead isn't "fighting to the death"... to avoid a trip to the woodshed for not being nice, I'm going to let this one rest gary

Thats a good point, even though it was a one sided affair.

Do you have a connection with the Lusitania?

This may not even qualify as a historically significant naval battle in the traditional sense, but . . that may be the point.   The attack on this commercial ship in May 1915 by a submarine was one of many similar events that effectively ended traditional concepts of warfare.   

Over on PearlHarborAttacked.Com!

subfixer wrote:

Tracy White wrote: This thread is starting to make my head hurt. Searat; where are you getting that Cordell Hull knew in advance that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked? There seems to be this desire to believe that the US had this glass jaw that would cause us to give up if we had lost at Midway. We took a larger hit at Pearl psychologically than we would have if we'd lost all of the carriers we'd thrown in to Midway. Even if we had lost Enterprise and Hornet as well as Yorktown, Saratoga was already heading back to Pearl when Midway happened and Wasp was just leaving for the Pacific. There is a big difference between winning at Midway and taking over the Hawaiian Islands. Japan did not want to occupy the Hawaiian islands, and Japan did not want to attack the US fleet in Pearl Harbor; Yamamoto campaigned strongly for the attack and overcame much internal opposition to it. Japan was after the natural resources  in the Dutch East Indies and Philippines and only attacked Hawaii to get to the US fleet. Japan had actually studied the logistics of an occupation and I posted some information about that here. Taking Hawaii was beyond Japan's abilities, and then to take Hawaii and actively patrol with a large carrier force beyond Hawaii would be a flat-out day dream. This whole notion that Japan could have run the US back to the western coasts borders on ludicrous. Their carriers were worn out by the time Midway happened and they did not have the logistical abilities for power projection past Midway, even for midway itself if you consider the long term. A comment for those who have called the US action at Midway brilliant... Check out "Shattered Sword"  if you have not already.         The "Conspiracy Theory" syndrome runs deep. And yes, Shattered Sword is a very good book and I recommmend it to everyone.

squeakie wrote:

JMart wrote: I would have to agree with Prof Tilley's assessment - basically, a battle must have profound and long-lasting strategic effects in order to be "significant". Of course, several mentioned in here fullfill that criteria to some extent: - Spanish Armada inasmuch as the 'expedition" basically bankrupted Felipe II (Phillip) court and marked the start of England as a world power. - Ironclads - made wooded ships obsolete in one day. - Jutland - actually showed the foolishness of massive capital ship navies, both tactically and economic. - Battle of the Atlantic; all four years - The only realistic way the Axis could have made GB bow out of the war. - Malta convoys - yes, malta convoys in WW2. Why? If Malta had not been re-supplied, GB/allies would not have been able to stop Rommel from reaching the oil fields of the Middle East. Read the great book "At all Costs" by Moses (the author, not the prophet). - The strategic submarine - not a "battle", but basically assured MADD (pun intended), keeping the cold war, well, cold. The Age of Sail? Trafalgar/Nelson? Great stories, gorgeous ships.... and (at most) a major nuisance to Napoleon's land campaign. Battles for colonies? more significant... just look at latin american countries, who speaks portuguese, who speaks spanish? Many times depended on which country (Portugal/Spain) won some obscure battle somewhere... Take Puerto Rico...Spanish colony, then took over my Sir Francis Drake (almost) and the Dutch (till dysentery and malaria killed them all).,,,then passes to the US in 1898. All because some (relatively) minor skirmishes and naval actions. Argentina could have been portuguese, Brazil could have been spaniard..... what if?? As for Midway...sorry, a great battle, but would not have changed the outcome of the war (my definition of "significant" battle). Face it, Japan "lost" the war the momment the first bomb fell on PH. Even if IJN would have made it to Hawaii, no historian has ever suggested that the US would not have done anything and everything possible to get it back. Losing "our" flattops in Midway would have delayed the inevitable by several months, max. Just look at the massive sea fleets the US had on the Pacific in late 44... dozens of flattops, hundreds of planes (of much higher quality than the IJN/IJA), etc etc. The "What If" series (if you dont have it yet), has been re-packaged in one volume, Robert Cowley is the editor. Very VERY highly reccomended! your comments on the Malta convoys rings a bell. There is a strong military theory that if the Germans had have taken Malta at whatever cost they would have controlled the entire Mediterranean. With controll of the Mediterranean they would have been able to take all of North Africa, and thus create an air umbrella that would have reached far into the Atlantic Ocean. This with the Palistenians on there side anyway would have gave them an endless supply of oil that would have been almost completely out of reach from our four engined bombers.     Airpower was what won the Battle Of The Atlantic. Add this with launching a Liberty Ship every three days spelled doom for the Nazis. The Germans couldn't put a submarine out to sea as fast as we were building ships.     Tying in with the previous paragraph, one needs to look at what was going on in the ship building yards on the mainland. We laid down 21 Essex Class carriers alone! And then add a large quantity of smaller escort carriers to this number. We were building them faster than the Japanese and Germans could even begin to deal with them. You knock out a carrier, and it was replaced with two! Just like the Russians building T 34 tanks!     I put myself on your side of the street sir, and confer with everything in your post gary

Tracy White wrote:

This thread is starting to make my head hurt. Searat; where are you getting that Cordell Hull knew in advance that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked? There seems to be this desire to believe that the US had this glass jaw that would cause us to give up if we had lost at Midway. We took a larger hit at Pearl psychologically than we would have if we'd lost all of the carriers we'd thrown in to Midway. Even if we had lost Enterprise and Hornet as well as Yorktown, Saratoga was already heading back to Pearl when Midway happened and Wasp was just leaving for the Pacific. There is a big difference between winning at Midway and taking over the Hawaiian Islands. Japan did not want to occupy the Hawaiian islands, and Japan did not want to attack the US fleet in Pearl Harbor; Yamamoto campaigned strongly for the attack and overcame much internal opposition to it. Japan was after the natural resources  in the Dutch East Indies and Philippines and only attacked Hawaii to get to the US fleet. Japan had actually studied the logistics of an occupation and I posted some information about that here. Taking Hawaii was beyond Japan's abilities, and then to take Hawaii and actively patrol with a large carrier force beyond Hawaii would be a flat-out day dream. This whole notion that Japan could have run the US back to the western coasts borders on ludicrous. Their carriers were worn out by the time Midway happened and they did not have the logistical abilities for power projection past Midway, even for midway itself if you consider the long term. A comment for those who have called the US action at Midway brilliant... Check out "Shattered Sword"  if you have not already.

      The "Conspiracy Theory" syndrome runs deep.

And yes, Shattered Sword is a very good book and I recommmend it to everyone.

This thread is starting to make my head hurt.

Searat; where are you getting that Cordell Hull knew in advance that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked?

There seems to be this desire to believe that the US had this glass jaw that would cause us to give up if we had lost at Midway. We took a larger hit at Pearl psychologically than we would have if we'd lost all of the carriers we'd thrown in to Midway. Even if we had lost Enterprise and Hornet as well as Yorktown, Saratoga was already heading back to Pearl when Midway happened and Wasp was just leaving for the Pacific.

There is a big difference between winning at Midway and taking over the Hawaiian Islands. Japan did not want to occupy the Hawaiian islands, and Japan did not want to attack the US fleet in Pearl Harbor; Yamamoto campaigned strongly for the attack and overcame much internal opposition to it. Japan was after the natural resources  in the Dutch East Indies and Philippines and only attacked Hawaii to get to the US fleet.

Japan had actually studied the logistics of an occupation and I posted some information about that here. Taking Hawaii was beyond Japan's abilities, and then to take Hawaii and actively patrol with a large carrier force beyond Hawaii would be a flat-out day dream. This whole notion that Japan could have run the US back to the western coasts borders on ludicrous. Their carriers were worn out by the time Midway happened and they did not have the logistical abilities for power projection past Midway, even for midway itself if you consider the long term.

A comment for those who have called the US action at Midway brilliant... Check out "Shattered Sword"  if you have not already.

JMart wrote:

I would have to agree with Prof Tilley's assessment - basically, a battle must have profound and long-lasting strategic effects in order to be "significant". Of course, several mentioned in here fullfill that criteria to some extent: - Spanish Armada inasmuch as the 'expedition" basically bankrupted Felipe II (Phillip) court and marked the start of England as a world power. - Ironclads - made wooded ships obsolete in one day. - Jutland - actually showed the foolishness of massive capital ship navies, both tactically and economic. - Battle of the Atlantic; all four years - The only realistic way the Axis could have made GB bow out of the war. - Malta convoys - yes, malta convoys in WW2. Why? If Malta had not been re-supplied, GB/allies would not have been able to stop Rommel from reaching the oil fields of the Middle East. Read the great book "At all Costs" by Moses (the author, not the prophet). - The strategic submarine - not a "battle", but basically assured MADD (pun intended), keeping the cold war, well, cold. The Age of Sail? Trafalgar/Nelson? Great stories, gorgeous ships.... and (at most) a major nuisance to Napoleon's land campaign. Battles for colonies? more significant... just look at latin american countries, who speaks portuguese, who speaks spanish? Many times depended on which country (Portugal/Spain) won some obscure battle somewhere... Take Puerto Rico...Spanish colony, then took over my Sir Francis Drake (almost) and the Dutch (till dysentery and malaria killed them all).,,,then passes to the US in 1898. All because some (relatively) minor skirmishes and naval actions. Argentina could have been portuguese, Brazil could have been spaniard..... what if?? As for Midway...sorry, a great battle, but would not have changed the outcome of the war (my definition of "significant" battle). Face it, Japan "lost" the war the momment the first bomb fell on PH. Even if IJN would have made it to Hawaii, no historian has ever suggested that the US would not have done anything and everything possible to get it back. Losing "our" flattops in Midway would have delayed the inevitable by several months, max. Just look at the massive sea fleets the US had on the Pacific in late 44... dozens of flattops, hundreds of planes (of much higher quality than the IJN/IJA), etc etc. The "What If" series (if you dont have it yet), has been re-packaged in one volume, Robert Cowley is the editor. Very VERY highly reccomended!

your comments on the Malta convoys rings a bell. There is a strong military theory that if the Germans had have taken Malta at whatever cost they would have controlled the entire Mediterranean. With controll of the Mediterranean they would have been able to take all of North Africa, and thus create an air umbrella that would have reached far into the Atlantic Ocean. This with the Palistenians on there side anyway would have gave them an endless supply of oil that would have been almost completely out of reach from our four engined bombers.

    Airpower was what won the Battle Of The Atlantic. Add this with launching a Liberty Ship every three days spelled doom for the Nazis. The Germans couldn't put a submarine out to sea as fast as we were building ships.

    Tying in with the previous paragraph, one needs to look at what was going on in the ship building yards on the mainland. We laid down 21 Essex Class carriers alone! And then add a large quantity of smaller escort carriers to this number. We were building them faster than the Japanese and Germans could even begin to deal with them. You knock out a carrier, and it was replaced with two! Just like the Russians building T 34 tanks!

    I put myself on your side of the street sir, and confer with everything in your post

gary

Mansteins revenge wrote:

searat12 wrote: But of course, the flip side of this is also true, in that if Yamamoto had conducted his operations (1941-1943) with an idea of actually winning, there really was no technical reason he could not have done so (i.e, inflict significant enough damage to achieve control of the Pacific long enough to fortify and secure the Japanese gains). It's nice to think that the US, or other countries when attacked are willing to 'fight to the death,' but in fact the opposite is usually true.  How many nations in the 20th century have 'fought to the death' when they have had really significant defeats?  I can only think of the Soviet Union under attack by Germany, and that was a very close-run thing!  WW1? Ended by armistice despite millions of deaths.  Korea?  Ceasefire  Vietnam?  Ceasefire.  First Gulf War?  Ceasefire.  Even the terrible struggles between the Israelis and Arabs all ended in negotiated ceasefires.  Given this historical fact, why would you think the US would be any different? Because the loss of three carriers and a few thousand dead isn't "fighting to the death"...

to avoid a trip to the woodshed for not being nice, I'm going to let this one rest

gary

searat12 wrote:

But of course, the flip side of this is also true, in that if Yamamoto had conducted his operations (1941-1943) with an idea of actually winning, there really was no technical reason he could not have done so (i.e, inflict significant enough damage to achieve control of the Pacific long enough to fortify and secure the Japanese gains). It's nice to think that the US, or other countries when attacked are willing to 'fight to the death,' but in fact the opposite is usually true.  How many nations in the 20th century have 'fought to the death' when they have had really significant defeats?  I can only think of the Soviet Union under attack by Germany, and that was a very close-run thing!  WW1? Ended by armistice despite millions of deaths.  Korea?  Ceasefire  Vietnam?  Ceasefire.  First Gulf War?  Ceasefire.  Even the terrible struggles between the Israelis and Arabs all ended in negotiated ceasefires.  Given this historical fact, why would you think the US would be any different?

But of course, the flip side of this is also true, in that if Yamamoto had conducted his operations (1941-1943) with an idea of actually winning, there really was no technical reason he could not have done so (i.e, inflict significant enough damage to achieve control of the Pacific long enough to fortify and secure the Japanese gains).

It's nice to think that the US, or other countries when attacked are willing to 'fight to the death,' but in fact the opposite is usually true.  How many nations in the 20th century have 'fought to the death' when they have had really significant defeats?  I can only think of the Soviet Union under attack by Germany, and that was a very close-run thing!  WW1? Ended by armistice despite millions of deaths.  Korea?  Ceasefire  Vietnam?  Ceasefire.  First Gulf War?  Ceasefire.  Even the terrible struggles between the Israelis and Arabs all ended in negotiated ceasefires.  Given this historical fact, why would you think the US would be any different?

I can only figure that when the war first started, the deal Yamamoto struck was to 'lose' badly early on, which would cause the collapse and overthrow of the Army-controlled government of Japan, a return of his friends, and preservation of the Empire.  But for their own purposes, the US double-crossed Yamamoto in some way, so that instead of a quickly-organised 'defeat' and a negotiated settlement, the US instead decided that only the complete destruction of the Japanese military and unconditional surrender would be acceptable.  Although Yamamoto was 'strung along' for awhile, eventually he figured out that he had been had, and thus indicated that he would make serious efforts to prevent that from happening, and that is when his plane was shot down.

Looking at the situation from the eyes of the US, it makes sense.  Japan had been a serious threat and thorn in the side of the US in the Pacific for decades, and a quickly negotiated peace without the elimination of Japanese military power would just have delayed the inevitable show-down to a later time.  The complete destruction and defeat of Japan would ensure the US would have 'clear sailing' in the Pacific for the forseeable future, and the defeat and collapse of the Europeans in the Pacific meant that the US could in one stroke, control the whole shebang.  

Wow, that is one book that I will be getting...one question though---why would the US be so intent on killing the man who was helping them win the war? I suppose it was to keep him quite about what he knew?

If all you write is true, then it supports my earlier arguments about the US not folding had the Japanese managed (despite Yamamoto trying to subvert it) to pull of a victory at Midaway...as the US knew ahead of time what the Japanese strategy was...

Almost forgot!  Admiral Yamamoto really hated Admiral Nagumo, who was personally responsible for supporting the Army in the overthrow of the then peace-minded Japanes government.  As part of the pre-attack reconaissance of Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto knew that the carriers weren't there, yet he ordered the attack anyways, and when he was notified of the effects of the attack (i.e., that the fuel tank farms, dry docks, etc. were unharmed), he personally authorised Nagumo to break off the attack!  It is also significant that during this battle, Yamamoto was back in Japan, with the battleships and rest of the fleet, and not part of the attack force at all (I rather suspect that given all the clues already given to the US at this time, that Nagumo would be 'surprised' by an American carrier task force at sea and be summarily sunk).

Same thing at Midway, where Yamamoto hung back in the rear with the battleships while Nagumo (with almost no immediately available surface ship anti-aircraft support) was being pounded, and the only other significant Japanese carrier force was sent up to Alaska, where it was of no use whatsoever.....

There is an excellent biography of Yamamoto called 'The Reluctant Admiral' which shows that Yamamoto certainly had the means, the motive and the timing.  The supposedly secret plan to attack Pearl Harbor was leaked via Argentina almost a year before.  The US Secretary of War knew Pearl Harbor would be attacked and when, more than 24 hours before it happened, and thus was more than ready to address the (late!) Japanese envoys when they came to his office.  The Japanese secret diplomatic codes had been 'broken' for several years, and all these things show up just shortly after Yamamoto had been on a mission to the UK, where he had been sent by the radical Japanese Army that had taken over the government and either assassinated or deposed some of Yamamotos best friends and mentors.  In the UK, Yamamoto spent a significant period of time at the house of, and by invitation by the head of British Intelligence, and they had many long discussions (still secret).  However, when Yamamoto was on his way home, he and the other members of his mission stopped off in Germany, supposedly to conduct the same sort of negotiations.  But Yamamoto refused to meet with Ribbentrop, or any of the German representatives, and thus went home to Japan without anything significant done on his part in, or with Nazi Germany.

Yamamoto was well-known as a gambler (he even considered quitting the Navy at one point to become a professional gambler at Monte Carlo!), he was also a womanizer, with several affairs going on at once, was extremely angry at the deaths of his friends, comrades and mentors in Japan, and was something of an alcoholic as well.  All of these things constitute 'leverage' to intelligence personnel looking to subvert or suborn, and certainly Yamamoto was a perfect candidate for such activity!

During the war, virtually every Yamamoto battle plan involved the gathering of widely dispersed small units travelling over widely dispersed approach routes to a central assembly area which would supposedly be the objective.  However, this 'strategy' ensures that not only will the different elements arrive at various times, but the likelyhood of any, or all of these elements being discovered was quite large, each of which could be dealt with by locally superior forces (as against keeping the fleet together, which is just one needle in the haystack of the Pacific, vs a whole box of needles sprinkled throughout).  And this 'strategy' failed again and again.  Even in those occasions where it was successful (first six months), this was almost entirely the result of the incredible disorganisation of the allies combined with local Japanese air superiority, and not because of any particular Japanese tactical or strategic superiority.  Furthermore, after Yamamoto was killed, his replacements largely continued the same failed tactics, with the same fatal results. 

One particularly nasty trick of Yamamoto was to 'support' a landing somewhere (like Wake and the various Lae and Guadalcanal reinforcements), but to always ensure that the Army units landed would be commanded by some of the most radical elements in the Japanese Army, the same lunatics that had seen to the assassination of his friends and mentors before the war.  Yamamoto would ensure that these units would be far too small to possibly take on the defending Americans, and that they wouldn't have near the supplies and equipment to make anything like a defense either.  To a man, these units, and their commanders were slaughtered wholesale in one stupid 'Banzai' charge after another (the first of these, the 'Iki Unit' was originally slated to be the landing force at Midway, but after that failure was sent straight in to Guadalcanal after the landing by the US 1st Marine Division.  That night, the entire 'Iki Unit' of some 800 Japanese soldiers led by their commander charged the lines of the 11,000 man-strong 1st Marines, and were unsurprisingly completely destroyed.). 

One incident of this type could be overlooked as a tactical 'mistake,' but to have the same thing happen again and again in the same place for six months says something else entirely!  Another indicator was the apparent lack of ability to bring in sizeable reinforcements and their supplies.  It would take the famous 'Tokyo Express' days, or even weeks to get a few hundred troops ashore at Guadalcanal, and yet, at the end of the campaign, the same destroyers were able to get the entire Japanese force of some 14,000 troops off the island and back to Rabaul in just seven nights, and without loss!  Not only that, but the commander of the amazingly successful 'Tokyo Express' was then summarily sacked, and sent to Thailand to do a useless desk job (Admiral Tanaka never went to sea again).  How could this make any sense, without some significant skullduggery going on at the highest levels of the Japanese Navy?  Read the 'The Reluctant Admiral' and see how many peculiarities you notice!

JMart wrote:

I would have to agree with Prof Tilley's assessment - basically, a battle must have profound and long-lasting strategic effects in order to be "significant". Of course, several mentioned in here fullfill that criteria to some extent: - Spanish Armada inasmuch as the 'expedition" basically bankrupted Felipe II (Phillip) court and marked the start of England as a world power. - Ironclads - made wooded ships obsolete in one day. - Jutland - actually showed the foolishness of massive capital ship navies, both tactically and economic. - Battle of the Atlantic; all four years - The only realistic way the Axis could have made GB bow out of the war. - Malta convoys - yes, malta convoys in WW2. Why? If Malta had not been re-supplied, GB/allies would not have been able to stop Rommel from reaching the oil fields of the Middle East. Read the great book "At all Costs" by Moses (the author, not the prophet). - The strategic submarine - not a "battle", but basically assured MADD (pun intended), keeping the cold war, well, cold. The Age of Sail? Trafalgar/Nelson? Great stories, gorgeous ships.... and (at most) a major nuisance to Napoleon's land campaign. Battles for colonies? more significant... just look at latin american countries, who speaks portuguese, who speaks spanish? Many times depended on which country (Portugal/Spain) won some obscure battle somewhere... Take Puerto Rico...Spanish colony, then took over my Sir Francis Drake (almost) and the Dutch (till dysentery and malaria killed them all).,,,then passes to the US in 1898. All because some (relatively) minor skirmishes and naval actions. Argentina could have been portuguese, Brazil could have been spaniard..... what if?? As for Midway...sorry, a great battle, but would not have changed the outcome of the war (my definition of "significant" battle). Face it, Japan "lost" the war the momment the first bomb fell on PH. Even if IJN would have made it to Hawaii, no historian has ever suggested that the US would not have done anything and everything possible to get it back. Losing "our" flattops in Midway would have delayed the inevitable by several months, max. Just look at the massive sea fleets the US had on the Pacific in late 44... dozens of flattops, hundreds of planes (of much higher quality than the IJN/IJA), etc etc. The "What If" series (if you dont have it yet), has been re-packaged in one volume, Robert Cowley is the editor. Very VERY highly reccomended!

"As for Midway...sorry, a great battle, but would not have changed the outcome of the war (my definition of "significant" battle). Face it, Japan "lost" the war the momment the first bomb fell on PH. Even if IJN would have made it to Hawaii, no historian has ever suggested that the US would not have done anything and everything possible to get it back. Losing "our" flattops in Midway would have delayed the inevitable by several months, max. Just look at the massive sea fleets the US had on the Pacific in late 44... dozens of flattops, hundreds of planes (of much higher quality than the IJN/IJA), etc etc."

Man, where have you been the last two days?---I could have used you !!!  LOL...

I would have to agree with Prof Tilley's assessment - basically, a battle must have profound and long-lasting strategic effects in order to be "significant". Of course, several mentioned in here fullfill that criteria to some extent:

- Spanish Armada inasmuch as the 'expedition" basically bankrupted Felipe II (Phillip) court and marked the start of England as a world power.

- Ironclads - made wooded ships obsolete in one day.

- Jutland - actually showed the foolishness of massive capital ship navies, both tactically and economic.

- Battle of the Atlantic; all four years - The only realistic way the Axis could have made GB bow out of the war.

- Malta convoys - yes, malta convoys in WW2. Why? If Malta had not been re-supplied, GB/allies would not have been able to stop Rommel from reaching the oil fields of the Middle East. Read the great book "At all Costs" by Moses (the author, not the prophet).

- The strategic submarine - not a "battle", but basically assured MADD (pun intended), keeping the cold war, well, cold.

The Age of Sail? Trafalgar/Nelson? Great stories, gorgeous ships.... and (at most) a major nuisance to Napoleon's land campaign.

Battles for colonies? more significant... just look at latin american countries, who speaks portuguese, who speaks spanish? Many times depended on which country (Portugal/Spain) won some obscure battle somewhere... Take Puerto Rico...Spanish colony, then took over my Sir Francis Drake (almost) and the Dutch (till dysentery and malaria killed them all).,,,then passes to the US in 1898. All because some (relatively) minor skirmishes and naval actions. Argentina could have been portuguese, Brazil could have been spaniard..... what if??

As for Midway...sorry, a great battle, but would not have changed the outcome of the war (my definition of "significant" battle). Face it, Japan "lost" the war the momment the first bomb fell on PH. Even if IJN would have made it to Hawaii, no historian has ever suggested that the US would not have done anything and everything possible to get it back. Losing "our" flattops in Midway would have delayed the inevitable by several months, max. Just look at the massive sea fleets the US had on the Pacific in late 44... dozens of flattops, hundreds of planes (of much higher quality than the IJN/IJA), etc etc.

The "What If" series (if you dont have it yet), has been re-packaged in one volume, Robert Cowley is the editor. Very VERY highly reccomended!

searat12 wrote:

The Japanese lost at Midway and didn't sue for peace, that's true.  And that is because Japan was controlled by the Army at the time (which Yamamoto had serious problems with: note my ealrier that Yamamoto may well have been working with the US to ensure Japanese defeat), and the gamble was 'all, or nothing.'  Midway was a brilliant US victory, and brilliant because it not only seized the initiative away from the Japanese (an act from which the Japanese never recovered), but absolutely ensured the defeat of Japan.  If the US had lost at this battle, it didn't mean that the US would be prostrated in defeat, but would have rearranged the requirements for victory so significantly, that at least a temporary peace would have been advisable, if not an absolute requirement for the US.  As a simulaecrum, you might recall that AL Qaeda officially 'declared war' on the US almost 10 years before 9/11, but we only 'noticed it' when the towers came down.  Similarly, the US could still 'be at war' with Japan (like we are still officially 'still at war' with North Korea), but no actual combat operations be underway.  Politics, ain't it amazing?  Yes, Yamamoto knew that war with the US could only succeed on the short-term, which is why his plan was a radical departure from previous planning.  And if his plans had been followed through efficiently, they could in fact have succeeded.  But there are LOTS of indications that Yamamoto actually 'queered the pitch' to ensure Japan would lose, and this was done in coordination with the US government of the time.  The original idea was that this would allow the Navy and/or more conservative political elements to remove the radical Army people from government and government influence, but this effort failed.  Furthermore, when it became obvious that the effort had failed, Yamamoto, in a return to honor in defense of his homeland, decided to cut off his relations with the US and expose the whole sorry affair, at which point the US ensured that Yamamoto would be killed before that could happen, and so the war went on........

The Japanese lost at Midway and didn't sue for peace, that's true.  And that is because Japan was controlled by the Army at the time (which Yamamoto had serious problems with: note my ealrier that Yamamoto may well have been working with the US to ensure Japanese defeat), and the gamble was 'all, or nothing.'  Midway was a brilliant US victory, and brilliant because it not only seized the initiative away from the Japanese (an act from which the Japanese never recovered), but absolutely ensured the defeat of Japan.  If the US had lost at this battle, it didn't mean that the US would be prostrated in defeat, but would have rearranged the requirements for victory so significantly, that at least a temporary peace would have been advisable, if not an absolute requirement for the US.  As a simulaecrum, you might recall that AL Qaeda officially 'declared war' on the US almost 10 years before 9/11, but we only 'noticed it' when the towers came down.  Similarly, the US could still 'be at war' with Japan (like we are still officially 'still at war' with North Korea), but no actual combat operations be underway.  Politics, ain't it amazing? 

Yes, Yamamoto knew that war with the US could only succeed on the short-term, which is why his plan was a radical departure from previous planning.  And if his plans had been followed through efficiently, they could in fact have succeeded.  But there are LOTS of indications that Yamamoto actually 'queered the pitch' to ensure Japan would lose, and this was done in coordination with the US government of the time.  The original idea was that this would allow the Navy and/or more conservative political elements to remove the radical Army people from government and government influence, but this effort failed.  Furthermore, when it became obvious that the effort had failed, Yamamoto, in a return to honor in defense of his homeland, decided to cut off his relations with the US and expose the whole sorry affair, at which point the US ensured that Yamamoto would be killed before that could happen, and so the war went on........

searat12 wrote:

Seems more like the kind of amphibious landing the Japanese never had to attempt, and very purposely avoided.  I don't think the Japanese ever conceived, or would have attempted anything like Normandy, and certainly if they had won at Midway, they would never have had to.  I don't think Manny has been paying attention to what I have been saying.  Neutralising a force means you don't have to actually fight it and/or destroy it, you just have to make sure it can't come after you, or interfere with your other plans.  You could be the biggest and baddest tank in the world, but if you haven't any fuel, you are just a pillbox to be bypassed.... I'm done with the 'what ifs!'

The Japanese lost Midway and they didn't sue for peace; they fought on for over three more years---so why would we have folded...??? That's my whole point, and Yamamoto knew it: the Japanese could only win in the short-term...long-term they never stood a chance, from a military point of view...Which parts of what I just wrote do you disagree with?

Mansteins revenge wrote:

The type of amphibious landing I am referring to is one that never happened: Japanese forces attempting to land on a beach near Los Angeles, or even Wikiki at Honolulu...That was my point, they COULDN'T have pulled an opposed landing off like that after Pearl---or, IMO, even one on the scale of Iwo or Okinawa...they just couldn't have...even the motley collection of defenders at Wake nearly turned away their landing attempt and lost some good-sized ships in the process...go back and look at what was defending Wake, and imagine what would have happened if we had the 1st or 2nd Marine Division there, with significant air support...

But lets say that Midway is lost, and now the eastern Pacific is under a Japanese air umbrella.  How is a lot of this 'stuff' supposed to get to Hawaii.  Sure imagine what would have happened if we had the 1st or 2d MarDiv there, but also imagine what would have happened if they couldn't get there (I think at this point in '42 they were still training in California - I might be wrong, I admit).  And again, I raise the question of how significant the air support would have been?  Remember that if the premise of this debate is that the Japanese were victorious at Midway, than all those skilled pilots that were lost there would still be available.  With all due respect, at this stage of the war, I don't think the US pilots had the same level of skill as the cream-de-la-cream of the IJN...

Alright, for real now... I'm done...   Manny, I concede to you the last word (well, at least wtih regard to me...)

Mansteins revenge wrote:

Some great points of debate here.  But I still stick with the opinion that the US would have not sued for peace regardless of the outcomes of Pearl or Midway...just wouldn't have happened, IMO. Japan had no realistic way of strategically defeating the US. The one thing that they admitted they needed to win was "a lack of willingness of the US to fight a long and costly war", and they guessed wrongly. That statement (that the Japanese made) make my argument.

But your argument is also based on the historical reality that the tide of the war changed in favor of the US quickly.  I mean, for all intents and purposes, by 6-months after Pearl, the Japanese were on the defensive and the US on the offensive.  Now, flip that around and say, that by late summer of '42 Midway and Pearl are in Japanese hands, their carrier taskforces are raging through the eastern Pacific, choking off transit through the Panama Canal, raiding US ports and shipyards along the west coast, their subs torpedoing ships all up and down the west coast (as suggested by Squekie, I think), carrier based planes maybe bombing a few US cities...  That willingness might, and I do stress MIGHT have changed, particularly because, AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT, the US felt the war in Europe was the more important of the two wars...

So hey, is this a dead horse yet???