HMS Courageous, if you like bizarre ships you'll love this one...

Yup, you are absolutely right!  That said, the whole Baltic plan concept was completely bonkers, as in order to get to the Pomeranian beaches or Flanders, you would have to get through the Kaisers' fleet (as they would travel back and forth from the Baltic to the North Sea via the Kiel canal quite frequently), not too mention the disaster at Gallipoli in the Dardanelles.  Another suspect issue is if the 'Courageous' and 'Furious' were actually 'just' intended for escort work and some shore bombardment, why were they armed with such huge guns if they did not expect to run into something that might have large guns too?  'Repulse' and 'Renown' were also 'neither fish, nor fowl' products of Jackie Fisher, and they were completed just after Jutland.  But when the Royal Navy discovered just how lightly armored they were (not to mention being equipped with just six 15" guns), they were sent right back in horror to the builders for significant armor upgrades!  All in all, 'Furious' and 'Courageous' proved excellent subjects for conversions to aircraft carriers, while Jackie Fisher really caused as much harm as good to the whole battlecruiser concept (which was not a bad concept, when looked at objectively)......

I fully concur!  The Germans designed and built exceptionally strong capital ships through thorough study and a willingness to learn from practise.  And, the Kongo class, being British designed and the nameship British built, demonstrated what the British could do when given their heads.  HMS Tiger is an excellent example.

But, we are presuming that the Courageous and Glorious, and the Furious offshoot were designed as battlecruisers. They weren't. They were designed and classified as "large light cruisers" primarily for one operation - Fisher's Baltic Plan.  Under this plan, British forces were to penetrate the Baltic Sea, carry out landings on the Pomeranian coast, as well as conducting simultaneous operations against the Dardanelles and against Flanders and the Friesian Islands. To accomplish this plan, the British ordered 162 light warships of many types, but especially these three ships. They were designed to force their way through the Baltic Narrows, then to provide fire support for light forces. They were never intended to fight or serve as capital ships in any way. They were simply extreme light cruisers designed to serve as high speed escorts for light forces. 

In other words, they could not fight against the capital ships of High Seas Fleet.  they would never have survived, whereas, had the British learned the same lessons as the Germans did about cordite storage and handling procedures, and applied appropriate solutions to those procedures, then the battlecruisers would have probably had a better combat record.

warshipguy wrote:

All are excellent points! It is simply important to realize that British Battlecruisers were not necessarily badly designed ships or that the basic idea behind their conception was flawed; there were several important reasons behind their tendency to blow up. Searat12 very poignantly note that one of the better armored German battlecruisers almost suffered a similar explosion as Queen Mary, Invincible, and, later, Hood. Bill Morrison

True, but the real point I was trying to make was that the Germans learned from the situation, made a few alterations, and thenceforth had no more problems with their battlecruisers.  I think the flaw of the British is that they took the theory to extremes (thus, HMS Courageous), rather than trying to figure out how to make the original concept truly work.  On one hand, this tendency is understandable, as they were in an arms race, and innovation is almost everything in such cases, but the Germans responded with very sober reflections of what the British presented as 'fact,' made their own calculations and came to the same 'result,' but without any of the teething problems that are inherent in extremely experimental and innovative designs.  Really, its hard to find any flaws in the German battlecruisers either from a design viewpoint, or from an operational viewpoint.  Probably the only 'flaw' inherent in the German ships is that they were not designed for long-range blue-water operations, while the British ships were mostly designed with world-wide deployment in mind.  However, the German navy was not really interested in contesting the seas with Britain all over the world, but just in a very focussed area (The North Sea), and this allowed them to build their ships a fair bit stronger and not worry too much about accommodations, etc.  I think if you look closely at the Japanese 'Kongo' class, you will be looking at some of the very finest battlecruisers ever built in just about every respect (and they didn't explode, even when dueling with new US battleships armed with 16" guns at close range!).

All are excellent points! It is simply important to realize that British Battlecruisers were not necessarily badly designed ships or that the basic idea behind their conception was flawed; there were several important reasons behind their tendency to blow up. Searat12 very poignantly note that one of the better armored German battlecruisers almost suffered a similar explosion as Queen Mary, Invincible, and, later, Hood.

Bill Morrison

Well, there were several reasons why British battlecruisers fared badly.  Armor is one reason, with German battlecruisers having significantly more armor, and better sub-compartmentisation of the ship too.  Second, the propellant charges for the German shells were in brass or tin cartridges, while the British cordite charges were lying around in flammable silk bags all along the ammunition train from the magazine to the guns, and third, the British battlecruisers had no passage flaps between the shell ready rooms at the base of the barbette and the ammunition stores, which meant any flash from a shell bursting in the turret overhead would travel right down the barbette and straight into the ammunition magazine..... But these issues were not really noticed by the British until Jutland (when of course, it was too late).  At the Falklands, the two British battlecruisers (armed with 8 x 12" guns each) were facing two German armored cruisers (only equipped with 8" guns), and thus were able to stay well out of range of most of the the German guns while pounding the crap out of the Germans with impunity in precisely the kind of action  battlecruisers were actually designed to do. 

 At Dogger Bank, the German armored cruiser 'Blucher' went down, for the same reason as the 'Sharnhorst' and her sister at the Falklands; they were just not up to the task of taking on a battlecruiser, nor were they designed to.  As well, the British screwed up pretty badly in this exercise, by directing most of the gunfire of their battlecruisers against the hapless 'Blucher,' while allowing the outnumbered German battlecruisers to escape.  Several of these ships had been hit by heavy British rounds, and one was almost lost by the kind of explosion that devastated the British battlecruisers at Jutland.  The Germans learned from this almost-catastrophe, and altered their ammunition handling methods accordingly, while the British did not.

In WW2, the incident of the Renown and the 'Salmon & Gluckstein' was one of the worst efforts by the Kriegsmarine, in that they wasted almost 20 minutes trying to figure out whether the very large warship rapidly approaching them was friend or foe (just how many large friendly warships they might reasonably expect to see in the North Sea at that time is a question no-one has ever been able to answer for me!).  In any case, rather than forming a line of battle and turning broadside to paste the approaching Renown by 'crossing the T,' they turned and ran as soon as Renown opened up with her 15" guns.  What should have been a battle of 18 x 11" guns against 4 x 15" guns turned into a ridiculous Monty Python 'run away' scenario, and the only reason Renown didn't catch up to the Germans and really do them some damage is the Renown was shipping so much water over her bows that the forward turrets became almost useless and the ship was sure to suffer structural damage (not just 'oilcanning!') if the pursuit continued at the speed the Germans were fleeing (at over 28 knots straight into the teeth of a strong gale).  An extremely poor show by the Germans, and Hitler was none too pleased when he heard the details!

The HMS Courageous kit is a beautiful kit of a beautiful ship! I just received mine as a gift and I love the detail and the subject.

I was reading the earlier entries in this thread about the inadequacies of British Battlecruisers and their tendency to explode when hit by their contemporaries. I couldn't help but think of several articles that I have read on the subject recently. It seems that the current thought is that their thin armor was not the cause but rather poor cordite handling procedures. The British tended to stack the charges in piles during an engagement, meaning that the ships were an explosion waiting to happen.  When the ship was hit in an appropriate spot, the resulting ball of fire from the initial shell explosion ignited these piles of cordite, blowing up the ship, instead of being contained behind sealed watertight doors.  Remember, the British ships fared well in the early stages of the war, especially at Dogger Bank and the Falklands.  British ships also mauled their German counterparts on several occasions. Even in WWII, HMS Renown, armed with one more twin turret that Courageous, outfought both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau off of Norway.

That is not to say that Courageous would have survived in any engagement with her own kind. Even the British admitted that she was more of a "large light cruiser" than a Battlecruiser.

However, the Courageous make for an interesting and welcome addition to my British Battlecruiser collection!

Bill Morrison

Thanks, Ed - I was thinking more of the actual ship, but that is a nice looking kit.  It looks more like the Glorious, though - at least from the angle provided - the Courageous apparently had a flatter prow, and the Glorious had a pointed, more clipper-like one.  (according to pics found on MaritimeQuest.com)

I like that they provided the ship's crest, too - it's a rather curious one.

1917 Courageous by Admiralty Modelworks

http://www.admiraltymodelworks.com/Products/Index.html

Funny thing, Dread - I've been away from these forums for quite a while, and I came back tonight to try and catch up.  I found this topic and was searching the net for some pics of the pre-conversion Courageous, and on the first page of Yahoo search hits I found ..... this thread.

Still no pics of the pre-conversion Courageous, except for a very-long-range view, and all that I can tell from that is that the afterdeck was extremely stepped-down.  I'd love to see any closer-range views, if anyone has access to any.

It did took a lot of "courage" to come up with it.

I must say, this thread has taken on a life of its own since my original posting. For those of you interested, Admiralty Modelworks, the people that brought you the Courageous will be bringing out even more goodies for the fans of the unusual. I expect we will know more after the IPMS Nationals in August but a check with their web site will give some clues as to the future. It is a great time to be a ship modeler. WS

That's true too, as the Americans had plenty of 'heads up' warning from aerial and submarine recon that the Japanese were coming, when and where.  This was also one of the flaws of the Japanese 'plan,' in that they hadn't figured out yet that the 'old' American battleships couldn't keep up with the fast carriers and 'new' battleships, and were therefore unlikely to join in any chase to the North, or anywhere else.  What they did do under Oldendorf was form a very traditional 'line ahead' formation with all broadsides bearing on the approaching enemy, with lighter forces forward (PT boats, destroyers, etc) to disrupt any attack formation the approaching Japanese chose to take up (defense in depth).  This is almost exactly what happened at Jutland (and Tsushima, and many others as well), and was in the finest traditions of the 'big gun' Navy.  And it worked just as well on this, the last occasion as it did on the first (Second Anglo-Dutch war, 2 June, 1653).  And it also shows up the futility of sending battleships singly, or as a pair on any mission where they might expect to run into serious opposition (do remember the movie 'Blazing Saddles?'  Remember how the one wagon tried to form a 'wagon circle' all by itself? You get the idea!).

Really, Surigao Strait was a classic example of the continuing utility of the heavily armored and heavily armed battleship, even 'old' ones!  If you are well-enough armored, and well-enough armed, and you have enough similarly equipped friends, and the enemy has to come to you, then high speed is nice, but really not that much of a consideration!  And of course, if you are a squadron or fleet of that size and power, then the enemy must come to you eventually (can't allow a 900-pound gorilla to stay in the livingroom for long!), which means you really don't have to do too much work to 'find' the enemy, as they will be working very hard to find you!  There is also an argument that says if you scatter your forces all over the ocean (and the ocean is a big place!), then each individual unit/squadron is necessarily weak, and the chances of at least some of these units being discovered is very high (and because they are weak, are likely to be quickly destroyed).  But if your forces are concentrated, then not only is that force far more powerful and much better able to defend itself, but is also much harder to find as well (one needle in a haystack vs a hundred needles)...... Note, this scenario really only works well in the attack, as in the defence, you may have any number of things you need to protect, which of course means you have to scatter at least some forces to defend them, so the the big job and responsibility of the 'powers that be' is to figure out just what 'balance' of forces will be utilized, and where.  Here endeth the lesson.......

I see what you're saying, but, the US forces did plan a night battleship action even if the Japanese forces didn't. A bit one sided perhaps, but the PT action prior to the main event should have given the IJN ships a little heads-up. They just plodded on into the trap.

True. But the Japanese 'plan' did not include a night action against battleships, or anything bigger than perhaps a cruiser or two.  The idea was to lure the whole American battlefleet North to chase after Japanese carriers, while the IJN battleships went in after the American landing fleet of transports.  If all had gone according to plan, the Japanese ships would have attacked the 'unprotected' landing fleet in daylight.  But of course, the Northern force (with Yamato, Nagato, Kongo and a bunch of heavy cruisers) was stymied and forced to retreat by the US escort carriers, the Southern force (with Yamashiro, Fuso and a heavy cruiser or two) were surprised, and the whole plan collapsed like a wet paper bag (which is to be expected if a plan is very complicated and absolutely depends on closely coordinated timing without consideration of what the enemy may or may not do!).  In retrospect, it is hard to consider this 'plan' as being much more than an entirely futile and suicidal exercise (and the Japanese knew it too!)....

What about Surigao Strait? That was a night action, wasn't it? There were definetly BBs in that battle and radar played a decisive role in it.

What you say about salvo firing is essentially correct, with six main guns being generally considered a minimum number for accurate firing at a sea-going target.  However, there is a problem with a battlecruiser or heavy cruiser firing at maximum ranges as a way of avoiding counter-fire from a battleship.  While it is true by WW2 gunnery at sea had some pretty awesome potential maximum ranges (even for 8" guns), a big problem was visibility, which rarely allowed for maximum, or even close to it, to be utilized (with the exception of shore bombardment).  As a result, if a battlecruiser or heavy cruiser could see a battleship to fire at, chances are they would be well within range for that battleship to fire back, and could spend an eternity trying to dodge the shell splashes while trying to get away.....

The big change happened once the US figured out how to use Radar effectively as a fire-control aid.  Not only did this mean the US could now actually utilize the enormous range of guns of all calibers, but the enormous night-fighting advantage of the Japanese Navy was essentially eliminated.  This did not happen overnight, and prior to this, it was quite common to have night battles fought at almost point-blank range, where any armor advantage held by either battlecruisers, or even battleships, let alone cruisers, was almost irrelevant.  As an example, the Japanese battlecruiser/fast battleship 'Hiei' was completely overwhelmed by not only 8" gunfire from American heavy cruisers, but more importantly by rapid 6" and 5" shellfire from US light cruisers and destroyers, and even heavy machine gun incendiary fire!  Ranges were so close that launched torpedoes did not have enough room to arm themselves, and in very short order 'Hiei' was ablaze from stem to stern, blind, helpless, and staggering slowly back to the North where she finally sank the next morning....... A similar encounter involving the battleship USS South Dakota and USS Washington against the Japanese battlecruiser/fast battleship 'Kirishima,' plus heavy cruisers 'Takao' and 'Atago' ended up with the South Dakota so badly damaged that she had to return to the States for repairs lasting almost a year (and 'Kirishima' was sunk), and much of that damage was caused by 8" and 5" gunfire from the cruisers, not the 14" shells of 'Kirishima.' 

In light of these experiences, it actually made a lot of sense to keep larger ships out of the night-fighting business, instead depending on lighter (and cheaper!) ships like light cruisers and destroyers for that sort of 'close-in' battle (think of it as a knife-fight in a phone booth!), and never again were battleships or battlecruisers employed by either side in night-fighting for this reason.

 This has been a fascinating discussion of two beautiful, graceful ships.  The reason ships with only 4 main battery guns could not be true battlcruisers was, I believe, that naval doctrine finally recognized (perhaps shortly before or during the First World War) that a minimum of 6 guns was needed to "ensure hits".  This is from an old read of my brother's illustrated book on battleships.  I forget the author and title, but the illustrated article concerned the design of Strasbourg and Dunquerque, designed by the French to run down German pocket battleships.

     Large naval guns fired in salvos, normally 1/2 of the main armament.  This was to give a speed of firing slow enough for spotters to identify the salvo fired at the last range setting, but not so slow as to fall behind the enemy's rate of fire, and timed so the next salvo could have the corrected range.  Actually at a given time there might be one salvo hitting the water, another perhaps 10 seconds behind it in mid flight, and a third loaded awaiting the corrected range from the result given from the first.   The salvo hitting the water would be either beyond (over), short of (under), or straddling/hitting the enemy ship.  The pattern of shells would cover an area lengthwise and breadthwise relative to the target ship.

     Normally one had to use at least two ranging salvos before the third could be dialed in to hit.  A 3-shell salvo was considered the minimum, because the triangle would have some length and breadth.  A 4-shell salvo, describing a rectangle, was better. (The same principle applied to WWII destroyers laying down depth charge patterns.)  4 guns, firing in two-shell salvos, would be insufficient.

  A lightly-armored battlecruiser could only fight a battleship at extreme range, if her guns were bigger and her fire control better.  And also if the first scoring salvo inflicted some sort of crippling damage, which it often did.  However, it is extremely difficult for a warrior to run off from a fight when he's winning.  This would have to be the tactic of a battlecruiser engaging a wounded, but still dangerous battleship with her fire control still intact.  Or heavy cruisers, for that matter.

An interesting exercise to demonstrate this is in the old game, Combined Carriers at War, by the Strategic Studies Group.  It runs under DOS.  There is a surface combat facility.  In one North Atlantic scenario, the Germans have two hypothetical battlecruisers, with 15" guns but built like eggshells.  They can score first hits at extreme range, but right after that you have to "flee" if you want to keep your BC's. 

So I believe that Repulse and Renown were "minimum" battlecruisers, and HMS Exeter and the Japanese Aoba's were minimum heavy cruisers. 

 

 

This has been a GREAT read! I had the Avalon Hill Jutland game when I was a college student, but we couldn't master the rules. I'm not real salty but I did get interested in the subject and actually bought a big collection of lead ships from that battle, all about 3" -4" long. I will look around for them, as I spent some real $$ on them.

Thanks for all the great info!

Bill

I think you are pretty much correct, as those ships were handsome, if fundamentally flawed, even for their intended shallow-water mission in the Baltic (railway guns and other shore batteries would have made short work of them, and of course, the Baltic was the major training ground for the German High Seas Fleet, and there were plenty of dreadnoughts available in the area at any given time to confront them).  Admiral Fisher and Churchill were both ardent admirers of the battlecruiser concept, and for good reasons, but you must also bear in mind they were also proponents of the doomed Dardanelles campaign and others as well!

There are a lot of myths and flawed ideas that have been around for a long time about battleships and battlecruisers that have been repeated so many times that they have become 'Gospel,' but that doesn't make them any less incorrect!  The idea that either the battlecruiser or battleship became 'obsolete' for one reason or another is probably the most egregious.  During the first world war, battlecruisers performed their functions magnificently, the hunting down and destruction of Von Spees cruiser squadron at the Falklands is a perfect example.  At both Dogger Bank and Jutland, battlecruisers did exactly what they were designed to do, both screening the main battle fleet, and drawing in the battle fleet of the enemy.  The fact that some of the British battlecruisers were destroyed is now fully understood as being a function of poor ammunition handling, and failure to learn from previous encounters (whereas the Germans had installed 'flash doors' in their ammunition handling rooms, and stored their cordite in brass cartridges, rather than piles of silk bags).  Battlecruisers were never intended to directly 'take on' battleships at sea, and the failure to follow that precept is the cause of the destruction of HMS Hood in the second world war as well.  The main operational argument against battlecruisers as a concept is in reality one of cost, since it costs as much, if not more to build and man a battlecruiser as it does a battleship, and thus in times of fiscal hardship, a battleship is much more 'cost-effective' in terms of 'bang for buck.'  It is for this reason that the heavy cruiser was developed in the interwar period, with its almost identical mission superceding that of the battlecruiser, but at a much cheaper cost.  Note that as soon as significantly enhanced financing became available and a recognizable threat appeared, nations began once more to build battlecruisers to augment the heavy cruiser force (French 'Dunkerques', German 'Graf Spees,' American 'Alaskas), and given the time and opportunity, many more would have been built, despite the so-called 'failures' of the concept in the first world war.

Looking at battleships, the common explanation is that they somehow became 'obsolete' as a direct result of the rise of the aircraft carrier.  This is equally untrue!  The battleship was designed to function as part of a fleet or squadron, never as individual ships, and virtually every time they were deployed individually, they suffered terrible losses.  This is not because the ships themselves were in any way obsolete, but they were used in a manner they were never intended to.  What DID become clear is that battleships and all other surface ships for that matter, would in future require competent air cover to continue to fulfill their function, and it is that lesson which was brought home by the advent of the aircraft carrier.

So, you might ask, if they are so wonderful, why are battleships not still part of the inventory?  And the answer to that goes back to my original precept of cost.  Quite simply, it is too expensive to either build, maintain, or deploy battleships in this day and age, when there are no other comparable warships for them to defend, or fight against.  At the end of WW2, the only nations still possessing battleships were in such a state of economic exhaustion, that battleships could simply no longer be afforded.  This was particularly true, since those nations other than the US which might have continued their use (France and the UK) had essentially given up their intent to maintain or obtain any sort of overseas empire.  The last use of battleships other than the US involved the Suez Crisis, where the French deployed the 'Richelieu,' and after that joint French/UK debacle, it was clear that the old colonial powers simply could no longer afford to flex the kind of muscle needed to continue their old strategies. 

This left the US as the ONLY nation still capable of operating battleships, and it is significant to note that every time since then when significant 'ship to shore' bombardment operations were required, the US has trotted out their old battlewagons once again, since nothing else in the world either planned or built has the same unique set of capabilities (Korea, Vietnam, First Gulf War).  Also, it is significant to note that the last time the battleships were overhauled and redeployed, it was at least partially in response to the Soviet construction and deployment of the 'Kirov' class ships, which can only be considered as modern forms of the battlecruiser resurrected.  With the collapse of the Soviet navy and the end of the First Gulf War, the US battleships were carefully placed back into mothballs.  In other words, if no-one else has battleships, then there really is no reason to have any of your own, and has little or nothing to do with the existence of aircraft carriers (which themsleves could be considered 'obsolete' by virtue of shore and aircraft-based long-range missiles).

Is it likely that the battleship will once more sail the seas?  Well, history shows that this WILL happen, if another power arises with the might, wealth and will to build them and threaten the current status quo.  It will be interesting to see just how long it takes for the Chinese navy to come to this design consideration, and if so, how long it will take the US to either dust off the old battlewagons once again, or consider the creation of a new design (if we are still in an economic position to do so).

Hi, guys!

Sorry to jump in so late, but having just stumbled upon this site, I am brand-new so am doing my best to find threads of interest. This is certainly one of them. I see a few familiar names from other warship sites I frequent, as well.

ANYWAY--I wanted to contribute to this discussion, just for FYI purposes. HMS Courageous, Glorious, and Furious were such oddities of history, because they had a very limited and specialized purpose from their inception. Their great size gave them high speed and the ability to mount large-caliber weapons, while doing so with a relatively shallow draught. These qualities were needed for their role in a British amphibious operation during World War One that never took place. Their roles were to provide heavy fire cover and support for a proposed assault and landing by British military forces on the Pomeranian coast. 

That operation was proposed by the same man who pushed their design--"Jackie" Fisher.  Fisher was also the "father" of the battlecruiser, but these three vessels were themselves, not battlecruisers--although the two types shared some of the same characteristics--and their identity as "large light cruisers" was established as a means of obtaining the necessary governmental funding for their construction.

With such a limited and specialized purpose, they were very much white elephants, with no real place among the Royal Navy when the operation for which they were designed never materialized.  I feel it is inappropriate to compare these ships with "proper" battlecruisers, as they were neither designed nor intended as such, and should be exempted from comparisons with the latter. 

The three ships were not all "sisters", as HMS Furious was the odd one out of a group of odd ones, with Courageous and Glorious being nearly identical twins.  Furious, the half-sister, carried a single 18.1-inch gun in a turret, aft. This was the largest caliber weapon ever fitted to a British warship, and was truly a strange one-off, far too large and massive for a ship of her size.

However bizarre their origins and purpose, C&G were nonetheless handsome, elegant ships and very modelworthy.  Not enough good can be said for Admiralty Model Works' superb quality, and I agree with all the praise they have received in the modeling community, thus far.

 

  

 

Dreadnought52 wrote:

I guess the only thing wrong with the philosophy was that it didn't work in practice! Battlecruisers didn't fare too well in any of their engagements unless it was with small fry. WS

I don't think that this is particularly true, though it is a commonly held belief.  The German battlecruisers at Jutland performed their task superbly.  Functioning as a powerful screening force for the main High Seas Fleet, Hipper's battlecruisers made contact with and forced back the British screen of light cruisers, then the British battlecruisers, before establishing the location and orientation of the main British Grand Fleet.  Once Hipper and Scheer were able to establish that the Grand Fleet was 'crossing their T,' the German battlecruisers once more charged into the fray to screen the battle turn of the High Seas Fleet to them to escape disaster at the hands of the British.  During that time, the German battlecruisers were subjected to a pounding by the combined gunnery of most of the dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers in the British Navy, and even managed to sink yet another British battlecruiser in the process without loss to themselves.  Even more amazingly, they performed this maneuver not just once, but TWICE, the second time with half of their own guns and turrets silenced by the heavy British gunfire, and despite all this punishment, not ONE of the German battlecruisers were sunk by the British (though 'Lutzow' had to be scuttled by her own crew before returning to Germany, and 'Seydlitz' came close to sinking before she could get back to harbor).  In other words, during the battle of Jutland, the German battlecruisers did EXACTLY what they were designed to do, and even the British battlecruisers (though taking heavy losses) were effective in drawing the High Seas Fleet into a 'killing field' that should have spelled the doom of most of the German Navy.  I can't see how you could ask more of any ship-type than that!

Yup, there were battlecruisers, and then there were battlecruisers!  The German examples were always very tough nuts to crack, and they certainly spent their time in the line of fire, not only of other battlecruisers, but most of the Grand Fleet as well.  Admiral 'Jackie' Fisher was the biggest proponent of 'speed equals protection,' and combined with some very poor strategies of Churchill, came up with some very poor ideas, such as 'Courageous,' 'Furious,' and even 'Repulse' and 'Renown' were looked on with horror by the Jutland survivors.  In fact, as soon as 'Renown' and 'Repulse' were launched, they were ordered immediately back into the shipyard for extra armor to be applied!

I think the battlecruiser concept (properly applied!) was not a bad one, but the ships needed to be built up to the job and used accordingly (something the Brits just never seemed able to do!).  The inevitable result was the 'fast battleship,' which made both the battlecruisers and other dreadnoughts effectively as obsolete as the pre-dreadnoughts were by the dreadnoughts themselves.

Looking at battlecruiser performance in WW2 is a bit misleading.  First off, many of teh battlecruisers surviving or just built at this time had a number of flaws both recognized, and unrecognized.  Certainly 'Scharnhorst' and 'Gneisenau' would have been far more effective ships if they had had the 15" guns they were designed for.  'Hood' and 'Repulse' both had bad luck hanging around the POW, in one case because of poor tactics (Hood was only able to use her forward guns for much of the battle, and the Germans were VERY good at directing the fire of their guns), and the other because of the appalling lack of aircover (and 'Repulse' actually took more battle damage before sinking than did POW!).   The Japanese 'Kongo's' only had two opportunities for surface battle, both times at night, both times at such extremely close range that hits by almost anything would cause damage (and the US battleship 'South Dakota' hardly escaped scott-free either!).  Not really the kind of battle the designers envisioned by any means!

So the argument rests.  Certainly, the many operations of HMS 'Renown' were very much in keeping with the planned mission of a battlecruiser, and she did them very well and very successfully too, even fending off both 'Scharnhorst' as well as 'Gneisenau' and forcing them to flee the area in a hurry!  And what was the planned mission of the 'Alaska' class?  It was to deal specifically with the big new Japanese heavy cruisers like the 'Takao's,' that were in many ways some of the most dangerous surface ships in the Pacific at the time.....

Yup, there were battlecruiser, and then there were battlecruisers!  The German examples were always very tough nuts to crack, and they certainly spent their time in the line of fire, not only of other battlecruisers, but most of the Grand Fleet as well  Admiral 'Jackie' Fisher was the biggest proponent of 'speed equals protection,' and combined with some very poor strategies of Churchill, came up with some very poor ideas, such as 'Courageous,' 'Furious,' and even 'Repulse' and 'Renown' were looked on with horror by the Jutland survivors.  In fact, as soon as 'Renown' and 'Repulse' were launched, they were ordered immediately back into the shipyard for extra armor to be applied!

I think the battlecruiser concept (properly applied!) was not a bad one, but the ships needed to be built up to the job and used accordingly (something the Brits just never seemed able to do!).  The inevitable result was the 'fast battleship,' which made both the battlecruisers and other dreadnoughts effectively as obsolete as the pre-dreadnoughts were by the dreadnoughts themselves.

Looking at battlecruiser performance in WW2 is a bit misleading.  First off, many of teh battlecruisers surviving or just built at this time had a number of flaws both recognized, and unrecognized.  Certainly 'Scharnhorst' and 'Gneisenau' would have been far more effective ships if they had had the 15" guns they were designed for.  'Hood' and 'Repulse' both had bad luck hanging around the POW, in one case because of poor tactics (Hood was only able to use her forward guns for much of the battle, and the Germans were VERY good at directing the fire of their guns), and the other because of the appalling lack of aircover (and 'Repulse' actually took more battle damage before sinking than did POW!).   The Japanese 'Kongo's' only had two opportunities for surface battle, both times at night, both times at such extremely close range that hits by almost anything would cause damage (and the US battleship 'South Dakota' hardly escaped scott-free either!).  Not really the kind of battle the designers envisioned by any means!

So the argument rests.  Certainly, the many operations of HMS 'Renown' were very much in keeping with the planned mission of a battlecruiser, and she did them very well and very successfully too, even fending off both 'Scharnhorst' as well as 'Gneisenau' and forcing them to flee the area in a hurry!  And what was the planned mission of the 'Alaska' class?  It was to deal specifically with the big new Japanese heavy cruisers like the 'Takao's,' that were in many ways some of the most dangerous surface ships in the Pacific at the time.....

Dreadnought52 wrote:

What ship modeler can't love the crazy design of what can only be called a large light cruiser like this ( OK, the RN called it a battlecruiser). A huge vessel, built like a light cruiser with 15" guns, how crazy can you get? Many of you already know that this ship was converted to an aircraft carrier before WWII but how many of you have seen it in its orginal outrageous configuration?

If you think Courageous is odd, try HMS Furious! (I'm not sure if there's a 1/700 resin kit of this ship, though) This is a more or less similar design, but instead of 15" turrets, had two 18" guns in single turrets. Even before the end of WW1 it was acknowledged as being fairly useless as a battlecruiser, and was progressively converted to a carrier, with initially only one end of the ship covered with a flight deck leaving the other 18" turret still in place. I think Furious was originally envisaged as a "fast monitor" for supporting a proposed amphibious landing on the Baltic coast.

Brews wrote:

British battlecruisers did have that nasty habit of blowing up. 3 survived Hood in 1941, I think 2 survived Indefatigable (or was it Queen Mary?) in 1916.

Actually, both HMS Queen Mary and HMS Indefatigable blew up at Jutland, along with the inaptly named HMS Invincible. The exact reason for the 3 losses at Jutland is fairly complicated (read one of the many books on WW1 naval combat, such as "Castles of Steel", for more info) but basically was due to poor ammo handling procedures and safety precautions in the turret + magazine rather than due to thin armour; hits on the turrets ignited the ready ammo, then the magazines causing the whole ship to blow up. Many of the German ships at Jutland had their turret armour penetrated by heavy shells, but they did not blow up, mainly due to safety precautions such as flashproof doors installed after the Battle of Dogger Bank (when the German battlecruiser Seydlitz very nearly blew up due to more or less the same reason as the three British ships at Jutland)

Hood's fate was slightly different and (according to most sources I have read) was most likely due to a shell from Bismarck penetrating the hull or deck armour somewhere around the amidships area and directly igniting the magazine. The fire in the 4" and UP (AA rocket) ammunition didn't directly cause the magazine explosion (as far as I know)
 

 

Just got my Courageous. WOW. Simply stunning. Worthy of only your very best build effort.

Brews wrote:

My grandmother told me to never join the navy, because I'd drown.

 

My grandfather told me that if I went into the Navy during wartime that I might die, but that I would at least die after a good night's rest in a clean bunk and with a hot meal in my belly.

( He was a cavalryman with Pershing against Pancho Villa, was gassed in France in WW I, fought under McArthur in New Guinea, served with the Aussies in Burma and led the US troops into Hiroshima.) He encouraged me to stay out of the infantry.

British battlecruisers did have that nasty habit of blowing up. 3 survived Hood in 1941, I think 2 survived Indefatigable (or was it Queen Mary?) in 1916.

My grandmother told me to never join the navy, because I'd drown.

Hi

I some circles, it was reported that Bismarck was fireing @ the P.O.W., and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugene was fireing @ the Hood. It is possible the Hoods extra rooms with a.a rockets was set off by 8" guns not 15", the A.A. rockets were stored in above the armour belt rooms. Thus setting off the biggest "fire works" show in the Atlantic area of opperations{only topped by Yamoto and Musashi in the Pacific}.

 SteveH

battlecruisers were never intended to go against their own kind or above, they were intended for against all cruisers & below. the glorious would have still lost to the scharnhorst & gneisenau.