Most historically significant naval vessel...?

Chuck Fan - I just threw that in to show how a little fact could be used to spun a good yarn. Its much truer to believe that the Iroquois may have had contact with the Norse and possibly absorbed some of the lost settlements. In the Iroquois language there are 200 words that are the same in meaning and pronunciation as old Norse.

Mike T.

searat12 wrote:

And certainly the native North Americans didn't treat the Norsemen as gods, just peppered them with arrows until they went away!  Another interesting theory involves the ancient Irish under St Brendan teh Bold, who supposedly ended up in America.  The only evidence for this on this side of the pond seems to be the Mandan indians, many of whom had red hair and blue eyes, plus a few linguistic similarities......

It is known that the gene which causes red hair amoungst some Europeans is extremely ancient, was present amongst the neaderthals, and certainly predated the rise of Homo sapiens.    So red hair amongst Indians does not necessarily imply recent gene exchange with the Irish.   

 It would be curious to see if the blue eyes of American Indians were caused by the same gene as that which caused blue eyes in Northern Europeans.  If they are not, then the blue eyes of Indians would have nothing to do with European contact.   There have also been other superficial similarities between different peoples of the world that later proved to be derived from different genes, and so do not constitute evidence of migration bring the same gene from one to another.    For example, the relatively fair skin of East Asians can be shown to be caused by a different set of genes than those which gave Europeans fair skin, so the fact that east Asians often have fair skin does not imply fair skinned Europeans migrated to Asia and intermarried with darker skinned natives.    Instead it is likely that homo sapiens arrived at both northern Europe and east Asia quite dark skinned, having freshly come out of Africa.  Only later did Europeans and Asians independently evolved lighter skin in independent response to local environments.

As far as any battles being won without at least local airsuperiority;

The Korean War comes to mind. The Chinese never established a daytime battlefield air presence, let alone air superiority, but were able to fight and win some ground battles. The daytime Air War there involving Chinese aircraft was more strategic in nature. The night air war did see an offensive tactical Chinese presence over the battlefield, but in primarily a nusciance roll.

Also the initial phases of the Yom Kippur war. Arab air defences negated the Israeli Air Force and allowed them, especially in the Sinai, to achieve local tactical victories without local air superiority.

stikpusher wrote:

As far as any battles being won without at least local airsuperiority; The Korean War comes to mind. The Chinese never established a daytime battlefield air presence, let alone air superiority,

Even during the phase when Mig-15 first appeared?

Chuck Fan wrote:

searat12 wrote: And certainly the native North Americans didn't treat the Norsemen as gods, just peppered them with arrows until they went away!  Another interesting theory involves the ancient Irish under St Brendan teh Bold, who supposedly ended up in America.  The only evidence for this on this side of the pond seems to be the Mandan indians, many of whom had red hair and blue eyes, plus a few linguistic similarities...... It is known that the gene which causes red hair amoungst some Europeans is extremely ancient, was present amongst the neaderthals, and certainly predated the rise of Homo sapiens.    So red hair amongst Indians does not necessarily imply recent gene exchange with the Irish.     It would be curious to see if the blue eyes of American Indians were caused by the same gene as that which caused blue eyes in Northern Europeans.  If they are not, then the blue eyes of Indians would have nothing to do with European contact.   There have also been other superficial similarities between different peoples of the world that later proved to be derived from different genes, and so do not constitute evidence of migration bring the same gene from one to another.    For example, the relatively fair skin of East Asians can be shown to be caused by a different set of genes than those which gave Europeans fair skin, so the fact that east Asians often have fair skin does not imply fair skinned Europeans migrated to Asia and intermarried with darker skinned natives.    Instead it is likely that homo sapiens arrived at both northern Europe and east Asia quite dark skinned, having freshly come out of Africa.  Only later did Europeans and Asians independently evolved lighter skin in independent response to local environments.

Notice I didn't say it was definitive evidence, but only that it was some evidence (and evidence not found among any other Indian tribes, to my knowledge).  Certainly there are always anomalies in any population, but it is never a good idea to overly generalize, or dismiss anything out of hand (it might jump up and bite you in the butt one day!). 

Basic timetable is North Korea invades June 1950 and pushes ROK/US forces to Pusan perimeter by July/August. Far East Air Force flying from Japan and USN/USMC/RN FAA from carriers off Korea shoot the North's Air Force out of the war. Sept 1950 MacArthur lands 1st Marines and Army troops at Inchon to rear of North Korean Army. UN forces then counterattack from Pusan and push communist forces out of South Korea. Oct 1950, UN forces cross 38th parallel into North Korea and begin driving to Chinese border with complete air supremacy. Chinese ground forces first enountered in sharp fighting, then "disappear". Nov 1950, Mig15s first encountered, flown by Soviet pilots, outclassing any fighter the UN has in theater. Their prime roll is intercepting B-29 raids on North Korean airfields, power plants, etc. Escorting fighters, F-80s and F-84s unable to protect the bombers. The call goes out for F-86s. Migs make no attempt to intervene in the ground battle. Thanksgiving 1950, Chinese launch massive ground intervention and push UN forces out of North Korea and well into South Korea by early 1951. In Dec.1950 Sabres arrive in theater and begin daily clashes with Migs in "MiG alley" along the N.Korea/Chinese border. In early 1951 UN forces rally, counterattack and push Chinese back to along 38th parallel where both sides stabilize and begin the stalemate/trench portion of the war that has more in common with WWI except for weapons used. These were the large scale hill fights-Pork Chop, Old Baldy, the Punchbowl, Heartbreak Ridge... some were won and some were lost. Communist air forces after the initial weeks of the war never contested UN battlefield air superiority-only the strategic. The Migs did sweep the B-29s from daylight skies over Korea, but none of the other UN aircraft.

searat12 wrote:

Just curious... What sort of planes was the US using for ground attack, close-support bombing, etc?

The Air Force used primarily F-80s, F-84s, F-51s, and B-26s for CAS, and interdiction. The Navy/Marines used F4U/AUs, ADs, F9Fs, F2Hs, and F7Fs.

Edit-no Bearcats in Korea. They would not see combat ever in US hands. They were however used by the French in Indochina.

stikpusher wrote:

As far as any battles being won without at least local airsuperiority; The Korean War comes to mind. The Chinese never established a daytime battlefield air presence, let alone air superiority, but were able to fight and win some ground battles. The daytime Air War there involving Chinese aircraft was more strategic in nature. The night air war did see an offensive tactical Chinese presence over the battlefield, but in primarily a nusciance roll. Also the initial phases of the Yom Kippur war. Arab air defences negated the Israeli Air Force and allowed them, especially in the Sinai, to achieve local tactical victories without local air superiority.

I would consider the Chinese winter offensive of 1950/51 a major victory obtained without air superiority. After summer 1950, the UN had air supremecy over the battlefield. Yet the Chinese were able to push UN forces back without even attempting to contest that. And due to numbers involved alone, it was a major battle. Nuclear weapons were even considered for usage.

The Yom Kippur Sainai opening round at best was an aerial no mans land. The Isaeli Air Force sustained crippling loss rates and only replacement from US stocks allowed them to have forces needed for their eventual successful counter attack on land and in the air. While the IAF had an air to air advantage, it did not translate over on to the CAS/interdiction until the ground forces had blasted a hole in the Egypian SAM/AAA defense belt.

Finally I will give another example of one side with no air power defeating a side with air superiority. DienBienPhu- The Viet Minh had no air power what so ever. The French did have a sizable air asset availble, and used it to the utmost. Yet they were defeated in conventional battle. Air Power was unable to make a decisive difference.

In the first and last cases, one opponent without air superiority was willing to endure horrendous casualties from the sky and ground and still achieve their battlefield objective. While the middle case was not as large a fight or victory as the other two, it certainly was significant in several ways. 1)it was the first time the Israeli army was defeated in open battle by the Egyptians, 2) it was the first time the Israeli Air Force did not have total air supremacy over it's opponents and dominance over all battlefields, 3)it showed just how much a full scale modern war can consume in aircraft, machines, men, etc in a very short time period between the competing Western and Soviet war doctrines.

Your original statement was one side winning without at least local air superiority. In all three cases that applied.

stikpusher wrote:

I would consider the Chinese winter offensive of 1950/51 a major victory obtained without air superiority. After summer 1950, the UN had air supremecy over the battlefield. Yet the Chinese were able to push UN forces back without even attempting to contest that. And due to numbers involved alone, it was a major battle. Nuclear weapons were even considered for usage. The Yom Kippur Sainai opening round at best was an aerial no mans land. The Isaeli Air Force sustained crippling loss rates and only replacement from US stocks allowed them to have forces needed for their eventual successful counter attack on land and in the air. While the IAF had an air to air advantage, it did not translate over on to the CAS/interdiction until the ground forces had blasted a hole in the Egypian SAM/AAA defense belt. Finally I will give another example of one side with no air power defeating a side with air superiority. DienBienPhu- The Viet Minh had no air power what so ever. The French did have a sizable air asset availble, and used it to the utmost. Yet they were defeated in conventional battle. Air Power was unable to make a decisive difference. In the first and last cases, one opponent without air superiority was willing to endure horrendous casualties from the sky and ground and still achieve their battlefield objective. While the middle case was not as large a fight or victory as the other two, it certainly was significant in several ways. 1)it was the first time the Israeli army was defeated in open battle by the Egyptians, 2) it was the first time the Israeli Air Force did not have total air supremacy over it's opponents and dominance over all battlefields, 3)it showed just how much a full scale modern war can consume in aircraft, machines, men, etc in a very short time period between the competing Western and Soviet war doctrines. Your original statement was one side winning without at least local air superiority. In all three cases that applied.

Mansteins revenge wrote:

stikpusher wrote: I would consider the Chinese winter offensive of 1950/51 a major victory obtained without air superiority. After summer 1950, the UN had air supremecy over the battlefield. Yet the Chinese were able to push UN forces back without even attempting to contest that. And due to numbers involved alone, it was a major battle. Nuclear weapons were even considered for usage. The Yom Kippur Sainai opening round at best was an aerial no mans land. The Isaeli Air Force sustained crippling loss rates and only replacement from US stocks allowed them to have forces needed for their eventual successful counter attack on land and in the air. While the IAF had an air to air advantage, it did not translate over on to the CAS/interdiction until the ground forces had blasted a hole in the Egypian SAM/AAA defense belt. Finally I will give another example of one side with no air power defeating a side with air superiority. DienBienPhu- The Viet Minh had no air power what so ever. The French did have a sizable air asset availble, and used it to the utmost. Yet they were defeated in conventional battle. Air Power was unable to make a decisive difference. In the first and last cases, one opponent without air superiority was willing to endure horrendous casualties from the sky and ground and still achieve their battlefield objective. While the middle case was not as large a fight or victory as the other two, it certainly was significant in several ways. 1)it was the first time the Israeli army was defeated in open battle by the Egyptians, 2) it was the first time the Israeli Air Force did not have total air supremacy over it's opponents and dominance over all battlefields, 3)it showed just how much a full scale modern war can consume in aircraft, machines, men, etc in a very short time period between the competing Western and Soviet war doctrines. Your original statement was one side winning without at least local air superiority. In all three cases that applied. I agree that your third example applies: DienBienPhu. Don't agree w/ the other two examples, as neither side, IMO, had air-superiority, and that was really how my question should have been worded: "Winning a battle against an opponent w/ air superiority...Good catch on the Bearcat, as well...

Manny,

How do you not consider the Chinese Winter Offensive of 1950/51 to be a victory for the Chinese, despite UN air supremacy? 

bbrowniii wrote:

Mansteins revenge wrote:  stikpusher wrote: I would consider the Chinese winter offensive of 1950/51 a major victory obtained without air superiority. After summer 1950, the UN had air supremecy over the battlefield. Yet the Chinese were able to push UN forces back without even attempting to contest that. And due to numbers involved alone, it was a major battle. Nuclear weapons were even considered for usage. The Yom Kippur Sainai opening round at best was an aerial no mans land. The Isaeli Air Force sustained crippling loss rates and only replacement from US stocks allowed them to have forces needed for their eventual successful counter attack on land and in the air. While the IAF had an air to air advantage, it did not translate over on to the CAS/interdiction until the ground forces had blasted a hole in the Egypian SAM/AAA defense belt. Finally I will give another example of one side with no air power defeating a side with air superiority. DienBienPhu- The Viet Minh had no air power what so ever. The French did have a sizable air asset availble, and used it to the utmost. Yet they were defeated in conventional battle. Air Power was unable to make a decisive difference. In the first and last cases, one opponent without air superiority was willing to endure horrendous casualties from the sky and ground and still achieve their battlefield objective. While the middle case was not as large a fight or victory as the other two, it certainly was significant in several ways. 1)it was the first time the Israeli army was defeated in open battle by the Egyptians, 2) it was the first time the Israeli Air Force did not have total air supremacy over it's opponents and dominance over all battlefields, 3)it showed just how much a full scale modern war can consume in aircraft, machines, men, etc in a very short time period between the competing Western and Soviet war doctrines. Your original statement was one side winning without at least local air superiority. In all three cases that applied. I agree that your third example applies: DienBienPhu. Don't agree w/ the other two examples, as neither side, IMO, had air-superiority, and that was really how my question should have been worded: "Winning a battle against an opponent w/ air superiority...Good catch on the Bearcat, as well... Manny, How do you not consider the Chinese Winter Offensive of 1950/51 to be a victory for the Chinese, despite UN air supremacy?

Mansteins revenge wrote:

bbrowniii wrote:  Mansteins revenge wrote:  stikpusher wrote: I would consider the Chinese winter offensive of 1950/51 a major victory obtained without air superiority. After summer 1950, the UN had air supremecy over the battlefield. Yet the Chinese were able to push UN forces back without even attempting to contest that. And due to numbers involved alone, it was a major battle. Nuclear weapons were even considered for usage. The Yom Kippur Sainai opening round at best was an aerial no mans land. The Isaeli Air Force sustained crippling loss rates and only replacement from US stocks allowed them to have forces needed for their eventual successful counter attack on land and in the air. While the IAF had an air to air advantage, it did not translate over on to the CAS/interdiction until the ground forces had blasted a hole in the Egypian SAM/AAA defense belt. Finally I will give another example of one side with no air power defeating a side with air superiority. DienBienPhu- The Viet Minh had no air power what so ever. The French did have a sizable air asset availble, and used it to the utmost. Yet they were defeated in conventional battle. Air Power was unable to make a decisive difference. In the first and last cases, one opponent without air superiority was willing to endure horrendous casualties from the sky and ground and still achieve their battlefield objective. While the middle case was not as large a fight or victory as the other two, it certainly was significant in several ways. 1)it was the first time the Israeli army was defeated in open battle by the Egyptians, 2) it was the first time the Israeli Air Force did not have total air supremacy over it's opponents and dominance over all battlefields, 3)it showed just how much a full scale modern war can consume in aircraft, machines, men, etc in a very short time period between the competing Western and Soviet war doctrines. Your original statement was one side winning without at least local air superiority. In all three cases that applied. I agree that your third example applies: DienBienPhu. Don't agree w/ the other two examples, as neither side, IMO, had air-superiority, and that was really how my question should have been worded: "Winning a battle against an opponent w/ air superiority...Good catch on the Bearcat, as well... Manny, How do you not consider the Chinese Winter Offensive of 1950/51 to be a victory for the Chinese, despite UN air supremacy?  Based on my research, neither side had significant air-assets during the surprise offensive that started the war...the UN was woefully prepared and it wasn't until later that the UN (US) could claim to have established air-dominance.

Oh, OK, I see.  Maybe we are comparing apples to oranges, inadvertantly.  The offensive Stikpusher and I are referring to is the 'second' major Communist offensive of the war, six months into the actual fighting.  After the US had stopped the NK and slipped in behind them at Inchon and after the US had crossed the 38th Parallel to push up to the the Yalu River.  The Chinese invaded with a massive force (300,000+ troops) which entered North Korea in mid-October and made contact (other than some 'minor' clashes) on 1 November 1950.  This ensuing Chinese Offensive drove UN forces out of the North and damn near back down to the Pusan Perimeter.  In fact, the defeat that the US was handed at the hands of the Chinese resulted in the longest retreat of any US army in history (the US 8th Army, which came pretty darn close to being completely wiped out).  All this in the face of overwhelming UN air superiority.  Here is an interesting snippet from Wikipedia on how the Chinese were able to accomplish this:

The Chinese seemed to come out of nowhere as they swarmed around the flanks and over the defensive positions of the surprised United Nations (UN) troops.^[50] The Chinese march and bivouac discipline also minimized any possible detection. In a well-documented instance, a Chinese army of three divisions marched on foot from An-tung in Manchuria, on the north side of the Yalu River, 286 miles (460 km) to its assembly area in North Korea, in the combat zone, in a period ranging from 16 to 19 days. One division of this army, marching at night over circuitous mountain roads, averaged 18 miles (29 km) per day for 18 days. The day's march began after dark at 19:00 and ended at 03:00 the next morning. Defense measures against aircraft were to be completed before 05:30. Every man, animal, and piece of equipment were to be concealed and camouflaged...  When Chinese units were compelled for any reason to march by day, they were under standing orders for every man to stop in his tracks and remain motionless if aircraft appeared overhead. Officers were empowered to shoot any man who violated this order.^[24]

And, lest you reply that the UN had not established air superiority at the time of the Chinese intervention, another snippet:

Even after the Air Force introduced the advanced F-86, its pilots often struggled against the jets piloted by elite Soviet pilots.^{[citation needed]} The UN gradually gained air superiority over most of Korea that lasted until the end of the war - a decisive factor in helping the UN first advance into the north, and then resist the Chinese invasion of South Korea.

searat12 - you should read "A Time for Trumpets" by Charles MacDonald. The weather helped the Germans alot, but they didn't kick ***. Not one German unit made its first day's objectives and they became sorely behind schedule. Helped alot by actions of units not expected to do anything especially those "d**n engineers!" Forget the movie "The Battle of the Bulge" its a joke, and a bad one at that.

I would agree with you about the Chinese winter offensive. Waves and waves of cannon fodder that could erode the best defense.

Mike T.

telsono wrote:

searat12 - you should read "A Time for Trumpets" by Charles MacDonald. The weather helped the Germans alot, but they didn't kick ***. Not one German unit made its first day's objectives and they became sorely behind schedule. Helped alot by actions of units not expected to do anything especially those "d**n engineers!" Forget the movie "The Battle of the Bulge" its a joke, and a bad one at that. I would agree with you about the Chinese winter offensive. Waves and waves of cannon fodder that could erode the best defense. Mike T.

Well, I'm not sure what you have read about the Ardennes offensive, and I wasn't thinking about that awful movie.  I was looking at 'Armor Battles of the Waffen SS' by Will Fey, and 'Tiger, The History of a Legendary Weapon 1942-45' by Egon Kleine and Vollmar Kuhn.  The Germans really gave the US  a spanking they hadn't been looking for, and at the worst possible time.  Yes, the US held out at Bastogne, and Patton rode to the rescue, etc, etc, but if the weather had stayed bad for another week, it would have set back the allied advance considerably, and Patton might have had a lot more resistance than he had bargained for as well (but they would have won eventually in any case!).

As for the Chinese in Korea, I say again, I am not well-versed in the conflict or the literature, so cannot I make any definitive statements, bow to my academic superiors, and only pose questions (hopefully intelligent!) to inform myself.  One thing is ALWAYS true, if you have no concern for casualties, and are willing to throw troops into the maelstrom without regard to losses, you will make territorial gains (bought by piles of bodies).......

searat12 - you should books from both sides of the situation. MacDonald has more than adequate credentials to speak of the subject as an historian for the US Army's history branch and the book has been praised by other historians like Carl d'Este about completeness on the subject. The work is fair to both sides and covers the battle by dividing it into the three axis of attack the Germans intended. Just going by the actions you mention gives on a partial partisan vies of that momentous battle. Read about the defense of St. Vith (studied by the US Armor school), the actions of the 82nd Airborne on the northern shoulder, the 2nd Armoured Division, the lack of German penetration at the southern shoulder, etc.

Also, MacDonald was there! He led an infantry company at the defense of the twin villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath which was told in his first book "Company Commader". The German armor took a great deal of damage in that fight before the GI's retreated.

Not reading MacDonald's book is like viewing the Guadalcanal Campaign only from the aviation aspect. Frank's book gives a good overview of that entire campaign.

But we should get back to nautical subject that this thread is about.

Mike T.