Most historically significant naval battles???

Mansteins revenge wrote:

I mean, the US lost OVER 12,000 DEAD on Okinawa alone, 79 ships SUNK/scrapped, and 762 airplanes lost---clearly the US was willing to take casualties---and lots of them...I hardly think the loss of 3 carriers and several thousand casualties in '42 would have caused the US to sue for peace...

I think you might be missing my point, but that's OK.  I don't really have a dog in this fight... we'll agree to disagree...

Well, I think it is important not to look at these things in isolation.  While the US was certainly cranking out new ships in '42, it is important to remember that by this time they were also engaged with the Battle of the Atlantic, and a lot of those assets were needed on the 'wrong' side of the world and thus not really available to deal with the Japanese.  It is also important to remember that if the Japanese had taken out the US carriers at Midway, that there was a massive Japanese surface fleet to back up the Japanese carriers that was on its way for the 'decisive battle,' and finish the job at Pearl Harbor (destroy the fuel depots, dry docks and machine shops). With the loss of the US carriers, it would have been entirely possible for the Japanese not only to take over Midway Island (which would have meant a constant aerial menace to Hawaii), but to move on Hawaii itself and either destroy or seize its use as a naval base.  At that point, the entire West Coast of the US would have been under threat, to include Panama, and if Panama could be neutrailized, then there wouldn't be any new fleet of US ships comin' to the rescue, as there would not have been the logistical elements available for them to do so (bases, refueling, repairs, etc).  Lotsa 'what ifs!'

I also agree that the Japanese grand strategy from the first was to inflict enough damage on the US that a negotiated peace or at least a ceasefire would be possible, and this had to happen with a year or so.  Whether this was a realistic goal is another story, but in my view, it might well have been possible if the damage inflicted was severe enough and fast enough (and never forget that most of Europe had, or was falling to the Germans at that time!).  And I don't think the Japanese thought that the US would sue for peace, but rather at a certain point the Japanese would present the US with an opportunity to back down without 'losing face,' or the ability of the US to conduct significant operations in the Pacific might have been so degraded that the US could simply have been either ignored, or at least contained.

Finally, while the Japanese were quite 'timid' in their fleet actions after Midway, the reason for that timidity was the lack of airpower caused by the lack of carriers and/or land-based aircover, which of course was caused by the losses at Midway.  I have given a lot of thought to this whole issue of Japanese fleet operations, particularly those conducted by, or influenced by Admiral Yamamoto, which leads me to some pretty peculiar conclusions/speculations, one of which is that Yamamoto actually intended for the Japanese to lose, and may in fact have been something of a spy and/or traitor on behalf of the US!!!

searat12 wrote:

Well, I think it is important not to look at these things in isolation.  While the US was certainly cranking out new ships in '42, it is important to remember that by this time they were also engaged with the Battle of the Atlantic, and a lot of those assets were needed on the 'wrong' side of the world and thus not really available to deal with the Japanese.  It is also important to remember that if the Japanese had taken out the US carriers at Midway, that there was a massive Japanese surface fleet to back up the Japanese carriers that was on its way for the 'decisive battle,' and finish the job at Pearl Harbor (destroy the fuel depots, dry docks and machine shops). With the loss of the US carriers, it would have been entirely possible for the Japanese not only to take over Midway Island (which would have meant a constant aerial menace to Hawaii), but to move on Hawaii itself and either destroy or seize its use as a naval base.  At that point, the entire West Coast of the US would have been under threat, to include Panama, and if Panama could be neutrailized, then there wouldn't be any new fleet of US ships comin' to the rescue, as there would not have been the logistical elements available for them to do so (bases, refueling, repairs, etc).  Lotsa 'what ifs!' I also agree that the Japanese grand strategy from the first was to inflict enough damage on the US that a negotiated peace or at least a ceasefire would be possible, and this had to happen with a year or so.  Whether this was a realistic goal is another story, but in my view, it might well have been possible if the damage inflicted was severe enough and fast enough (and never forget that most of Europe had, or was falling to the Germans at that time!).  And I don't think the Japanese thought that the US would sue for peace, but rather at a certain point the Japanese would present the US with an opportunity to back down without 'losing face,' or the ability of the US to conduct significant operations in the Pacific might have been so degraded that the US could simply have been either ignored, or at least contained. Finally, while the Japanese were quite 'timid' in their fleet actions after Midway, the reason for that timidity was the lack of airpower caused by the lack of carriers and/or land-based aircover, which of course was caused by the losses at Midway.  I have given a lot of thought to this whole issue of Japanese fleet operations, particularly those conducted by, or influenced by Admiral Yamamoto, which leads me to some pretty peculiar conclusions/speculations, one of which is that Yamamoto actually intended for the Japanese to lose, and may in fact have been something of a spy and/or traitor on behalf of the US!!!

"Finally, while the Japanese were quite 'timid' in their fleet actions after Midway, the reason for that timidity was the lack of airpower caused by the lack of carriers and/or land-based aircover, which of course was caused by the losses at Midway." 

The Japanese did not lose any air land-based air assets at Midway...if you study OOB's for the Japanese vs. Americans/British/Australians, the Japanese war machine was woefully inadequate for anything short of the 6 month "surprise" campaign that they did, in the event, execute...

The bottom-line in my debate w/ both you and bbrowni is that the Japanese simply did not possess enough of an army to invade the West coast of the US or, IMO, Central America...I also strongly dismiss the notion that the US would have sued for peace...it was decided fairly early that nothing less than unconditional surrender was to be had from both the Germans and the Japanese by the Allies...While it makes good novels and "what ifs", simply put, it was never a real possibility of the Japanese setting foot in California or Panama, regardless of the outcome of Midway...our ground army and air force would have slaughtered any sea-borne invasion force...

Well, it is surprising what politicians will say at any given time, even if it is all just a bunch of nonsense, and political 'decisions' can be surprisingly flexible in the 'right' conditions!  Note, I never said the Japanese had any intention or need to invade the West Coast, or Panama.  They just needed to neutralise them.  A few well-placed bombs in the Panama canal locks puts them out of action for years.  A few well-placed submarines outside Bremerton, San Francisco and Long Beach keeps any ships from coming out, and an air raid or two on the building slips keeps any new ships from being built there too. 

The Japanese Guadalcanal and New Guinea operations were planned before the losses at Midway, and could have been successful if significant carrier-based cover was available to allow the completed construction of the ground-based airfields necesssary for further expansion, and to cut off the allied supply route to Australia (Henderson airfield was the whole objective of Guadalcanal after all, and the airfields at Port Moresby was the objective of the New Guinea operation!).  The Japanese Army assumed that this cover would be available, but of course it was not, and both operations failed miserably and at huge cost.  And all this could have been prevented if the Japanese had taken out the US carriers at Midway......

I also recall a lot of big claims of 'invulnerability' for Singapore and the Phillipines too, before the Japanese Army clobbered both of them in short order, and in both cases it was air-superiority that really did the job.... As far as size goes, MOST of the Japanese Army was in China and Manchuria for most of the war (and not doing much, either!).  The biggest problem for the Japanese is that the Army never understood or accepted the limitations of the Navy, no matter what losses had been incurred.  The second biggest problem for the Japanese was that they never understood what to do with their submarines, even though they had plenty of contacts with the Germans who could could have shown them how.  The third biggest problem for the Japanese was a large collection of pretty crappy Admirals, who just kept doing the same operation in the same manner in the same place again and again until the US got wise and blew them to Hell and back........

Mansteins revenge wrote:

The bottom-line in my debate w/ both you and bbrowni is that the Japanese simply did not possess enough of an army to invade the West coast of the US or, IMO, Central America...I also strongly dismiss the notion that the US would have sued for peace...it was decided fairly early that nothing less than unconditional surrender was to be had from both the Germans and the Japanese by the Allies...While it makes good novels and "what ifs", simply put, it was never a real possibility of the Japanese setting foot in California or Panama, regardless of the outcome of Midway...our ground army and air force would have slaughtered any sea-borne invasion force...

Uh, thats bbrowniii, Manny...

OK, since the debate rages on - so I'll chime in despite my previous promise to shut up...

Keep in mind, as I have said before, that the Japanese had no intention or desire to invade California (or probably Panama either).  Their military strategy was focued on Asia, but to accomplish what they wanted to do IN ASIA, they had to geet the Americans out of the way.  Remember, the whole goal of Pearl was to give the US such a knock on the head that we could not counter-punch.  While that failed, Midway was expected to finish the job...  Part of the Japanese strategy was to lure the US carriers out into the 'open' so they could be dealt with.  I do think, however, that at that point the Japanese thought the US only had two carriers left in the Pacific (didn't they think Yorktown was sunk at Coral Sea...?)

Gotta go teach now....

Can't believe everyone forgot the Battle of Charelston Harbor where the first functional submarine was tested during the Civil War the Hunley.

bbrowniii wrote:

Mansteins revenge wrote: The bottom-line in my debate w/ both you and bbrowni is that the Japanese simply did not possess enough of an army to invade the West coast of the US or, IMO, Central America...I also strongly dismiss the notion that the US would have sued for peace...it was decided fairly early that nothing less than unconditional surrender was to be had from both the Germans and the Japanese by the Allies...While it makes good novels and "what ifs", simply put, it was never a real possibility of the Japanese setting foot in California or Panama, regardless of the outcome of Midway...our ground army and air force would have slaughtered any sea-borne invasion force... Uh, thats bbrowniii, Manny... OK, since the debate rages on - so I'll chime in despite my previous promise to shut up... Keep in mind, as I have said before, that the Japanese had no intention or desire to invade California (or probably Panama either).  Their military strategy was focued on Asia, but to accomplish what they wanted to do IN ASIA, they had to geet the Americans out of the way.  Remember, the whole goal of Pearl was to give the US such a knock on the head that we could not counter-punch.  While that failed, Midway was expected to finish the job...  Part of the Japanese strategy was to lure the US carriers out into the 'open' so they could be dealt with.  I do think, however, that at that point the Japanese thought the US only had two carriers left in the Pacific (didn't they think Yorktown was sunk at Coral Sea...?) Gotta go teach now....

And of course, if you REALLY want to play 'what ifs,' then Nagumo's decision at Pearl Harbor not to send in one more strike to destroy the fuel tank farms, dry docks and machine shops in many ways can be considered the point at which the Japanese 'lost' the war.  If Nagumo had, then there would never have been a Midway, or a Coral Sea battle either, and the Japanese would have stormed along to a quick victory almost unopposed, because the US Navy at that point would have been forced to retreat to the West Coast through lack of logistics.......

Mikeym_us wrote:

Can't believe everyone forgot the Battle of Charelston Harbor where the first functional submarine was tested during the Civil War the Hunley.

Interesting, but forgive me if I ask, didn't the CSS Hunley sink during this episode?  Hardly a successful demonstration of anything significant (the same thing happened with the 'Turtle' during the Revolutionary War).........

It was sunk after sinking a Union frigate with a "Torpedo". The circumstances of the sinking are unclear but what is known is that the crew did not sink their own ship but it was accidentally run over by another Union ship that came to the rescue of the crew of the first Union ship.

Mikeym_us wrote:

It was sunk after sinking a Union frigate with a "Torpedo". The circumstances of the sinking are unclear but what is known is that the crew did not sink their own ship but it was accidentally run over by another Union ship that came to the rescue of the crew of the first Union ship.

That doesn't sound unclear to me...  It's pretty interesting, actually.  I knew the Hunley seemed to sink as more a result of an accident than anything else, but this is the first I ever heard of a Union ship running it down (by mistake no less...)

Mansteins revenge wrote:

I mean, the US lost OVER 12,000 DEAD on Okinawa alone, 79 ships SUNK/scrapped, and 762 airplanes lost---clearly the US was willing to take casualties---and lots of them...I hardly think the loss of 3 carriers and several thousand casualties in '42 would have caused the US to sue for peace...

There is compelling evidence to suggest that the casualties at the Battle of Okinawa were actually a significant factor in deciding to drop the atomic bombs, specifically because the US was NOT willing to continue to take such catastrophic casualties any more - and Truman et al knew that the casualties involved in an invasion of Japan proper would have been much, MUCH worse...  So rather than demonstrating a willingness to take casualties, Okinawa could be seen as a bit of a breaking point, an 'enough is enough' moment.  And, also keep in mind that, you are comparing 1945 to 1942 - the worst of the war in the Pacific, for all intents and purposes was still ahead of the Americans, but by '45 they could see that victory was imminent.  Had the US fleet been decimated at Midway, with the resulting threat to (and perhaps imminent loss of Hawaii) and the US Navy shoved all the way back to California, maybe that 'enough is enough' moment would have come earlier.  If we kept getting our lunch handed to us, maybe Roosevelt and the Congress decide to say 'uncle' (even if only temporarily) in the Pacific, give the Japanese what they 'wanted' and instead the US focuses solely on Europe, which by your own admission Manny, was seen to be a far greater threat and the most important theater in the war.

As to Japan's designs on invading the mainland US, as I said before, that was never in the cards.  Here's a bit from Wiki that touches on their real goals at Midway and beyond:

"The Japanese plan was to lure America's few remaining carriers into a trap and sink them.^[6] The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway Atoll to extend their defensive perimeter. This operation was considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa, as well as an invasion of Hawaii.^[7]

The Midway operation, like the attack on Pearl Harbor, was not part of a campaign for the conquest of the United States, but was aimed at its elimination as a strategic Pacific power, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was also hoped another defeat would force the U.S. to negotiate an end to the Pacific War with conditions favorable for Japan.^"

searat12 wrote:

bbrowniii wrote:  Mansteins revenge wrote: The bottom-line in my debate w/ both you and bbrowni is that the Japanese simply did not possess enough of an army to invade the West coast of the US or, IMO, Central America...I also strongly dismiss the notion that the US would have sued for peace...it was decided fairly early that nothing less than unconditional surrender was to be had from both the Germans and the Japanese by the Allies...While it makes good novels and "what ifs", simply put, it was never a real possibility of the Japanese setting foot in California or Panama, regardless of the outcome of Midway...our ground army and air force would have slaughtered any sea-borne invasion force... Uh, thats bbrowniii, Manny... OK, since the debate rages on - so I'll chime in despite my previous promise to shut up... Keep in mind, as I have said before, that the Japanese had no intention or desire to invade California (or probably Panama either).  Their military strategy was focued on Asia, but to accomplish what they wanted to do IN ASIA, they had to geet the Americans out of the way.  Remember, the whole goal of Pearl was to give the US such a knock on the head that we could not counter-punch.  While that failed, Midway was expected to finish the job...  Part of the Japanese strategy was to lure the US carriers out into the 'open' so they could be dealt with.  I do think, however, that at that point the Japanese thought the US only had two carriers left in the Pacific (didn't they think Yorktown was sunk at Coral Sea...?) Gotta go teach now.... And of course, if you REALLY want to play 'what ifs,' then Nagumo's decision at Pearl Harbor not to send in one more strike to destroy the fuel tank farms, dry docks and machine shops in many ways can be considered the point at which the Japanese 'lost' the war.  If Nagumo had, then there would never have been a Midway, or a Coral Sea battle either, and the Japanese would have stormed along to a quick victory almost unopposed, because the US Navy at that point would have been forced to retreat to the West Coast through lack of logistics.......

I used the lack of a prolonged bombing of Pearl to argue my points earlier: that Japanese Admirals were for the most part VERY conservative and timid: Pearl, Coral Sea, Leyte Gulf, etc...

Okay, here goes: assuming worst case scenerio: Pearl Harbor is blown to bits---nothing left; Panama Canal is disabled; all US carriers sunk...I argue that the US STILL would not have sued for peace, period...the Japanese simply did not have the ability to land a force on the West coast and/or sustain it, period...And the ONLY way, IMO, that the US would have sued for peace is if the Japanese had marched through Washington DC...

And this talk of Japanese subs and carriers patrolling of the coast of California w/ impunity is ridiculous---we couldn't even do that until LATE in the war against Japan (Look at how quick Doolittle's raid was launched when he ran into fishing boats---hundreds of miles off of the Japanese coast). Land based a/c and our own submarines (who knew what they were doing) would have sunk any who got close...

Final and best argument: Look at Great Britain after the fall of Norway and France in 1940. Isolated, under bomber and U-boat attack; they were in a very similar situation as you propose the US could have been in had Midway, the Panama Canal and Pearl fell, AND DID face a REAL possibility of invasion....Did they sue for peace? On the contrary; their resolve stiffened...And I don't even want to hear the counter-arguement that they had the US on their side so they could remain defiant...lol...

Well, it is true that the UK would have lost and been comprehensively defeated if the US did not come in on their side.  They couldn't even feed themselves without US cargo ships coming in, and without the 'lend-lease' destroyers and aircraft, there would have been no way to protect the convoys either, and that would have been the end of the UK as far as Adolf was concerned, whether they officially 'surrendered' or not.  This is what I meant by 'neutralisation,' and if the US didn't make all their efforts on the behalf of the UK, even well before the US got officially into the war, I don't think you would have heard Churchill making quite so many speeches about 'fighting them on the beaches' as he did....... And certainly, for all intents and purposes, the UK was comprehensively kicked out of the Far East and  SE Asia in quite short order......

Same is true for the US vs Japan.  If Japan could knock the US out of the Pacific, then they would have achieved their objective, and it would have been extremely difficult for the US to have come back in, especially with the war in Europe still raging.  As for submarines, the Japanese had just about the best submarines in the world at the begining of the war, and one point in particular made them imminently suitable for West Coast patrolling, and that was the incredible range these boats could go without refueling or resupply.  It is important to remember that just before Pearl Harbor, there was something like a dozen IJN subs quietly patrolling around the Hawaian islands, and they had been there for almost a month!  Japanese fleet submarines were specifically designed to operate off the US West Coast for extended periods (and in fact did so on a few occasions!), and the only reason they did not in fact do so as a primary mission was because of the Japanese Admiralty, not because there was any limitations on the boats (and a lot of them carried their own airplanes too!).  Think in terms of the U-boats off the East Coast, and the damage they caused.  They never numbered more than about a dozen boats at any given time 'on station,' and usually a lot less.  When you figure that the Japanese had the largest fleet of submarines in the world in 1941, then the idea of fairly constant submarine patrols on the West Coast becomes a very grim reality, and even worse if it is backed up by a periodic surface task force coming out of a captured Pearl Harbor....

But the facts are, the Japanese appear to have gone completely stupid as far as the submarines were concerned, and never adapted their tactics for anything besides fleet actions.  Not because they couldn't, they just didn't!  The US Navy however, learned a LOT from the Germans in WW1, and scattered their subs across the Pacific to seek out and destroy merchantmen in coordinated attacks, and if a warship happened along, they would sink that too, but primarily attacking the merchant fleet.  And the Japanese casualties from this campaign were staggering!  It got so bad, that by the tail end of 1942, the Japanese were already forced to use submarines to bring in supplies to Guadalcanal, submarines that could have been sockin' it to the US merchant fleet instead.

It really is a bizarre scenario with no rational explanation, as the initial Japanese sub designs after WW1 were the result of German engineering, with a whole bunch of German engineers and former German U-boat officers specifically brought to Japan to teach them about submarines for almost ten years.  Apparently, the class on strategy, tactics and objectives never made it into the syllabus!

Mansteins revenge wrote:

bbrowniii wrote:  Mansteins revenge wrote:  Tracy White wrote: I'm going to limit my comments to one time period because I'm only familiar enough with the 20th  century to make it worthwhile. I see Pearl Harbor as the true turning point of the second World War, in both theaters, and  disagree with the comment that if we had lost the battle of Midway it would have been all over. The axis in effect lost the war the moment they allowed the full weight of the United States' industrial capacity and population to enter the fray with a fire in the belly. Even if we had lost Midway, it would have at best delayed the outcome by a year or two. The new carriers were reaching the pacific by summer of 1943, by summer of 1945 even if we had lost midway we would have been pushing the japanese back pretty hard. The outrage it  lit in the U.S. population in general gave us the motivation to not only defeat the axis, but changed the course of US Policy forever. Pearl Harbor merely officially legitimized a struggle that had started after the first world war and really entrenched itself with the Japanese invasion and occupation of parts of China. It is one of those interesting "won the battle but lost the war" battles for the Japanese.  I agree that if the tables had been turned and we lost our three carriers to maybe one of theirs that we would have still prevailed in the end, but it does offer up some chilling scenerios that would have probably tested American resolve and confidence to a far greater degree than it actually did...Winning Midway, IMO, gave the US the immeadiate confidence that we could, and would, win...A loss would maybe have said: we can win, but when are we gonna start? I'm no naval historian, but I think I disagree with that sentiment.  I think that, had the US lost at Midway, and lost big - like you say three carriers to one of theirs, at the very least the US would have seriously considered a peace with Japan in an effort to focus on the 'main theatre' of the war in Europe.  Also consider that, without those carriers, for all intents and purposes the whole west coast of the US would have been wide open to Japanese attack, Australia would have been completely isolated, and may have fallen as well... Interesting thesis, but I respectfully disagree...now Newt Gingrich has a "what if?" novel out that asks the question: "What if the japanese had humg around Pearl harbor and continued to launch strikes at Pearl harbor, and possibly found the American carriers and dealt with them?" I'm waiting for it to come out in paperback, but in the event, I think had America lost Midway there would be no way in Hell that the US Congress or its citizens would have accepted peace after Pearl Harbor... I feel as though your thesis is flawed because as the Japanese got further from their original lines of communications they became much less effective, and they never made an ampibious assault of any size against serious oposition...when they made limited ones, such as at Wake, they got their lunch handed to them...Other assets would have come into play had we lost Midway...eg: US subs would have wreaked havoc on any fleet that sailed for Pearl or the West coast, as well as the other many naval and air assets the US possessed...Wasp, Saratoga, BB's, bombers, etc...In fact, the US decided very early on that the MAIN threat came from the Germans and that the European theatre would take priority, and it did...IMO, a Japanese victory at Midway would have been a serious blow, but only a temporary one...to think that he US would be sitting at a surrender table 6 months after Pearl borders on the incredible...

there actually is a book out called "What If?", and it's written by people that are well known historians and members of the War College. One of the "what if's" was Pearl Harbor, and they take the basic attack as well know it and put it in each side's hands with several hypothetical sceneros. One was why didn't they go ahead and make the so called third and maybe even a fourth strike. Well the very first thing to remember was that even with the second strike they had lost the element of surprise. Didn't have enough fuel and equipment for the fourth strike to be sure. Didn't have any idea where the American aircraft carriers were at, at the time. The strike was actually somewhat of a failure in several ways besides not hitting a single aircraft carrier. The failed to knock out the fuel farm that was vastly needed (this alone maybe the single most important thing they didn't do). Also much has been said about failing to destroy the dry docks, but almost nothing has been said about the heavy lifting devices (dock side cranes for one). By hitting the cranes alone you couldn't resupply or rebuild any equipment. Also by hitting the drydocks they would have rendered the port almost usless when it came to refloating and rebuilding the sunken ships as everything would then have been moved to the west coast. Otherwise it wouldn't have ment all that much. So in otherwords the stone was cast, and it was only a matter of time when one looks at the industrial mite that Japan and Germany faced.

    In the Atlantic things were much different, but yet similar in many ways. Untill the Allies figured out a way to safely guard the supply convoys the Germans pretty much had their own way. Sure the capture of the Enigma Machine was a great blow, but nothing that couldn't have been overcome. What got things moving was an umbrella of aircraft flying overhead. Yet there was still a vast open area that the convoys had to run thru to make it to England. Then along came the little escort carrier launching Avengers on anti submarine duty on a near constant basis. It's not so much a fact that they were sinking subs all the time as it was a fact that they prevented submarines from attacking the floatilla. And then we must come to the fact that the Germans just could effectively put submarines out there as fast as we could build Liberty Ships (one every three days I think). So once again we can chalk another victory up to Rosie The Riviter.

gary

Some great points of debate here.  But I still stick with the opinion that the US would have not sued for peace regardless of the outcomes of Pearl or Midway...just wouldn't have happened, IMO. Japan had no realistic way of strategically defeating the US. The one thing that they admitted they needed to win was "a lack of willingness of the US to fight a long and costly war", and they guessed wrongly. That statement (that the Japanese made) make my argument.  

Also, I find it strange to think that the Japanese 'never made an an amphibious assault of any size against serious opposition!'  The whole point of amphibious assaults (if you do it correctly) is to land someplace where there won't be serious opposition, and to use whatever assets you may to ensure serious opposition doesn't appear.  On that basis, the Japanese were very good at it indeed, with Singapore taken, the Phillipines seized, and many other examples too (and the Phillpines had a very significant US Army presence, with lots of aircraft of all types available to resist the Japanese, and artillery, and warships too, and plenty of warning that the Japanese were coming, and the US still had its butt handed to it on a plate because we weren't ready, were too slow, and had never seriously planned for anything like what actually happened......

searat12 wrote:

Also, I find it strange to think that the Japanese 'never made an an amphibious assault of any size against serious opposition!'  The whole point of amphibious assaults (if you do it correctly) is to land someplace where there won't be serious opposition, and to use whatever assets you may to ensure serious opposition doesn't appear.  On that basis, the Japanese were very good at it indeed, with Singapore taken, the Phillipines seized, and many other examples too (and the Phillpines had a very significant US Army presence, with lots of aircraft of all types available to resist the Japanese, and artillery, and warships too, and plenty of warning that the Japanese were coming, and the US still had its butt handed to it on a plate because we weren't ready, were too slow, and had never seriously planned for anything like what actually happened......

The type of amphibious landing I am referring to is one that never happened: Japanese forces attempting to land on a beach near Los Angeles, or even Wikiki at Honolulu...That was my point, they COULDN'T have pulled an opposed landing off like that after Pearl---or, IMO, even one on the scale of Iwo or Okinawa...they just couldn't have...even the motley collection of defenders at Wake nearly turned away their landing attempt and lost some good-sized ships in the process...go back and look at what was defending Wake, and imagine what would have happened if we had the 1st or 2nd Marine Division there, with significant air support... 

The one thing the Japanese (and Germans) had in their favor, and primarily why they were successful through '42, was that the US and most other nations lacked a willingness to fight or take the threats that existed seriosuly...as soon as the US "geared up", the Axis had their butts handed to them, time and again...

Mansteins revenge wrote:

Some great points of debate here.  But I still stick with the opinion that the US would have not sued for peace regardless of the outcomes of Pearl or Midway...just wouldn't have happened, IMO. Japan had no realistic way of strategically defeating the US. The one thing that they admitted they needed to win was "a lack of willingness of the US to fight a long and costly war", and they guessed wrongly. That statement (that the Japanese made) make my argument.

 

But your argument is also based on the historical reality that the tide of the war changed in favor of the US quickly.  I mean, for all intents and purposes, by 6-months after Pearl, the Japanese were on the defensive and the US on the offensive.  Now, flip that around and say, that by late summer of '42 Midway and Pearl are in Japanese hands, their carrier taskforces are raging through the eastern Pacific, choking off transit through the Panama Canal, raiding US ports and shipyards along the west coast, their subs torpedoing ships all up and down the west coast (as suggested by Squekie, I think), carrier based planes maybe bombing a few US cities...  That willingness might, and I do stress MIGHT have changed, particularly because, AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT, the US felt the war in Europe was the more important of the two wars...

So hey, is this a dead horse yet???

Mansteins revenge wrote:

The type of amphibious landing I am referring to is one that never happened: Japanese forces attempting to land on a beach near Los Angeles, or even Wikiki at Honolulu...That was my point, they COULDN'T have pulled an opposed landing off like that after Pearl---or, IMO, even one on the scale of Iwo or Okinawa...they just couldn't have...even the motley collection of defenders at Wake nearly turned away their landing attempt and lost some good-sized ships in the process...go back and look at what was defending Wake, and imagine what would have happened if we had the 1st or 2nd Marine Division there, with significant air support...

But lets say that Midway is lost, and now the eastern Pacific is under a Japanese air umbrella.  How is a lot of this 'stuff' supposed to get to Hawaii.  Sure imagine what would have happened if we had the 1st or 2d MarDiv there, but also imagine what would have happened if they couldn't get there (I think at this point in '42 they were still training in California - I might be wrong, I admit).  And again, I raise the question of how significant the air support would have been?  Remember that if the premise of this debate is that the Japanese were victorious at Midway, than all those skilled pilots that were lost there would still be available.  With all due respect, at this stage of the war, I don't think the US pilots had the same level of skill as the cream-de-la-cream of the IJN...

Alright, for real now... I'm done...   Manny, I concede to you the last word (well, at least wtih regard to me...)

Seems more like the kind of amphibious landing the Japanese never had to attempt, and very purposely avoided.  I don't think the Japanese ever conceived, or would have attempted anything like Normandy, and certainly if they had won at Midway, they would never have had to.  I don't think Manny has been paying attention to what I have been saying.  Neutralising a force means you don't have to actually fight it and/or destroy it, you just have to make sure it can't come after you, or interfere with your other plans.  You could be the biggest and baddest tank in the world, but if you haven't any fuel, you are just a pillbox to be bypassed.... I'm done with the 'what ifs!'

searat12 wrote:

Seems more like the kind of amphibious landing the Japanese never had to attempt, and very purposely avoided.  I don't think the Japanese ever conceived, or would have attempted anything like Normandy, and certainly if they had won at Midway, they would never have had to.  I don't think Manny has been paying attention to what I have been saying.  Neutralising a force means you don't have to actually fight it and/or destroy it, you just have to make sure it can't come after you, or interfere with your other plans.  You could be the biggest and baddest tank in the world, but if you haven't any fuel, you are just a pillbox to be bypassed.... I'm done with the 'what ifs!'

I've been listening; we just disagree...you made your points and I made mine...Winning at Midway would have just temporarily "neutralized" US strength in the Pacific, IMO...Funny thing is, I actually think that the US victory was a very significant and important victory, I just don't subscribe to the notion that having lost it would have cost the US the war...

The Japanese lost Midway and they didn't sue for peace; they fought on for over three more years---so why would we have folded...??? That's my whole point, and Yamamoto knew it: the Japanese could only win in the short-term...long-term they never stood a chance, from a military point of view...Which parts of what I just wrote do you disagree with?

The Japanese lost at Midway and didn't sue for peace, that's true.  And that is because Japan was controlled by the Army at the time (which Yamamoto had serious problems with: note my ealrier that Yamamoto may well have been working with the US to ensure Japanese defeat), and the gamble was 'all, or nothing.'  Midway was a brilliant US victory, and brilliant because it not only seized the initiative away from the Japanese (an act from which the Japanese never recovered), but absolutely ensured the defeat of Japan.  If the US had lost at this battle, it didn't mean that the US would be prostrated in defeat, but would have rearranged the requirements for victory so significantly, that at least a temporary peace would have been advisable, if not an absolute requirement for the US.  As a simulaecrum, you might recall that AL Qaeda officially 'declared war' on the US almost 10 years before 9/11, but we only 'noticed it' when the towers came down.  Similarly, the US could still 'be at war' with Japan (like we are still officially 'still at war' with North Korea), but no actual combat operations be underway.  Politics, ain't it amazing? 

Yes, Yamamoto knew that war with the US could only succeed on the short-term, which is why his plan was a radical departure from previous planning.  And if his plans had been followed through efficiently, they could in fact have succeeded.  But there are LOTS of indications that Yamamoto actually 'queered the pitch' to ensure Japan would lose, and this was done in coordination with the US government of the time.  The original idea was that this would allow the Navy and/or more conservative political elements to remove the radical Army people from government and government influence, but this effort failed.  Furthermore, when it became obvious that the effort had failed, Yamamoto, in a return to honor in defense of his homeland, decided to cut off his relations with the US and expose the whole sorry affair, at which point the US ensured that Yamamoto would be killed before that could happen, and so the war went on........

searat12 wrote:

The Japanese lost at Midway and didn't sue for peace, that's true.  And that is because Japan was controlled by the Army at the time (which Yamamoto had serious problems with: note my ealrier that Yamamoto may well have been working with the US to ensure Japanese defeat), and the gamble was 'all, or nothing.'  Midway was a brilliant US victory, and brilliant because it not only seized the initiative away from the Japanese (an act from which the Japanese never recovered), but absolutely ensured the defeat of Japan.  If the US had lost at this battle, it didn't mean that the US would be prostrated in defeat, but would have rearranged the requirements for victory so significantly, that at least a temporary peace would have been advisable, if not an absolute requirement for the US.  As a simulaecrum, you might recall that AL Qaeda officially 'declared war' on the US almost 10 years before 9/11, but we only 'noticed it' when the towers came down.  Similarly, the US could still 'be at war' with Japan (like we are still officially 'still at war' with North Korea), but no actual combat operations be underway.  Politics, ain't it amazing?  Yes, Yamamoto knew that war with the US could only succeed on the short-term, which is why his plan was a radical departure from previous planning.  And if his plans had been followed through efficiently, they could in fact have succeeded.  But there are LOTS of indications that Yamamoto actually 'queered the pitch' to ensure Japan would lose, and this was done in coordination with the US government of the time.  The original idea was that this would allow the Navy and/or more conservative political elements to remove the radical Army people from government and government influence, but this effort failed.  Furthermore, when it became obvious that the effort had failed, Yamamoto, in a return to honor in defense of his homeland, decided to cut off his relations with the US and expose the whole sorry affair, at which point the US ensured that Yamamoto would be killed before that could happen, and so the war went on........

The notion that Yamamoto was in the fold for the US is intriguing...He spent a lot of time in the US and was very knowledgable about us and our culture...are there any books that deal with the subject of Yam being in the tank with us?

I would have to agree with Prof Tilley's assessment - basically, a battle must have profound and long-lasting strategic effects in order to be "significant". Of course, several mentioned in here fullfill that criteria to some extent:

- Spanish Armada inasmuch as the 'expedition" basically bankrupted Felipe II (Phillip) court and marked the start of England as a world power.

- Ironclads - made wooded ships obsolete in one day.

- Jutland - actually showed the foolishness of massive capital ship navies, both tactically and economic.

- Battle of the Atlantic; all four years - The only realistic way the Axis could have made GB bow out of the war.

- Malta convoys - yes, malta convoys in WW2. Why? If Malta had not been re-supplied, GB/allies would not have been able to stop Rommel from reaching the oil fields of the Middle East. Read the great book "At all Costs" by Moses (the author, not the prophet).

- The strategic submarine - not a "battle", but basically assured MADD (pun intended), keeping the cold war, well, cold.

The Age of Sail? Trafalgar/Nelson? Great stories, gorgeous ships.... and (at most) a major nuisance to Napoleon's land campaign.

Battles for colonies? more significant... just look at latin american countries, who speaks portuguese, who speaks spanish? Many times depended on which country (Portugal/Spain) won some obscure battle somewhere... Take Puerto Rico...Spanish colony, then took over my Sir Francis Drake (almost) and the Dutch (till dysentery and malaria killed them all).,,,then passes to the US in 1898. All because some (relatively) minor skirmishes and naval actions. Argentina could have been portuguese, Brazil could have been spaniard..... what if??

As for Midway...sorry, a great battle, but would not have changed the outcome of the war (my definition of "significant" battle). Face it, Japan "lost" the war the momment the first bomb fell on PH. Even if IJN would have made it to Hawaii, no historian has ever suggested that the US would not have done anything and everything possible to get it back. Losing "our" flattops in Midway would have delayed the inevitable by several months, max. Just look at the massive sea fleets the US had on the Pacific in late 44... dozens of flattops, hundreds of planes (of much higher quality than the IJN/IJA), etc etc.

The "What If" series (if you dont have it yet), has been re-packaged in one volume, Robert Cowley is the editor. Very VERY highly reccomended!

JMart wrote:

I would have to agree with Prof Tilley's assessment - basically, a battle must have profound and long-lasting strategic effects in order to be "significant". Of course, several mentioned in here fullfill that criteria to some extent: - Spanish Armada inasmuch as the 'expedition" basically bankrupted Felipe II (Phillip) court and marked the start of England as a world power. - Ironclads - made wooded ships obsolete in one day. - Jutland - actually showed the foolishness of massive capital ship navies, both tactically and economic. - Battle of the Atlantic; all four years - The only realistic way the Axis could have made GB bow out of the war. - Malta convoys - yes, malta convoys in WW2. Why? If Malta had not been re-supplied, GB/allies would not have been able to stop Rommel from reaching the oil fields of the Middle East. Read the great book "At all Costs" by Moses (the author, not the prophet). - The strategic submarine - not a "battle", but basically assured MADD (pun intended), keeping the cold war, well, cold. The Age of Sail? Trafalgar/Nelson? Great stories, gorgeous ships.... and (at most) a major nuisance to Napoleon's land campaign. Battles for colonies? more significant... just look at latin american countries, who speaks portuguese, who speaks spanish? Many times depended on which country (Portugal/Spain) won some obscure battle somewhere... Take Puerto Rico...Spanish colony, then took over my Sir Francis Drake (almost) and the Dutch (till dysentery and malaria killed them all).,,,then passes to the US in 1898. All because some (relatively) minor skirmishes and naval actions. Argentina could have been portuguese, Brazil could have been spaniard..... what if?? As for Midway...sorry, a great battle, but would not have changed the outcome of the war (my definition of "significant" battle). Face it, Japan "lost" the war the momment the first bomb fell on PH. Even if IJN would have made it to Hawaii, no historian has ever suggested that the US would not have done anything and everything possible to get it back. Losing "our" flattops in Midway would have delayed the inevitable by several months, max. Just look at the massive sea fleets the US had on the Pacific in late 44... dozens of flattops, hundreds of planes (of much higher quality than the IJN/IJA), etc etc. The "What If" series (if you dont have it yet), has been re-packaged in one volume, Robert Cowley is the editor. Very VERY highly reccomended!

"As for Midway...sorry, a great battle, but would not have changed the outcome of the war (my definition of "significant" battle). Face it, Japan "lost" the war the momment the first bomb fell on PH. Even if IJN would have made it to Hawaii, no historian has ever suggested that the US would not have done anything and everything possible to get it back. Losing "our" flattops in Midway would have delayed the inevitable by several months, max. Just look at the massive sea fleets the US had on the Pacific in late 44... dozens of flattops, hundreds of planes (of much higher quality than the IJN/IJA), etc etc."

Man, where have you been the last two days?---I could have used you !!!  LOL...

There is an excellent biography of Yamamoto called 'The Reluctant Admiral' which shows that Yamamoto certainly had the means, the motive and the timing.  The supposedly secret plan to attack Pearl Harbor was leaked via Argentina almost a year before.  The US Secretary of War knew Pearl Harbor would be attacked and when, more than 24 hours before it happened, and thus was more than ready to address the (late!) Japanese envoys when they came to his office.  The Japanese secret diplomatic codes had been 'broken' for several years, and all these things show up just shortly after Yamamoto had been on a mission to the UK, where he had been sent by the radical Japanese Army that had taken over the government and either assassinated or deposed some of Yamamotos best friends and mentors.  In the UK, Yamamoto spent a significant period of time at the house of, and by invitation by the head of British Intelligence, and they had many long discussions (still secret).  However, when Yamamoto was on his way home, he and the other members of his mission stopped off in Germany, supposedly to conduct the same sort of negotiations.  But Yamamoto refused to meet with Ribbentrop, or any of the German representatives, and thus went home to Japan without anything significant done on his part in, or with Nazi Germany.

Yamamoto was well-known as a gambler (he even considered quitting the Navy at one point to become a professional gambler at Monte Carlo!), he was also a womanizer, with several affairs going on at once, was extremely angry at the deaths of his friends, comrades and mentors in Japan, and was something of an alcoholic as well.  All of these things constitute 'leverage' to intelligence personnel looking to subvert or suborn, and certainly Yamamoto was a perfect candidate for such activity!

During the war, virtually every Yamamoto battle plan involved the gathering of widely dispersed small units travelling over widely dispersed approach routes to a central assembly area which would supposedly be the objective.  However, this 'strategy' ensures that not only will the different elements arrive at various times, but the likelyhood of any, or all of these elements being discovered was quite large, each of which could be dealt with by locally superior forces (as against keeping the fleet together, which is just one needle in the haystack of the Pacific, vs a whole box of needles sprinkled throughout).  And this 'strategy' failed again and again.  Even in those occasions where it was successful (first six months), this was almost entirely the result of the incredible disorganisation of the allies combined with local Japanese air superiority, and not because of any particular Japanese tactical or strategic superiority.  Furthermore, after Yamamoto was killed, his replacements largely continued the same failed tactics, with the same fatal results. 

One particularly nasty trick of Yamamoto was to 'support' a landing somewhere (like Wake and the various Lae and Guadalcanal reinforcements), but to always ensure that the Army units landed would be commanded by some of the most radical elements in the Japanese Army, the same lunatics that had seen to the assassination of his friends and mentors before the war.  Yamamoto would ensure that these units would be far too small to possibly take on the defending Americans, and that they wouldn't have near the supplies and equipment to make anything like a defense either.  To a man, these units, and their commanders were slaughtered wholesale in one stupid 'Banzai' charge after another (the first of these, the 'Iki Unit' was originally slated to be the landing force at Midway, but after that failure was sent straight in to Guadalcanal after the landing by the US 1st Marine Division.  That night, the entire 'Iki Unit' of some 800 Japanese soldiers led by their commander charged the lines of the 11,000 man-strong 1st Marines, and were unsurprisingly completely destroyed.). 

One incident of this type could be overlooked as a tactical 'mistake,' but to have the same thing happen again and again in the same place for six months says something else entirely!  Another indicator was the apparent lack of ability to bring in sizeable reinforcements and their supplies.  It would take the famous 'Tokyo Express' days, or even weeks to get a few hundred troops ashore at Guadalcanal, and yet, at the end of the campaign, the same destroyers were able to get the entire Japanese force of some 14,000 troops off the island and back to Rabaul in just seven nights, and without loss!  Not only that, but the commander of the amazingly successful 'Tokyo Express' was then summarily sacked, and sent to Thailand to do a useless desk job (Admiral Tanaka never went to sea again).  How could this make any sense, without some significant skullduggery going on at the highest levels of the Japanese Navy?  Read the 'The Reluctant Admiral' and see how many peculiarities you notice!

Almost forgot!  Admiral Yamamoto really hated Admiral Nagumo, who was personally responsible for supporting the Army in the overthrow of the then peace-minded Japanes government.  As part of the pre-attack reconaissance of Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto knew that the carriers weren't there, yet he ordered the attack anyways, and when he was notified of the effects of the attack (i.e., that the fuel tank farms, dry docks, etc. were unharmed), he personally authorised Nagumo to break off the attack!  It is also significant that during this battle, Yamamoto was back in Japan, with the battleships and rest of the fleet, and not part of the attack force at all (I rather suspect that given all the clues already given to the US at this time, that Nagumo would be 'surprised' by an American carrier task force at sea and be summarily sunk).

Same thing at Midway, where Yamamoto hung back in the rear with the battleships while Nagumo (with almost no immediately available surface ship anti-aircraft support) was being pounded, and the only other significant Japanese carrier force was sent up to Alaska, where it was of no use whatsoever.....

Wow, that is one book that I will be getting...one question though---why would the US be so intent on killing the man who was helping them win the war? I suppose it was to keep him quite about what he knew?

If all you write is true, then it supports my earlier arguments about the US not folding had the Japanese managed (despite Yamamoto trying to subvert it) to pull of a victory at Midaway...as the US knew ahead of time what the Japanese strategy was...

I can only figure that when the war first started, the deal Yamamoto struck was to 'lose' badly early on, which would cause the collapse and overthrow of the Army-controlled government of Japan, a return of his friends, and preservation of the Empire.  But for their own purposes, the US double-crossed Yamamoto in some way, so that instead of a quickly-organised 'defeat' and a negotiated settlement, the US instead decided that only the complete destruction of the Japanese military and unconditional surrender would be acceptable.  Although Yamamoto was 'strung along' for awhile, eventually he figured out that he had been had, and thus indicated that he would make serious efforts to prevent that from happening, and that is when his plane was shot down.

Looking at the situation from the eyes of the US, it makes sense.  Japan had been a serious threat and thorn in the side of the US in the Pacific for decades, and a quickly negotiated peace without the elimination of Japanese military power would just have delayed the inevitable show-down to a later time.  The complete destruction and defeat of Japan would ensure the US would have 'clear sailing' in the Pacific for the forseeable future, and the defeat and collapse of the Europeans in the Pacific meant that the US could in one stroke, control the whole shebang.