WWII historians...help!!

...that the loss of 110 aviators was not the 'cream of the IJN' or that it did not represent 'irreplaceable experience.'  My comment was that it is a myth to assert--as Morison, among others, did (in his The Two-Ocean War, page 160) that "...Nagumo lost most of (his) pilots..." which represents perhaps the start of the myth in Western circles.

The facts are as follows; aircrew losses among the four carriers over the course of the entire battle:  Akagi (6); Kaga (21); Hiryu (72); Soryu (10) ...110 in total plus 11 men in floatplanes for a grand total of 121 Japanese flyers lost at Midway.  Source: Shattered Sword, pages 476 and 579.

Randy Stone

Shattered Sword is still fairly new compared to the other works on Midway, and should still be readily available.

By the end of June 4, aside from the Japanese carriers sinking or already sunk, the Japanese airgroups were fairly depleted when compared to in the morning. Hiryu's the most, after having flown the most stikes and losing more planes to defending fighters/AA fire. It is true, that many of the surviving pilots from the other three carriers would go on to join new air groups from Zuikaku and Shokaku, after Santa Cruz less than five months later, their ranks would be decimated as well. Their attacks on Hornet would be their last hurrah, so to speak. They would also damage Enterprise enough to where she was only exposed to danger under the most complelling circumstances.

Wasp was sunk by a submarine in probably one of the most devestating single torpedo spreads in naval history.  

...you've confused Wasp (which was scuttled after being damaged by submarine torpedoes) with damage to Enterpise in two separate carrier actions (Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz) but you are correct about the relatively light aircrew losses at Midway by the Japanese.  The heavy ship-based--and shore-based, let's not overlook--losses were sustained in the Solomons.  At Midway, the heaviest aircrew losses were sustained by Hiryu, naturally, which took heavy hits during the Midway strike and, later, by the twin attacks on Yorktown.  I believe one of the IJN flattops took only 6 aircrew KIA but that could be far off the mark.  I have yet to get out to the garage for Shattered Sword which is, as you pointed out, readily available and in paperback as well. 

One thing which bears comment--and I think Shattered Sword addresses this--is that the Japanese were not exactly flush with aircraft after six months of operations.  At Midway they went into action without anything like the bulging aircraft numbers they took to Pearl Harbor.  Thus, their operations also played into Nimitz' planning which relied on superior numbers of aircraft vis-a-vis his Japanese counterparts.  Another point which bears emphasis is that had the Nimitz' plan gone right Yorktown would never have been hit, but--it appears--Mitscher took it on himself to send Hornet's planes to the west rather than to where the Japanese were known to be...and the rest is, as they say, history.

Randy Stone

Randy Stone wrote:

...an excellent suggestion to refer to Shattered Sword.  An excellent, authoritative book wrt the Japanese at Midway.  As I recall it has virtually all--if not all--of the names of lost Japanese aircrew and I am certain Mark Horan has the names of the lost US aircrew.  However, I will stick with my 110 aircrew losses, each side.  I will now walk out to the garage for Shattered Sword and the facts...

...an excellent suggestion to refer to Shattered Sword.  An excellent, authoritative book wrt the Japanese at Midway.  As I recall it has virtually all--if not all--of the names of lost Japanese aircrew and I am certain Mark Horan has the names of the lost US aircrew.  However, I will stick with my 110 aircrew losses, each side. 

I will now walk out to the garage for Shattered Sword and the facts...

Tracy White wrote:

Please read Shattered Sword before attemping to quote figures. (this is to the board in general)

Randy Stone wrote:

...would be in order, but not limited to: 1). The Japanese aircrew were not wiped out in this action.  They lost precisely the same number as the USN (and Marines), 110 men.  I'd have to look but I believe that represented about 20% of the IJN aircrew, someone is free to correct that percentage, if they choose.  Maintenance crew would be another issue altogether but the severe losses sustained by the prewar, largely China-trained aircrew would occur during the Guadalcanal Campaign.

I thought they lost closer to 200+ pilots.  I could be wrong about that....  I'll see if I can find a reference  More significant than the raw numbers, though, was their inability to replace these pilots, or more precisely, the pilots experience.  The pilots lost at Midway were among some of their best, representing a years worth of pilot training (pre-war) and invaluable combat experience.

...is most often presented as a strategic victory for the Allies and a tactical victory for the Japanese.

While the Americans certainly suffered for the loss of Lexington, aircraft and--let's be clear--Neosho, I would submit that the Japanese suffered more for the damage to Sho and Zui, and their aircraft at this particular point in the war, thus rendering it a tactical victory for the Allies as well as a strategic victory.  That's the Willmott (H.P. Willmott / The Barrier and the Javelin [recently reprinted and also highly recommended]) view of matters although John Lundstrom is not quite so keen on this interpretation.

That being said, the Japanese, having sent CarDiv 5 to the South Pacific, disposed of two American carriers--or so they thought.  That would have more than compensated for the damage to Sho and the airgroup losses.  If a second string team could manage this kind of performance against the Americans what chance would the Americans have against the varsity squad of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 off Midway ?

Of course, the local Japanese commander had originally wanted more carrier strength at the Coral Sea while Nimitz had wanted to nail the Kido Butai in the South Pacific with his superior strength, carrier versus carrier.  Of course, as we know, the Doolittle Raid scotched that idea by taking away half of nimitz' carrier strength whereupon the Midway Operation conveniently provided a fresh opportunity.  That brings up another myth to dispel: namely, that the USN was at a severe disadvantage in strength off Midway.  A review of the forces arrayed--at the point of contact--should be enough to dispel that notion, not to mention the fact that the US could just leave Midway to the Japanese if the going got too rough.  Lots of interesting angles here. 

As for the Buffalo, one might look at how much success the landbased Wildcats 'enjoyed' alongside the Buffalo at Midway.  While the Buffalo had a great many problems--as an oversold and underproduced aircraft probably being the greatest--it seems to me that tactics were more at the core of its losses at Midway than anything else.  I'd recommend Jim Maas' Squadron Signal book on the Buffalo (yes, the are some good SS publications) and various American Aviation Historical Society articles concerning the Buffalo and Brewster.  An interesting story.

Randy Stone

subfixer wrote:

Just so everyone is clear; Kido Butai was the term for the massed Japanese carrier force, correct?

A more literal translation would be "Mobile Striking Force," and there's a sublte difference. The Kido Butai was tasked with raids and destruction as opposed to occupation, hence a separate occupation force in the Japanese forces moving towards Midway.

Randy Stone wrote:

2). American landbased attacks against Nagumo represented the fiercest, intensely professional and most determined attacks the Kido Butai had sustained up to that point in the war; it could be claimed to be the first such attack--that's arguable--but what is not in question was the ferocity of the attacks which kept Nagumo backing up on his heels with his formation increasingly scattered and his CAP repeatedly low on ammunition.  American landbased squadrons may have been handicapped by obsolescent aircraft (of which the Buffalo was not quite the dog folks assume it was), by inexperienced pilots (some pilots reporting to their squadrons at Midway right out of the replacement pool, with no training at all in tactics or operations) and by being defeated in detail near Nagumo's ships but their efforts were extraordinary and not to be underestimated or lightly dismissed.     Randy Stone

Just so everyone is clear; Kido Butai was the term for the massed Japanese carrier force, correct? If that is the case, then what you say about the Kido Butai not having a serious challenge is true. But, Shokaku and Zuikaku were not present at the battle of Midway because of a previous action (the Coral Sea battle). That amounts to a third of the Kido  Butai being absent from the action at Midway. Shokaku and Zuikaku had been detached from Kido Butai and were operating off of Port Moresby, New Guinea, and had suffered there a bit. Shokaku had been hit with three bombs and Zuikaku had lost most of her airwing. The Japanese could have (but it wasn't in their doctrine) combined the airwing of Shokaku with the intact Zuikaku and then would have had a fifth carrier at the battle. (That would have changed things a bit). What I am geting at is that the Japanese had, indeed, seen some serious aerial attacks prior to this battle.

The Buffalo was a pretty bad fighter, only the Finns had any success with it.

The B-17s at Midway were B-17E models, early production (remote belly turret, not ball turrets). Although several were daged by flak and fighters, none were lost. As already pointed out, they bombed from high altitude and all their bombs were avoided. It is interesting to note, that less than a year later, after much trial and error in the Solomons campaign, they came down much lower during the Bismark Sea battle and scored many hits.

All of the above points are pretty much correct. Off the top of my head the Midway based air attacks were: 6 TBFs and 4 B-26As make a torpedo attack- 5 TBFs and 2 B-26s shot down; 16 SBDs make a glide bombing attack, 8 shot down, including the strike leader, Maj Henderson; B-17s make a high altitude level bombing attack, no losses, no hits on ships; 11 SB2Us attack the Haruna (group leader felt he could nto reach the carriers and chose largest close target), 3 lost. All this is before Nagumo's Midway strike returns and a US carrier is identified. After all these strikes, Midway has lost the major portion of its' offensive air strength (not to mention nearly all its' fighters), but the Japanese really have no way of knowing this.

...would be in order, but not limited to:

1). The Japanese aircrew were not wiped out in this action.  They lost precisely the same number as the USN (and Marines), 110 men.  I'd have to look but I believe that represented about 20% of the IJN aircrew, someone is free to correct that percentage, if they choose.  Maintenance crew would be another issue altogether but the severe losses sustained by the prewar, largely China-trained aircrew would occur during the Guadalcanal Campaign.

2). American landbased attacks against Nagumo represented the fiercest, intensely professional and most determined attacks the Kido Butai had sustained up to that point in the war; it could be claimed to be the first such attack--that's arguable--but what is not in question was the ferocity of the attacks which kept Nagumo backing up on his heels with his formation increasingly scattered and his CAP repeatedly low on ammunition.  American landbased squadrons may have been handicapped by obsolescent aircraft (of which the Buffalo was not quite the dog folks assume it was), by inexperienced pilots (some pilots reporting to their squadrons at Midway right out of the replacement pool, with no training at all in tactics or operations) and by being defeated in detail near Nagumo's ships but their efforts were extraordinary and not to be underestimated or lightly dismissed.

3). Nagumo may have been indecisive, that's an original view, but not particularly correct in view of how the Japanese actually conducted carrier operations.  Most assumptions regarding this 'indecisiveness' assume that the Japanese operated their carriers in a similar manner to the USN.  This is incorrect and leads to all number of poor conclusions.  The reason Yorktown could make Midway and Zuikaku could not lay in how the respective navies operated their airgroups.  The Japanese were hamstrung by the loss of division mate Shokaku while the Americans were able to incorporate Saratoga squadrons aboard Yorktown with stunning success when one considers that only Yorktown put her ad hoc group over the target without delay and en masse...to Soryu's detriment.

4.) As was mentioned earlier, Shattered Sword (Parshall and Tully) provides a detailed look at this action from the Japanese perspective and is a must to understanding precisely what happened and how at Midway.  For a concise view of the American side of battle I would recommend both Black Shoe Carrier Admiral (Lundstrom) and A Glorious Day in Our History (Horan, Cressman, et al.).  Forget Morison nor would I recommend Isom, but I would not discourage anyone from reading either, just keep your distance.

Randy Stone

In the case of the B-17s, the ships just had to wait until they saw the bombs being released, then they just put the helm over to avoid them. It was no problem avoiding them.

The B-26s were armed with torpedoes if I remember correctly.

As to Neu's question of Nagumo being shaken by the near miss of the B-26; from what I've read, the close-call of that aircraft which just barely missed the island structure of the Akagi and then cartwheeled into the sea, just got his blood up and made him more resolute in enacting Tomonaga's recommendation of a second strike on Midway Island.

squeakie wrote:

The B17's flying out of Midway were probably early models, and probably didn't have good enough equipment on board to do anything. Not sure about the B26's (I didn't realize they were even there). Wether or not they even came close to hitting anything is a mute point. What they really did was to buy time for the next wave of attack aircraft; just like the torpedo bombers did.

They had the Norden bombsights...Let's not all get into an exercise in trying to defend the performance of the land-based aircraft...they scored no hits and took fairly heavy losses, but as in all battles, everyone had their part to play...no point though trying to invent or imbelish accomplishments or defend their actions...What made Midway important was that the Japanese had the cream of their attack carrier fleet and best naval aircrews wiped out...simple.

just a thought about the land based aircraft, and maybe I right or maybe I'm wrong (won't be the first time).

    The B17's flying out of Midway were probably early models, and probably didn't have good enough equipment on board to do anything. Not sure about the B26's (I didn't realize they were even there). Wether or not they even came close to hitting anything is a mute point. What they really did was to buy time for the next wave of attack aircraft; just like the torpedo bombers did. And as much as we cuss and discuss this we all need to remember that Butch OHare flew a land based Wildcat!

     Also it's very important to realize that the outcome of the battle of Midway did two things towards the outcome of WWII in the PTO.

* it was a boost of adrenalin to the Allies in the PTO that they much dearly needed.

* after the war the Japanese Naval Officers interviewed have said more than once that they felt the war was lost after Midway

gary

It would seem all the land based attacks, B-26/TBF, SBD, B-17, and SB2U, were more to emphasize Tomonaga's request for the second strike on Midway. The indeciveness came once the seaplane scouts spotted the US Task Force and it was a question of which target to hit first. Of course the US carriers had priority, but 1) the original contact sighting mentioned no carriers, 2) Midway was still throwing every attack plane it had, however ineffectively, at Nagumo's force. Once the carrier contact was sent, there was not question as to waht to attack, but rather how. Attack immediately and lose a portion of the returning Midway strike, or take the time to do the job properly?

stikpusher wrote:

Bondo, I think my biggest thanks to the movie was in it launching my hunger to learn about this battle ( I was 11 when I fist saw it on opening nite and I'll bet you can remember your youth of that age).  Anyways, I would recomend three books to read on Midway to give you a good idea of the chronology of events in that battle: Incredible Victory by Walter Lord, Miracle at Midway by Gordon Prange, and Shattered Sword, listed above. Between all three books, one gets a pretty good idea of who did what during tha battle. I think Shattered Sword, while a good book, is more of a clarificaton and was not as much of a revamp of Midway as portrayed. It did however go in to far greater detail of the Japanese carrier air operations and altered (but not overly so) the state of the Japanese carriers when Bombing Six, Scouting Six, and Bombing Three delivered the decisive strike that changed the course of the war that morning. Interestingly enough, referring to Manny's statement of the earlier attacks of the morning by US forces, my take is that those strikes did more to re inforce Japanese contempt for the Americans, rather than scare them. While they did help to use op(but not wear down) the defenses, and finally divert some, most accounts I have read that quote Japanese participants seem to commonly state they were unimpressed by the skills of the US aviators.

subfixer wrote:

IT's still there, MR, try reloading.

Tracy White wrote:

Answering the original question, that was a VF-5 F6F-3 flown by Ensign Bob Black during a raid on Palau on March 30, 1944. His hydralics were damaged by flack and he had to land without the use of flaps. Coming in fast, his tail hook was ripped out and because he was heading off-center, he hit the aft 5" mount before one of the barricades that would have probably not stopped him either (but would likely have flipped him over). He walked away with a slight cut to the scalp, probably from the gun site, which was a common "point of contact" during crash landings of the era.

Towards the end of the clip another Hellcat comes in hot and you can see what appears to be either blood or oil on the front windscreen on an obviously damaged plane (some holes in windscreen)...as the pilot is helped out of the cockpit, you can see that his face is blackened or bloodied and his jaw seems to be hanging at an odd angle, like he was hit in the face...poor devil...

bondoman wrote:

Probably the first time scale modeling meant something to me, after dozens of rainy day builds, was the Monogram Dauntless.

You just gotta love the Dauntless.

Well the original premise of this post was identifying the footage of that carrier landing. So far I think the points are:

-Bondoman is gray on history

-The crash was on the CV-10 Yorktown. It was an F6F

-Louis Pruneau simplified the island on the dio

-The movie is  free if you look for it, but it's 3 gigs and I'm not set up to upload it.

I've read Miracle at Midway, but not the others. There's an interesting what if concerning a scheme by the Japanese to draw the American carriers into a similar kill box, that did not occur by accident.

 Probably the first time scale modeling meant something to me, after dozens of rainy day builds, was the Monogram Dauntless.