Chief Kindred,
Thank you! I'm getting the crap shot outta me here!
Pharoah,
Hmmm... no worries, dude. I am a bit taken aback by the outright condemnation of my OEF information. I'm well aware of most of the circumstances of Apache crashes within the past few years, as I've either interviewed the pilots themselves, or guys who were there. Drop me an email.
DPD1,
The Karbala mission, where the 11th AHR got shot up was a well executed mission by the two battalions that conducted it. Problem is, it should never have happened. I've interviewed half a dozen pilots who participated in the mission. When you send two full battalions on a deep attack mission without accurate intel, artillery or tac air support, into an urban environment, they are going to get shot up. Also, the air defenses around Karbala were the ONLY coordinated air defense the Iraqis had EVER employed against US forces. And it was very well coordinated.
The problems with the mission began well before it even began. Supply convoys for the three battalions were driving north from Kuwait to the regiment's FARP. With traffic snarls and general slow going, only one battalion's supplies got there by the time the regiment was supposed to jump off. As a result, only two of the three battalions were able to participate. Of the full 64 helicopter regiment, only 29 actually overflew the target. Only one, flown by CW2 Joe Goode, returned to base without at least one hole in it.
Everyone,
As for maintenance issues, I will reiterate that IN A COMBAT SITUATION, Apache units have CONSISTENTLY maintained a minimal 90% combat readiness. Other factors, like weather or lack of fuel may have grounded the Apache force, but that is it.
The Apache had some issues initially in Desert Storm because they hadn't been adapted to the desert environment. During the war, however, they performed flawlessly and were the subject of much praise during and after the war. As for the other conflicts mentioned, a) the Apache didn't serve in Grenada, it became operational in 1984 with the 6th Cavalry; b) in Bosnia, there were numerous POLITICAL issues that affected the Apache deployment (do we really wanna deploy Army units, etc) and a high-profile training accident that pretty much was the reason for said criticism; c) OEF. Where was the criticism? The Apaches operated nearly flawlessly in a combat environment that was totally alien to them, which is a testament to the intelligence, flexibility and resourcefulness of the aircrews of the 3-101st, 1-229th and follow-on units that are still conducting ops in Afghanistan. They were able to take a platform that they trained in hover-fire tactics on, and transitioned to running fire (a la Vietnam tactics) and employ it effectively to support our guys on the ground for extended periods of time, all the while taking RPG, SA-7, small arms and AAA fire.
To finally put an end to this debate, I think that TF Wings, which is currently operating in Afghanistan illustrates it best. Historically the OEF attack helicopter requirement was for a single battalion of Apaches. Right now, TF Wings is flying two companies of National Guard AH-64s alongside a single squadron of Marine Reserve AH-1Ws from HMLA-773. Now that's cooperation.