WWII historians...help!!

subfixer wrote:

Just so everyone is clear; Kido Butai was the term for the massed Japanese carrier force, correct?

A more literal translation would be "Mobile Striking Force," and there's a sublte difference. The Kido Butai was tasked with raids and destruction as opposed to occupation, hence a separate occupation force in the Japanese forces moving towards Midway.

...is most often presented as a strategic victory for the Allies and a tactical victory for the Japanese.

While the Americans certainly suffered for the loss of Lexington, aircraft and--let's be clear--Neosho, I would submit that the Japanese suffered more for the damage to Sho and Zui, and their aircraft at this particular point in the war, thus rendering it a tactical victory for the Allies as well as a strategic victory.  That's the Willmott (H.P. Willmott / The Barrier and the Javelin [recently reprinted and also highly recommended]) view of matters although John Lundstrom is not quite so keen on this interpretation.

That being said, the Japanese, having sent CarDiv 5 to the South Pacific, disposed of two American carriers--or so they thought.  That would have more than compensated for the damage to Sho and the airgroup losses.  If a second string team could manage this kind of performance against the Americans what chance would the Americans have against the varsity squad of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 off Midway ?

Of course, the local Japanese commander had originally wanted more carrier strength at the Coral Sea while Nimitz had wanted to nail the Kido Butai in the South Pacific with his superior strength, carrier versus carrier.  Of course, as we know, the Doolittle Raid scotched that idea by taking away half of nimitz' carrier strength whereupon the Midway Operation conveniently provided a fresh opportunity.  That brings up another myth to dispel: namely, that the USN was at a severe disadvantage in strength off Midway.  A review of the forces arrayed--at the point of contact--should be enough to dispel that notion, not to mention the fact that the US could just leave Midway to the Japanese if the going got too rough.  Lots of interesting angles here. 

As for the Buffalo, one might look at how much success the landbased Wildcats 'enjoyed' alongside the Buffalo at Midway.  While the Buffalo had a great many problems--as an oversold and underproduced aircraft probably being the greatest--it seems to me that tactics were more at the core of its losses at Midway than anything else.  I'd recommend Jim Maas' Squadron Signal book on the Buffalo (yes, the are some good SS publications) and various American Aviation Historical Society articles concerning the Buffalo and Brewster.  An interesting story.

Randy Stone

Randy Stone wrote:

...would be in order, but not limited to: 1). The Japanese aircrew were not wiped out in this action.  They lost precisely the same number as the USN (and Marines), 110 men.  I'd have to look but I believe that represented about 20% of the IJN aircrew, someone is free to correct that percentage, if they choose.  Maintenance crew would be another issue altogether but the severe losses sustained by the prewar, largely China-trained aircrew would occur during the Guadalcanal Campaign.

I thought they lost closer to 200+ pilots.  I could be wrong about that....  I'll see if I can find a reference  More significant than the raw numbers, though, was their inability to replace these pilots, or more precisely, the pilots experience.  The pilots lost at Midway were among some of their best, representing a years worth of pilot training (pre-war) and invaluable combat experience.

Tracy White wrote:

Please read Shattered Sword before attemping to quote figures. (this is to the board in general)

...an excellent suggestion to refer to Shattered Sword.  An excellent, authoritative book wrt the Japanese at Midway.  As I recall it has virtually all--if not all--of the names of lost Japanese aircrew and I am certain Mark Horan has the names of the lost US aircrew.  However, I will stick with my 110 aircrew losses, each side. 

I will now walk out to the garage for Shattered Sword and the facts...

Randy Stone wrote:

...an excellent suggestion to refer to Shattered Sword.  An excellent, authoritative book wrt the Japanese at Midway.  As I recall it has virtually all--if not all--of the names of lost Japanese aircrew and I am certain Mark Horan has the names of the lost US aircrew.  However, I will stick with my 110 aircrew losses, each side.  I will now walk out to the garage for Shattered Sword and the facts...

...you've confused Wasp (which was scuttled after being damaged by submarine torpedoes) with damage to Enterpise in two separate carrier actions (Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz) but you are correct about the relatively light aircrew losses at Midway by the Japanese.  The heavy ship-based--and shore-based, let's not overlook--losses were sustained in the Solomons.  At Midway, the heaviest aircrew losses were sustained by Hiryu, naturally, which took heavy hits during the Midway strike and, later, by the twin attacks on Yorktown.  I believe one of the IJN flattops took only 6 aircrew KIA but that could be far off the mark.  I have yet to get out to the garage for Shattered Sword which is, as you pointed out, readily available and in paperback as well. 

One thing which bears comment--and I think Shattered Sword addresses this--is that the Japanese were not exactly flush with aircraft after six months of operations.  At Midway they went into action without anything like the bulging aircraft numbers they took to Pearl Harbor.  Thus, their operations also played into Nimitz' planning which relied on superior numbers of aircraft vis-a-vis his Japanese counterparts.  Another point which bears emphasis is that had the Nimitz' plan gone right Yorktown would never have been hit, but--it appears--Mitscher took it on himself to send Hornet's planes to the west rather than to where the Japanese were known to be...and the rest is, as they say, history.

Randy Stone

Shattered Sword is still fairly new compared to the other works on Midway, and should still be readily available.

By the end of June 4, aside from the Japanese carriers sinking or already sunk, the Japanese airgroups were fairly depleted when compared to in the morning. Hiryu's the most, after having flown the most stikes and losing more planes to defending fighters/AA fire. It is true, that many of the surviving pilots from the other three carriers would go on to join new air groups from Zuikaku and Shokaku, after Santa Cruz less than five months later, their ranks would be decimated as well. Their attacks on Hornet would be their last hurrah, so to speak. They would also damage Enterprise enough to where she was only exposed to danger under the most complelling circumstances.

Wasp was sunk by a submarine in probably one of the most devestating single torpedo spreads in naval history.  

...that the loss of 110 aviators was not the 'cream of the IJN' or that it did not represent 'irreplaceable experience.'  My comment was that it is a myth to assert--as Morison, among others, did (in his The Two-Ocean War, page 160) that "...Nagumo lost most of (his) pilots..." which represents perhaps the start of the myth in Western circles.

The facts are as follows; aircrew losses among the four carriers over the course of the entire battle:  Akagi (6); Kaga (21); Hiryu (72); Soryu (10) ...110 in total plus 11 men in floatplanes for a grand total of 121 Japanese flyers lost at Midway.  Source: Shattered Sword, pages 476 and 579.

Randy Stone

Randy Stone wrote:

...that the loss of 110 aviators was not the 'cream of the IJN' or that it did not represent 'irreplaceable experience.'  My comment was that it is a myth to assert--as Morison, among others, did (in his The Two-Ocean War, page 160) that "...Nagumo lost most of (his) pilots..." which represents perhaps the start of the myth in Western circles. The facts are as follows; aircrew losses among the four carriers over the course of the entire battle:  Akagi (6); Kaga (21); Hiryu (72); Soryu (10) ...110 in total plus 11 men in floatplanes for a grand total of 121 Japanese flyers lost at Midway.  Source: Shattered Sword, pages 476 and 579. Randy Stone

Well, I guess if you want to argue a technicality, the question has to be how many pilots did Nagumo start with.  If it was 241 or less, then he did, in fact, lose most of his pilots.  'Course, that is pretty nit-picky (and I have NO idea how many pilots they had to start).

When that figure is leveled among the four carriers, is that somethign like 1/3 of all their pilots? That is still a serious chunk. I would not call that part of Midway a myth so much as an exagerration. There would be only two more carrier battles (Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz) in 1942 before nearly all the rest of the pre war IJN flyers were gone. Most of the IJN avaitor casualties during the Solomons fighting were land based from Rabaul, and while their losses were just as staggering to the Japanese war effort, most of those were not carrier aviators.

A large portion portion of US aviator casualties at Midway were land based Marines. While all the US air groups suffered heavily in their torpedo squadrons, only Enterprise had significant losses among her Scout and Bombing squadrons.

...arguing anything, much less technicalities.  I'm just trying to follow the facts. 

Depending on the precise manner of counting, the Kido Butai took some 458 aviators into action at Midway, less floatplane crew.  That brings us to a loss rate of about 24%.  Over the years the myth has assumed 'most' or 'all' of the aviators were lost at Midway, explaining the IJN fall from preeminence.  Much of this error is--in my estimation--the result of Morison, who is readily available and periodically reprinted.  A 'mining' of the bibliographies of various books which address various aspects of the Pacific War invariably turn up Morison to the exclusion of primary research or of later research by more fortunate or informed authors than Morison was, or chose to be.

However, during the Guadalcanal Campaign, the Japanese lost 110 aviators at the Eastern Solomons and 145 at Santa Cruz, for the net loss of Hornet.  This is an obvious simplification of matters all around but it should indicate--setting aside the issue of land-based units, which would overwhelmingly tip the scales--that it was in the Solomons where the Japanese Naval Air Force was decimated, wholly aside from other factors such as crew rotation, replacement, training and airframe development and replacement.

I'm not trying to be a geek here about carrier operations in the Pacific War but I am a geek about it and it's always nice--and I believe interesting to boot--to have the true record of what occurred rather than what has been presented over the years, however sincerely.  I learned at the feet of several who have forgotten more than I will ever know about this topic but when I want to find out about some topic or other, I think it's important to go to the experts and the sources themselves.  I did and that's where I'm at.

And it's always nice to gab with someone else who shares similar interests.

Randy Stone

Randy Stone wrote:

The facts are as follows; aircrew losses among the four carriers over the course of the entire battle:  Akagi (6); Kaga (21); Hiryu (72); Soryu (10) ...110 in total plus 11 men in floatplanes for a grand total of 121 Japanese flyers lost at Midway.  Source: Shattered Sword, pages 476 and 579.

They were probably in the Pilot Briefing room getting their new orders to return to Midway Island, while their planes were being re-armed and refueled, and abandoned ship from the hanger deck.  If one of the bombs had penetrated in the right spot the aircrew losses would have been catastrophic to say the least.  Maybe Hiryu lost so many because that bomb did hit the right spot!  Does Shattered Sword specify how the pilots died?  In combat, or otherwise?

...quite an extensive write-up in Shattered Sword about losses.  Hiryu, as mentioned earlier, took quite a beating inasmuch as she was the antagonist vis-a-vis Yorktown, which cost both vessels.  The CAP losses--in fact--CAP sorties are fully listed in one of the appendices; CAP pilot losses were not high, in any event.  Shattered Sword will no doubt not be the final word on Japan's part at Midway, but it surely is among the finest.

Randy Stone

tucchase wrote:

They were probably in the Pilot Briefing room getting their new orders to return to Midway Island, while their planes were being re-armed and refueled, and abandoned ship from the hanger deck.  If one of the bombs had penetrated in the right spot the aircrew losses would have been catastrophic to say the least.  Maybe Hiryu lost so many because that bomb did hit the right spot!  Does Shattered Sword specify how the pilots died?  In combat, or otherwise?

stikpusher wrote:

Lets take Hiryu's B5N group (Kates) as an example. 18 launched for the morning Midway strike. 10 launched (including one battle damaged flown by Tomonaga and one "orphan" from Akagi) for Afternoon torpedo strike on Yorktown. I believe 5 (including Akagi "orphan") returned to Hiryu. Net total of opertional Hiryu B5Ns left, four. Out of 18 avaliable operational that morning. Not a very high survivability rate.

Accoding to my refs, two strikes were launched from Hiryu...

...the first: 18 Vals and 6 Zeros, with a loss of 13 of the Vals = 26 airman lost...

...the second: 10 Kates and 6 Zeros, with a loss of 6 Kates and 3 Zeros = 21 airman lost...

So according to my refs, in just these two actions, 47 Japanese airman from Hiryu were lost.

Also, according to my refs, the Japanese carriers were hit as follows:

Akagi: 2 bomb hits, Kaga: 4 bomb hits, Soryu: 3 bomb hits, Hiryu: 4 bomb hits...Interstingly, the US sank all four w/o any torpedo strikes, which the Japanese preferred over bombs in anti-shipping strikes...

I cannot use Quotes here.  I am getting "Non matching quote blocks in post" when I click the Post button.  This is regardless of whether I modify the quoted area or not.

tucchase wrote:

I cannot use Quotes here.  I am getting "Non matching quote blocks in post" when I click the Post button.  This is regardless of whether I modify the quoted area or not.

Remove the apostrophe in Manstein's, it is the culprit.

subfixer wrote:

tucchase wrote: I cannot use Quotes here.  I am getting "Non matching quote blocks in post" when I click the Post button.  This is regardless of whether I modify the quoted area or not. Remove the apostrophe in Manstein's, it is the culprit.

Thanks Subfixer!  You would think they could tell the difference between a Quote and an Apostrophe.  Especially when the quotes used are written out.  They must have changed something in the programming.  I haven't had this problem until today, and I have quoted Manny several times.

So we just destroyed the carriers, but the Japanese actually sank them!  It figures.  Their torpedoes actually worked.

stikpusher wrote:

Those are just the strikes against Yorktown. If you add in the morning Midway strike, the figures are higher. her kates flew two strikes that day, one against Midway, and one against thw Yorktown. Her Vals flew only one strike, and took severe casualties on that one (over 66%).