New German Destroyer...price gouging?

No, the two events I refer to were conducted with battleships. The October bombardment of Henderson conducted by Kongo and Haruna destroyed over half the aircraft there and nearly all the aviation fuel. Only the discovery of a forgotten aviation fuel dump allowed air ops the next day to save the island at that time. Other bombardments conducted by cruisers had not had such a devastating effect. The attempts to repeat in November had the potential to change the course of the battle. The November battles first was US cruisers against two Japanese battleships, Hiei and Kirishima, which was successful for the USN in turning back the IJN force. Two nights later the attempt by the surviving Kirishima was intercepted by South Dakota and Washington fatally damaged in the fray.

 You are very correct in saying that the Japanese committed their battleships piecemeal. Had they committed theirs at Guadalcanal in November of 1942 with the same mindset as they did at Leyte Gulf, that campaign could have ended very differently.

But I would venture it was probably the Royal Navy who ventured their battleships out the most to engage in line actions. Especially in the Mediterranean Sea.

stikpusher

Tracy White:

WallyM3:

I don't mean to exclude the contribution of something along the line of Capital ships, but, quite frankly, what good did they do the US even in the Pacific?

They made lovely Anti-aircraft platforms and were decent at shore bombardment. Oh, and flagships.....

 

Everybody seems to forget about late 1942 in the Pacific. Both sides aircraft carriers were essentially out of action by November due to damage and attrition, and the matter of control was settled at night by surface actions. In October, Japanese surface bombardment nearly wiped out US airpower at Henderson Field. A repeat was attempted in November, the first being repulsed by USN cruisers and destroyers, and the second by US Battleships. Had that battle gone the other way and Japan been victorious, then gone on to silence Henderson field, allowing the successful landing of powerful Japanese reinforcements, potentially changing the outcome of the Guadalcanal campaign. They also helped to fight ashore the US Forces in North Africa during Operation torch at the same time period, against the French Navy. Arguably the biggest defensive nut needing to be cracked on that landing. Then of course two years later there is Leyte Gulf with the shining surface action of the old battleships at Surigao Straight and the missed opportunity of San Bernardino Straight. Night aircraft actions off of US carriers was still in development then and could not have inflicted the damage that capital ships could have.

The Naval Battles of Guadalcanal are probably the most dramatic and closest to being a decisive surface Capital Ship action. At least in the Pacific Theater. A US loss there would certainly have extended the war in the Pacific by delaying US offensive capabilities. At Leyte Gulf, not so much. The Marianas already being in US hands as a base for the upcoming atomic bomb attacks does not change that timeline.

Very good points.

If you take them out of the equation, you come up with different probable outcomes. And in some significant ways, as you point out.

Tracy White

WallyM3:

I don't mean to exclude the contribution of something along the line of Capital ships, but, quite frankly, what good did they do the US even in the Pacific?

They made lovely Anti-aircraft platforms and were decent at shore bombardment. Oh, and flagships.....

Everybody seems to forget about late 1942 in the Pacific. Both sides aircraft carriers were essentially out of action by November due to damage and attrition, and the matter of control was settled at night by surface actions. In October, Japanese surface bombardment nearly wiped out US airpower at Henderson Field. A repeat was attempted in November, the first being repulsed by USN cruisers and destroyers, and the second by US Battleships. Had that battle gone the other way and Japan been victorious, then gone on to silence Henderson field, allowing the successful landing of powerful Japanese reinforcements, potentially changing the outcome of the Guadalcanal campaign. They also helped to fight ashore the US Forces in North Africa during Operation torch at the same time period, against the French Navy. Arguably the biggest defensive nut needing to be cracked on that landing. Then of course two years later there is Leyte Gulf with the shining surface action of the old battleships at Surigao Straight and the missed opportunity of San Bernardino Straight. Night aircraft actions off of US carriers was still in development then and could not have inflicted the damage that capital ships could have.

EBergerud

Had he done so it would have been medals and girls galore for everyone on the Bismarck, especially Lutjens.

Nice post, and I like your colourful narratives!

Manstein's revenge

The Trump destroyer is pretty nice---even has little mines on rollers that you attach to deck track...also seems to have mine-sweeping equipment on board as well...looks like the Germans tried to maximize the utility of these craft...

They tried to make them a jacks of all trades.    Trouble is that then you are a master of none.

The German order of battle consisted of about 3 dozen destroyers build before and during the war.   Most were lost. 

Conversely,  the USN had more than 40 destroyers of the'Goldplater' classes (pre-war roughly equivalent to the German destroyers in capabilities) and ultimately close to 400 post-1930 destroyers in commission by 1945.   The USN could afford to have specialized mine laying destroyers,  mine sweeping destroyers,  and destroyers optimized for anti-air defence  while the German Navy could barely cobble together enough to successfully sortie out of the harbor.  

The Trump destroyer is pretty nice---even has little mines on rollers that you attach to deck track...also seems to have mine-sweeping equipment on board as well...looks like the Germans tried to maximize the utility of these craft...

PS: I love the Tirpitz

WallyM3

I don't mean to exclude the contribution of something along the line of Capital ships, but, quite frankly, what good did they do the US even in the Pacific?

They made lovely Anti-aircraft platforms and were decent at shore bombardment. Oh, and flagships.....

Trivia lovers. Good to see.

It's self-evident that the Germans should have built a fleet based on smaller vessels and enough of them to dominate the Baltic. And built more U-boats. (More trivia: once France fell and the US began rearmament, the Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over. All Doenitz's spreadsheets that showed a German victory presupposed a level of ship building about the same as in 1940. By 1943 US Liberty ships were coming out so fast, that the U-boats were a pin-***. They were never a war winner - unless they caused the collapse of Churchill's government and that wasn't going to happen after Pearl Harbor. Clay Blair's exhaustive history of the U-boat war makes this point with powerful clarity.) But history is very rarely tidy. We know what Hitler wanted to do - rewrite world history in one lifetime - but that doesn't mean he had a precise blueprint. Germany was building up its Navy furiously after Munich (despite a treaty Hitler signed with the UK in 1935). Why? Ships fit into "guns and butter" model nicely. Also very clear that Hitler really wanted to scare the UK into neutrality. It's very clear he hopes of exactly this through the Danzig crisis. After the fall of France, Hitler seemed to have assumed the Brits would "see reason." (We know now they very nearly did. Churchill prevented a separate peace - barely.) Always a great question about Sea Lion. Was Hitler really serious about shipping his army across the Channel in river barges? We'll never know thanks to Fighter Command.  But if Hitler hadn't poured some big marks into the Navy during rearmament there would have been no invasion of Norway and no talk at all about Sea Lion.

Hitler once said he was a "coward at sea." Hitler did a lot of talking like that. The Norwegian operation was not the mark of a naval coward.  Operation Rhine is well documented. (Don't know what it is about battleships but two of the great memoirs of WWII concern them: "Battleship Bismarck" by Burkard Baron Von Mullenheim-Rechberg and Mitsuru Yoshida's remarkable "Requiem for Battleship Yamato". Both books were authored by surviving junior officers.) Raeder was desperate to do anything to help the cause and sent Bismarck and Prinz Eugen for a raid: Prinz Eugen was actually supposed to do the raiding. Then everyone would join Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in Brest. Lutjens wanted to delay things until Tirpitz was ready, but the Wehrmacht was about ready to clobber Crete and it wasn't exactly a secret that things were brewing on the Russian border. So Raeder ordered an immediate sortie. Hitler allowed it, but agreed with Raeder than contact with British warships should be avoided if at all possible. Once the ships left port, micro-managing from Berlin or France wasn't possible even if they'd wanted to. Naval battles are like that: the enemy has a lot to say about the narrative.  In the Denmark Straight Bismarck was very seriously damaged. When Prince of Wales retreated behind smoke, they had two cruisers with them and heaven knows what over the horizon. Lutjens from that moment was desperate to get to France - as he should have been. Had he done so it would have been medals and girls galore for everyone on the Bismarck, especially Lutjens. In the end, the German Navy handed Churchill exactly what he needed - a spectacular public relations coup. Better than the Graf Spee. Rader was an idiot. Of course he had hung around with Scheer and Scheer had hung around with the real Adm Tiripitz and Tirpitz was a four-square loonie. And Doenitz was sitting there with a smirk - he knew where the resources were going to go after the Bismarck debacle. 

In theory Hitler could have prevented the operation. He did express doubts. But one thing Hitler did like was aggressive spirit. He was also very good at underestimating the opposition. One thing Raeder didn't count on was the fact that the RN would strip every convoy in two oceans and send the entire British Navy after Bismarck. So Hitler bit his lip. The German surface fleet was neutered after Operation Rhine because Hitler didn't want to risk the public relations bath of losing his whole Navy in a week. Ironically, the same thing happened to German paratroopers after Crete. Frankly, at this period, nobody in power in Berlin was thinking about anything other than Russia.

Hitler could be very aggressive. He could also play it "by the book." The best example of this was during Barbarossa. We can see now that ordering AG Center's panzers to Kiev was a huge blunder and that Guderian and Bock were right to plead for a move on Moscow. But at the time, the "book" said destroy the Russian field army. Hitler and many others who supported his decision hoped that after a Russian defeat at Kiev, the Red Army would break. Too bad for the little corporal, but there were more men gathering during the squandered month than were lost at Kiev. The real gutsy move would have been an immediate drive on Moscow: AG Center would have had two flanks in the air for over 200 miles. Some generals thought Guderian in particular was cracked. And it would have been a gamble. But that was the point. When the USSR didn't crack early, Hitler did have to gamble. It's ironic that Germany lost WWII because Hitler played it close to the vest. The 1942 offensive was also strangely conservative - although this time around Hitler had few supporters. His generals wanted to have a big, ugly slugging match at Moscow: a gigantic Borodino. They were right: if the German qualitative superiority was still there, the Red Army could have possibly cracked. (It had done so in 1917.)  Hitler decided to "hit em where they aint" and strike the weakest point of the Russian line. The German victory at Kharkov in May only egged him on. But Case Blue only made sense if the Russians were stupid and fought as close to the front as possible. They didn't - instead they traded space for time, and effectively. (The 1941 campaign was nothing like this. Stalin didn't trade space for time, he lost space because the Red Army nearly was annihilated.)  But Hitler claimed his generals didn't understand economics. Ok. How was he going to get the oil from the Black Sea to Germany, especially if the Russians demolished the fields? Did he really think a fall/winter offensive would work in the mountains around Baku? And above all, who was going guard that enormous northern flank. It's clear to historians today what was clear to Manstein in late 1942: the Stalingrad offensive had not only been a bad play, the Wehrmacht had come within whisker of losing the entire southern army. After that period, Hitler did indeed start moving squads around. Stalin thought of trying to assassinate Hitler in 1943 but decided he was the best weapon held by the Red Army.

Eric

The gist of it was well communicated. The gambler/control-freak is only my opinion

My memory and my understanding of German idiom are quite faulty.

If the notion of the thought is not reasonably communicated, I withdraw.

I think the quote was "hero on land, coward at sea", though it was really "gambler on land; too much of a control-freak to let his admirals control the sea"

Eric, wasn't Hitler micro-managing well before Stalingrad? I thought it was his 'don't take risks' orders that prevented Bismarck and Eugen from persuing Prince of Wales.

Perhaps this is a wasted stern shot, but I'd like to pose the question: could Germany's Naval (economic, ship, personnel) been better have devoted to a greater preponderance of light Cruisers (and no larger) and lighter surface vessels?

(This implies, to my thinking, a diversion to production of U-Boats, etc.)

I don't mean to exclude the contribution of something along the line of Capital ships, but, quite frankly, what good did they do the US even in the Pacific?

Little historical trivia to end my part in this thread. The use of German surface ships reflected the odd command relationship between the German armed services (Wehrmacht is technically correct for the lot) created by Hitler in 1938. The Army was the hundred pound guerilla; Luftwaffe was Goering's sandbox before the war and the Navy was odd man out. The revolution in November 1918 that ended any attempt to continue WWI had started in the German Navy and the fleet never lived it down. Consequently, its officers were loyal to the regime to a fault. The more powerful Hitler became, the more Nazi became the service. (Doenitz as Fuhrer in 1945 was not so strange really.) Hitler liked that, but never really knew what to do with the fleet which, ironically, he had encouraged after 1936. It's true that Raeder felt betrayed by war in 1939 because "Plan Z" was just beginning. (Hitler, in my view, was absolutely right to start war in 1939 - by then all potential enemies were beginning rearmament that would have left Germany broke and on a limb in 1945. A lot of historians gloss over it, but it was very obvious to heads of the German Army's economic section - Thomas and others - as well as the financial whiz kids trying to pay for the Nazi's "guns and butter" economic policies that the German economy was a chaotic mess. Hitler was telling them, and not so indirectly, not to worry because Germany wouldn't be paying anyone for any debts. Hitler also had a shark's instinct for blood. His opponents were weak in 1939: if there was ever a time to rewrite history that was it.) When war did come the U-boat arm had been neglected because the Kreigsmarine, like most navies, greatly overestimated the effectiveness of ASDIC. And Hitler was assuring everyone there was going to be a short war. The fun was on.

The German war effort was run by OKW (Armed forces command), the Luftwaffe (in practice independent until the failure over Britain) and OKH (Army command). Hitler commanded the lot. What was missing was a German equivalent of General Marshall or Alanbrooke or even STAVKA. Hitler played that role. Until 1942 he didn't run the war day by day but was always there to intervene when generals got into a quarrel. (His role in the Sedan offensive was typical. Very important to remember that every single strategic decision ratified by Hitler had both opponents and supporters. During the Stalingrad campaign this began to change and Hitler started to run things at a micro-level, often with catastrophic results.) Because Plan Z wasn't there, and because the U-boats didn't start to show their teeth until 1940, the Navy's and OKW's role (except for the brilliant operation in Norway) was pretty limited. Raeder of course should have recalled all German warships home in August 1939 but it seemed that some commerce raiding was the only role possible - it was unthinkable for the German surface fleet to do nothing even if badly outnumbered. Then comes victory in France and Hitler's assurances of a short war sound good. OKW took this moment to make a play for a major role in the war. OKW chief General Jodl with Rader's support (Goering would have gone along too - he alone was afraid of a war in Russia) urged that Germany proceed against England by taking Gibralter and taking the Mediterranean basin along with the Mideastern oil fields. HItler wanted to conquer Russia - after that was done, the Med was easy meat. OKH favored Hitler. So OKW says "Jawohl", supports Barbarossa and dedicates efforts to the U-boat war and helping Rommel. In this atmosphere the German BBs just coming on line, Bismarck and Tirpitz, were weapons without a defined mission. And, if the war was short, there was no real role to play. So Raeder cooked up these idiot raids into the Atlantic (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau caused some serious trouble in one) until the Bismarck debacle. If the German fleet would have gathered and sat in anchor - exactly what it should have done - it would have looked as though the Navy was afraid: unthinkable with memories of 1918 very fresh. See, nobody could really say "well, let's get ready for the long haul." Because, to admit that the war was long was to admit that Hitler had made a monumental blunder and that Germany was facing doom. Mentally tough and physically very dangerous - made you sound defeatist. (No wonder OKW was filled with plotters against Hitler like Canaris, as was OKH - these people knew how bad the pickle was after the defeat at Moscow.)  The upshot was that Hitler made Doenitz his darling and forgot about rest of the Navy outside of its active role in the Baltic. (As it was, serving in the German surface fleet was very dangerous duty: take a look of a list of German warships sunk in the war sometime. And those ships were sinking in cold water.) Not a way to run a railroad. Couldn't haven't to a nicer bunch of guys. But Tirpitz was there building its record as ace bomb dodger.

Eric

Hitler once made the admission (I wish that I could find it for citation right now) that he had great courage on land (tactically and strategically), but was a complete coward at sea. (I am paraphrasing, but my recollection is that it captures the nuance.)

That would explain much.

ddp59

the german navy was not supposed to be ready til about 1944-45. hitler messed that up by going to war early.

I seem to recall something about him ordering his capital ships to stay near home and that might have been because of the loss of Bismark? He often made decisions that handcuffed his top officers strategy wise. I could be totally wrong about the details but I have seen something to that effect on historical documentaries.

I've read that he was a pretty tough boss.

But it seems to me he had to. He died in 1945.

the german navy was not supposed to be ready til about 1944-45. hitler messed that up by going to war early.

Very good likeness of Doentiz really - especially after he finished his tour at Spandau. And I guess if you want a styrene model of an object whose sole purpose was to serve as an expensive target for expensive British bombers than Tirpitz has no real competition.

Raeder must have spent the war on meth. Bismarck, Tirpitz, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and all of heavy cruisers and "Panzerschiffe" would have made for a really scary "fleet in being" if stationed in Norway. Would have driven the RN (not to mention the RAF) absolutely crazy. It was almost like he wanted to prove his point that the German Navy wasn't ready for war to squander or risk those ships piecemeal.

Eric

You've lost some weight, I see.

Yes, the Tirpitz...

BTW, I meant to ask earlier.

Do you have a German ship build recommendation, Manny?

WallyM3

I love seeing long-lost archival footage....

By the way, I love the Tirpitz...

I love seeing long-lost archival footage....

I didn't know the Zuiho blockaded Berlin?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pBtNsQYSKIQ&feature=player_detailpage

When it comes to fits and faults, let's not generalise. Each ship is different, and some problems are harder to fix. 

The root is a conflict of priorities

Builders wants something that is broadly accurate in basic form and fits well first and foremost - there's no point to have extra detail when to fix fitting issues one will have to destroy the detail in the process or have a crack of a grin on the hull.

Companies are designing kits to quick to market and look good in the box. After all the pitfalls will not be known until the model's bought and actually built, and most 'review sites' that companies supply kit to do in-box reviews which are half relevant. 

Make large pieces fit together well is a lot harder to do than mold 4 side walls of a box each with engravings.  I respect Tamiya not necessarily because their research (which can be crap for non-Jap subjects, but then there are very few), but because of quality. Things fit. Edges are sharp. Engineering is smart - there's thought behind the parts breakdown to make the modeler's life easier. 

On the other hand, some companies currently aim at people who like things that look pretty in a box, but hardly build, or are not very particular about quality of their builds. This is a marketing philosophy I disagree with, because I see it as a cop-out.

It's hard if a modeler must resort to carve up the model because the basic shape is wrong.

It's hard to make sharp edges from soft angles (but easy to do the other way around, why I have no idea!)

It's hard to be presented with a bunch of detail that are overscale, which needs to be removed, then proper ones added - I'd rather it be molded plain to begin with.

Oh, and finally, Tamiya Scharnhorst molded the stern in a separate piece, and the reason I suspect is just to fit the hull into the then standard sized box. 

I think I'm a little lost here. Are we to praise one kit over another because it's easier to remove gobs of putty? In the real world modelers should not expect a perfect fit on every part - they sure wouldn't want to pay for a kit designed to those standards. And this does go back to a point I made earlier that better modelers will find the inherent pitfalls of a complex kit much easier to cope with than a beginner or someone who does one ship in a year. But I do think we can ask companies to do a good job on "mission critical" fits. I've spent a good amount of time getting the wing on an Eduard Fw-190. Other than the fact that the wings don't fit, it's a terrific model: lots of detail, wonderful decals, super instructions. But the wings don't fit. I'm at the stage where I can make them fit without (knock on wood) creating serious trouble down the road. But I've made Tamiya and Hasegawa fighters whose wings fit right on, right away. And it's hard to figure. On my last Dragon tanks the fit on some of the very small pieces was precise - exactly what you'd want if something that fits in one hand has 500 parts. But I had my hands full trying to get the top and bottom portions of the hull together. The model maker and the modeler have a kind of pact: if the maker sells a complex kit it's fair to expect the modeler to have decent skills or the willingness to push the envelope to get good results. However, I think the modeler can ask fairly that the wings fit and that the upper and lower hull sections of a tank fit. 

I would define a good ship as one where you didn't have to break out the putty at all for something dealing with a hull or the fit between hull and deck. Maybe I've been lucky in the slums, but the most any of my 700 ships (or my ancient Iron Duke) required was a very little Mr. Surfacer. I know the Scharnhorst bow is a complex shape (I have an old 700 Tamiya that I got to sit next to Belfast, and they chose to do the bow as a separate piece.) But I really wonder if we shouldn't expect good hulls. And model airplanes whose wings fit.

Eric

bbrowniii

 

cerberusjf:

 

 

 But I don’t understand how you can say it was less work than the Trumpeter Hood. 

Probably in the same way that some people find marathons a breeze and others could not imagine even attempting one - it's perception...

 

Both perception and actual work. Scharnhorst's hull at the seam is a lot simpler than Hood. That meant I could be more "gross" with my movements; I could use heavy grit sanding sticks to take the epoxy putty down quickly without worry about removing the scuttle (Porthole) detail because the armor belt stood away from the hull, parallel to it. Since Hood's belt bulged and her hull flared, the step I had between the two pieces was harder to take down because I couldn't use the heavy grit so much or use larger sanding motions. I suppose if I'd had some sort of micro-planing tool I could have shaved it down quicker, but I suppose Trumpeter could have worked harder to make a better fit, too. I just did not have the same amount of fit problems and work with Scharnhorst hull that I did with Hood. Note that the hull was the only thing I spoke to; I thought Trumpeter's deck to hull fitting was excellent. But that's not what made me set it aside for a while.....

cerberusjf

 But I don’t understand how you can say it was less work than the Trumpeter Hood.